#### THE

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## THE DECLINE OF CHURCHES.

HEN, a little more than ten years ago, a law was passed suppressing all monasteries in the Kingdom of Italy, the very shadow of the Papacy fell on a typical case of that modern decline of churches at which all persons are wondering, rejoicing, or grieving, according to their interests, opinions, or feelings. There, in the seat of a historic hierarchy nearly nineteen centuries old, the change was more impressive than in new places, and seemed equally inevitable. And when two only were spared among the monasteries, - the Benedictine Monte Casino for its venerable historic interest, and San Marco at Florence for its associations with Savonarola and for the pictures of Fra Angelico, — these were types of the chief influences that preserve the churches in their slow decay. First of all, the venerableness and sacredness of the past; this is the element which is preser-But, at the same time, the immobility of the vative of form. past as crystallized in form, by reason of which it refuses to adjust itself to the constant movement of the human mind, is a cause of that same decay which its strong hold on affection and reverence retards. Secondly, the personal element, which is illustrated by the sparing of San Marco for Savonarola's sake. A Catholic people spares an institution distasteful and foreign to its

present civilization for the sake of a man who was condemned as a heretic by their fathers. So a man full of life and faith will take hold of a declining form and make it the vehicle of power, because any thing would serve him for a means of expression. The Church every now and then is rescued from stagnation for a time by such a man, and the infused life remains a longer or shorter time after his departure.

But the important point to be held in mind is the destruction of all the monasteries but two, not the saving of those two; not the fact that men part with the churches slowly for old association's sake, and perhaps because they see nothing better coming, but that, whether they see any thing better or not, they appear to be parting with them.

There is a way in vogue of blinding the eyes to the present drift of events, and of maintaining the undiminished, or even enlarging, importance of the pulpit by enumerating the preachers and their sermons, as a farmer counts his sheep. Then the theory is that each one is a genuine mutton (frequently a very serious fact), available for nutritive purposes and capable of a bleat which is as good as any other bleat. Thus Dean Ramsay, mistaking magnitude for importance, enters into an arithmetical calculation. The clergy list of England for 1864, he finds, fills two hundred and sixty pages, with an average of seventy churches and chapels to a page, a total of eighteen thousand two hundred. Assuming the dissenters to have perhaps two thousand less, he adds sixteen thousand two hundred for their ecclesiastical in-Then, from the Edinboro' Almanac and other authorities, he concludes that the established church and other communities in Scotland have a total of three thousand one hundred and twenty churches. These altogether make a total of thirty-seven thousand five hundred and twenty churches in Great Britain. Assuming that two sermons weekly are preached in each church (a low estimate he thinks), the Dean is triumphant over the result that the "Sabbath" air vibrates each week with seventyfive thousand and forty sermons, - nearly four millions a year! Under the circumstances, one is astonished at the extraordinary tenacity of life manifested by piety, which still lives. And remembering the effect of one harangue of Peter the Hermit, or Bernardine of Sienna, or Antony of Padua, what manner of sermon is this, that the life of one little insular kingdom can swallow up four millions per annum without a ruffle upon the surface? The difficulty with all such calculations is that the number of sermons is the most alarming symptom of ecclesiastical dissolution. Robertson, it is said, complained of the burden of so much talking. Until such an expenditure can be justified by adequate results, this prodigious flood of preaching must be held to be a morbid symptom. The great Church, in her days of great power, never developed such a tide of preaching as rolled in with Protestantism. She was obliged to increase her preaching energetically, as a weapon against the preachers of the Reformation. Her scanty supply of the spoken word was one advantage which John Huss had over her. When Schiller said, "Herder's sermon pleased me better than any other I have ever heard, but I must honestly confess that no sermon pleases me," he was the æsthetic and critical mouthpiece of a feeling very widely spread among the lettered and unlettered. "I dislike good sermons just as much as bad," says a writer in "The Spectator" (the present weekly journal); and another says: "I admit for myself that the one great take-off in going to church is the sermon; . . . the parson so enrages my wife, that she says she is always wrestling all sermon-time with a morbid desire to throw a prayer-book at his head." High-Churchmen are sometimes even more unceremoni-"Why this preaching?" says one; "why does this man talk to us?' Who is he that he should talk? Why not be content to worship only, when we go to church? Besides, ministers are simply nuisances." Coleridge, it is said, remarked "that he found, on inquiry, that four-fifths of the people who attended his preaching, attended from a sense of duty to the other fifth." Mill has a note in his work on "Liberty" which is illustrative; wishing to show that persecution is by no means extinct, the philosopher says: -

<sup>&</sup>quot;Ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice; but the heads of the evangelical party have announced as their principle for the government of Hindoos and Mahometans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the Bible is not taught, and, by necessary consequence, that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended Christians. An Under-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his con-

stituents on the twelfth of November, 1857, is reported to have said, 'Toleration of their faith [the faith of a hundred millions of British subjects], the superstition which they called religion, by the British Government, had had the effect of retarding the ascendency of the British name and preventing the salutary growth of Christianity,'"

This is a noteworthy passage as indicative of the decline of pulpit influence. The calm and coldly observing Mill, looking at the popular indications of the present vitality of a persecuting spirit in religion, treats the pulpit as of no consequence, —that is, as worth very little, either as moving the people or as indicating the popular feeling; if it oppose religious liberty, its words are only "the ravings of fanatics and charlatans," but the opinion of an Under-Secretary is of the highest importance. Wendell Phillips says the ministers are puppets. A churchman says the great Episcopalian need is "churchmanship which shall recognize the nineteenth century." Not very long ago a conference was held in London with the workingmen to ascertain why they did not go to church, and it was found they professed to feel little need for ministers, and still less regard for them. "I sometimes wonder," says a writer from the West, "whether the minister whom I hear knows that this is the nineteenth century. . . . If the ministers are incapable of leading, let them report in the rear, or go to the plow or some other honorable employment. . . . Is there to be no end of droning over Adam and his apple?" Speaking of some important critical questions, Froude says: "We desire to know what those of the clergy think whose love of truth is unconnected with their prospects in life. We desire to know what the educated laymen, the lawyers, the historians, the men of science, the statesmen, think; and these are for the most part silent, or confess themselves modestly uncertain. The professional theologians alone are loud and confident. But they speak in the old angry tone, which rarely accompanies deep and wise convictions." It is the same on all sides; in some way or other, by derision or rudeness or the better way of manly reproach, as well as by neglect and abandonment, popular distrust and dislike have singled out the pulpit conspicuously for their mark. Twenty-five years ago, Theodore Parker mentioned the "common clerical complaint of a certain thinness in the churches;" and now we have statistics prepared to show that possibly not more than a third, and certainly not a half, of the population attend church. Decline in support; decline in numbers; decline in respect and influence, — is what is written plainly over the porch of the present church system.

It is not to be supposed, however, that we monopolize this trouble. Probably we may safely claim preëminence in it; but other times have had a share. It is a question whether it is better to remain away from church, or to attend and go to sleep, for which latter plan a Waterbury genius prepared by inventing a "head-rest attachment for pews." We adopt the former method; our ancestors, it is to be feared, cannot altogether clear their skirts of the charge that they were prone to the latter. Dr. Increase Mather berated his congregation for sleepiness, telling them that the "conscience will roar for it upon a death bed," and that Satan undoubtedly causes it, for he would "rather have men wakeful at any time than at sermon time." The anecdote of South is familiar, that he awoke a nobleman in church, begging him from the pulpit not to breathe so loud, lest he should wake up the king. Dean Swift took for a text the accident to the drowsy Eutychus, and remarked: "I have chosen these words with design, if possible, to disturb some part in this audience of half an hour's sleep, for the convenience and exercise whereof this place, at this season of the day, is very much celebrated. The preachers now in the world, however they may exceed St. Paul in the art of setting men to sleep, do extremely fall short of him in the power of working miracles; therefore, hearers are become more cautious, so as to choose more safe and convenient stations and postures for their repose, without hazard of their persons, and upon the whole matter choose rather to trust their destruction to a miracle than their safety." Dean Ramsay describes the blunt method of James Bonar, a Scotch clergyman. He introduced in his sermon the word hyperbolical, then paused, and said: "Now, my friends, some of you may not understand this word, hyperbolical. I'll explain it. Suppose I were to say that this congregation were all asleep in this church at the present time, I would be speaking hyperbolically, because [looking around] I do not believe many more than half of you are sleeping."

There is much suggestion also in the ancient expedients to attract attention. Ministers now advertise their topics each

week; ingenuity is taxed to invent taking titles, and some give their sermons two names with an or between, like the old novels; every current topic is twisted into fit matter for a sermon; discourse is interlarded with bold, flippant, "sensational" remarks to gratify some popular prejudice or excite a smile; congregations vie with each other in brilliant music, and seek halls instead of churches. But all this is tame compared with things told of the old preachers. A bishop of the eighth century used to compose his sermons in ballads to attract the people, and the eccentric Maillard, in the fifteenth century, improved upon this by singing in the pulpit the popular songs of the day. Fra Rocco, a mediæval preacher, commanded all the penitent to hold up their hands, and every man's hand was raised: then Fra Rocco cried aloud: "O holy Archangel Michael! thou who with adamantine sword standest at the judgment seat of God! cut me off every hand that has been held up hypocritically," and each man dropped his hand in haste. Probably the most inveterate modern "sensationalist" would not venture upon these extravagances, or upon such as the following from John Simple, a Presbyterian minister of zealous fame, who was accustomed to copy the monkish style in the pulpit. Preaching on "Justification by Faith? or by Works?," he proceeded thus: "Sirs, this is a very great debate. But who is that looking in at the door with his red cap? Follow your look, sir, it is very ill manners to be looking in. But what's your name? Robert Bellarmine. Bellarmine, whether is a man justified by faith or works? He is justified by works. Stand thou there, man. But what is he, that honestlike man standing in the floor, with a long beard and Geneva cowl? A very honest-like man! Draw near; what's your name, sir? My name is John Calvin, Calvin, honest Calvin, whether is a man justified by faith or works? He is justified by faith. Very well, John, thy leg to my leg, and we shall hough [trip] down Bellarmine even now."

These illustrations, and hundreds of similar ones that are encountered by every student of old pulpit lore, indicate that popular indifference is no new problem to the pulpit; that appeals to other motives than the sober realities of religion are quite ancient and more or less constant; and that the very inadequate manufacture for so much machinery attracted the attention of ecclesiastics

iong ago. Here I recur to the excessive flood of preaching as a morbid symptom. The trouble admits of two very different explanations. The preachers, like Dr. Increase Mather, say the human heart is desperately wicked; but the human heart says the preachers are desperately dull. Now, if the popular theory should happen to be the true one, and the chief cause of the trouble is that sermons as a whole are essentially narcotic, how alarming is it to think of four million of them per annum!

But after due import is allowed to drowsiness at church and pulpit "sensationalism" in old times, it still must be admitted that the pulpit has been in the past a power which now it is not. There has been a great decline in its influence. Its most strenuous advocates, among whom I would rank myself, must perceive that it has failed to grow according to the need of the times, and that many other means of imparting popular instruction or moving popular enthusiasm have far outstripped it. As to visible results, one sermon would reach farther in a past day not very remote, possibly not more distant even than Wesley or Whitefield, than the whole dense mass of four millions now. It is true, our fathers slept at church, but they called it the devil's malice: we stay at home altogether, and call it common sense. What would our Protestant people say now to an Antony of Padua, preaching to thirty thousand people in the open air; or to Whitefield, the central object that all Moorfields sought, sparkling with the lanterns needful to find the way of a winter's morning to the great preacher's five o'clock sermons? We should think it a strange thing, if some preacher on a Sunday should clear out by his words all gambling shops and secret stalls of infected and vicious books, so that Monday should behold the city made a valley of Hinnom with purifying fires. Yet even so did Bernardine and Antony and Savonarola, to such good purpose that the people burned their tools of gambling and magic, and their licentious playthings, in the public squares, and made bonfires of Ovid, Martial, and Boccaccio. An old writer tells of more than a hundred of these penitential fires burning in the streets of Paris in obedience to a sermon of a gray-friar; and the practical nature of the test may be inferred from the writer's addition that the ladies threw into the flames their head-dresses and other ornaments. What a boon to Ireland a preacher would have been who could send all the absentee landlords of that wretched country hurrying back to their oppressed tenantry!—as Balzac relates that a Capuchin, one Jerome Narni, preached with such power against the lazy absentee bishops at Rome that thirty of them started the next morning for their dioceses.

So remarkable a social fact as the ascendency of any great means of popular influence is not to be ascribed to any one cause; but it is impossible not to advert here to the greatness of many of the old preachers, and especially their moral greatness and extraordinary devotion to their mission. Take the old heroes of Methodism, who set out on their circuits with a spade strapped to the saddle to dig their way through snow-drifts. When one considers their labors and hardships, one thinks they deserved their influence: it was no greater than their devotion, and not so profound as their humility. Hear one of them speak of himself: "I am but a brown-bread preacher; I have nothing of politeness in my language or address; but I help all I can to heaven in the best way I can. I have been in danger by snow-drifts and land-floods; by falls from my horse; by persecution, cold, pain, weakness, and weariness; trials of heart and understanding and judgment; and various reasonings with friends and foes, men and devils, and most with myself." From some out-of-the-way backwoods settlement they wrote for a preacher, and added: "Be sure and send us a good swimmer," - a clerical qualification which became intelligible when it was learned that the last minister had been drowned in trying to swim across a stream unprovided with bridge or ford. These "great unknown," as they have been called, were ubiquitous in the wilderness; they often died in wilds so remote that no one knew their fate for many months or years. "My friend," said Richard Nolly to an ungracious emigrant whose track he had followed, and who complained that, after emigrating to get rid of the preachers, he was discovered by one before he had unloaded his wagon, - "my friend, if you go to heaven, you'll find Methodist preachers there; and if you go to hell, I'm afraid you'll find some there; and you see how it is in this world. I'd advise you to come to terms with God, and then you'll be at peace with us." It was not inapt when these men were called Graduates of Brush College and Fellows of Swamp University. They were sturdy men, who stood without being shored up. "How is it you have no Doctors of Divinity?" was asked of Jacob Kruber, an old Revolutionary Methodist hero, who prayed that the Lord would bless all the crowned heads of Europe, "give them short lives and peaceful deaths, take them to heaven, and let us have no more of them;" and he answered, "Our Divinity is not sick, and does not need doctoring." I

It is no part of my purpose at this time to discuss the causes of the decline of churches. These are many and varied, and involve the discussion of very wide-spread social movements, as well as changes in mental and moral tendency. Neither would it be possible here, even if desirable, to trace out in full the process by which the change has come about. But I will, in a few words, outline the latter, especially as it will serve to introduce a distinction to which I wish to call attention more at length.

The process starts first of all from the mighty historical Church, - an all but universal institution, which preserved a central au-· thority while it spread out over all peoples, rooted itself organically in every country and every civilization, inspected all kingdoms and even assumed their government, and was as the firmament spanning the earth. The emphasis is on the institution. Other things are universal, but the Church has been the first and the last institution universal, binding nations together into a body corporate; and it will enjoy this distinction alone, until we have the Congress of Nations which shall legislate war, by a happy interpretation of the popular conscience, into the list of barbarous expedients now outgrown. The ministers of this Church were only so many representatives or embodiments of its power and authority, having no individual or personal value. Their importance inhered in their miraculous functions, issuing from their vital union with the institution. At the Reformation, this institution was broken up. Companies and nations seceded from her, mocked at her power, derided her glories, and set up churches for themselves. This we may roughly call the second stage in the process, — a change from a church to churches, from one all-embracing institution to many local institutions, like the English church and the churches of the American Colonies. Beyond doubt this was a gain in liberty, a step in local self-

<sup>&</sup>quot; Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets."

government. The ecclesiastical power was held to be centred in the people, and in many cases the priestly power, or faculty of ordination, was also reposed there. The change was a rise in the importance of the personal element in the ministrations, of the minister as a man, because the people selected him. As the institution declined, man ascended. Still, the emphasis, on the whole, was upon the institution; it was considered in some sense supernatural, and was, moreover, instituted and protected by connection with the State.

What we may roughly call the third and last stage of the process in this community was introduced in Massachusetts, in 1833, by an amendment to the Bill of Rights. This provided that the support of the church should be no longer a matter of legal obligation, but entirely voluntary. Any member of a society or parish could withdraw at will, and be thereafter not liable for any society or parish expenses. By this step it is manifest that churches ceased to be institutions at all. They became merely . societies of individuals, with no different sort of legal relations from those pertaining to any other incorporated company or club. Each man is made the supreme arbiter for himself as to religious associations. He can attend or not, and pay or not, as he pleases. I Obviously, this was a step in liberty; or if that be doubted, say a decline in legal restraint, and another rise in the importance of the personal element. Immediately appeared a tendency to make the minister every thing, the organization and its duties nothing. Men claim to choose their own ways of doing good, and are continually becoming slower to believe that they ought to go to church if they do not like the minister. The church has disappeared, and left simply the preacher, who competes with other preachers by his powers of thought or rhetoric, and whom men follow or leave according to whim, sentiment, or appreciation, just as they do other lecturers.

The effect of this state of things upon pulpit supply, and the reaction of this again upon the character of the pulpit, are very obvious. Owing to the importance of the minister, his popularity being the society's chief capital and maintenance; owing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For a masterly elucidation of this matter, the reader is referred to an article by Rev. Joseph H. Allen, of Cambridge, upon "Some Results of the Voluntary System, especially in our Country Parishes," in the "Christian Examiner," for March, 1868.

also to a nobler cause, the increase of education and the elevation of intellectual standing in all matters; and, furthermore, because of the greater power and influence, to say nothing of gain, now held out to talent in many other walks of life, - a power and character are demanded for really noble and effective work in the pulpit which are becoming continually harder to supply. The necessity of popularity to a preacher may or may not be an ill. It depends upon the sort of thing that is popular in his community. Unfortunately, the demand upon the pulpit is not always - I fear it must be conceded at present not often - noble and righteous, worthy both of the teacher and the taught. Ability may be in demand without nobility. I have been assured by a shrewd observer of much experience that, in his judgment, no one can do any thing more unpopular than to require men to think, or, by consequence, to think himself. I hear of a parish, not a thousand miles from our Athens, writing to the Denominational Association for a minister "who will not move for fifteen hundred years." A minister who left the pulpit and went to farming, said to me, after a short trial of his new life: "You cannot imagine, my dear friend, the relief it is to be free from the necessity of pleasing." Another assured me lately that there was only one clerical qualification worth mentioning, - to wit, tact; he said: "Piety, morality, learning, eloquence, are of no account; tact is every thing." It has been remarked, and is probably true, that any one man in a congregation, even if comparatively insignificant in parts or possessions, can turn away the minister if he deliberately set about it, and that, too, without resorting to slander. When it is considered to what different dispositions the minister must preach; what ignorance, misapprehension, opinionatedness, bigotry, rashness, crudeness, he is sure to encounter in an average congregation; and amid what social envyings, jealousies, heart-burnings, and vulgarities he must move equably and as a harmonizing presence, — it is not surprising that many ministers find the "necessity of pleasing" a perilous strain upon the conscience. One, a very noble man, who abandoned the pulpit and devoted himself to the law, said to me: "I told my people in my farewell discourse that I had tried to tell the truth in the pulpit, and believed I had been tolerably successful. Indeed, I could not remember having lied at all, but of that I would not be too positive." "But," I answered, "equivocation is commonly said to be a lawyer's weapon; can you be absolutely truthful before a jury?" "Well," said he, "I have not lied much—not at all that I remember—in the pulpit; and if a man can speak the truth and be a minister, he can speak the truth in any other circumstances that I know of."

We have to thank this "necessity of pleasing" for the prevalent "sensationalism" in the pulpit, and indeed upon the secular lecture platform. It is the bid of weak men for a hearing, and is successful with the large class that follows entertainment, or the excitement of hearing their own rashness and half-thought expressed and asserted with bold or insolent flippancy. Many men, who shrink from deliberately compromising the truth, will resort to low devices to win attention, utter crude extravagances or sorry jokes, and bedizen their mother tongue with tawdry attire; so sacrificing that dignity, loftiness, and temperance of speech which seems to me hardly less important than ingenuousness, and is the certain result of patience and care in thought. It is permitted to a teacher to think so far as to discover new ways to defend old beliefs; or possibly he may venture on a gentle heresy or two, if he dexterously put the new wine into old bottles familiarly labeled, so that it may pass current for something else until people get used to it: but if he ponder long and wisely over a difficulty, until he clears it up by detecting an error in the old belief and offers plainly a better way of thinking, being at the same time careful to say nothing wildly or in excess, he may borrow of the flowers their beauty and of the stars their majesty, but he will speak to a handful in an upper chamber. I do not suppose that any great and wise teacher bemoans his small audience. One, whose affluent genius and insight have often failed to attract the hearing they ought to command, writes me, adverting to the fact: "I would always speak without price to as many people as chose to hear, if it were in my power to do so." Neither is the crowd that sits grinning and ogling under common haranguing to be despised. I say only that weak men, who know better, follow the fashion and don the "motley," seeing it to be "the only wear;" and that the "necessity of pleasing," to which our present system chains the minister, inevitably tends to drag the pulpit to a lower level rather than to lift men to a higher, - has, indeed, actually done so.

But here an important distinction is to be made. The decline of churches and the diminished power of the pulpit are to be conceived simply as the eclipse of an institution. Not by any means are they to be held synonymous with decline of social respect or regard for the minister; not even with diminished intellectual consideration, when the office is worthily filled. Probably there never has been a time among English-speaking peoples when the minister has enjoyed a higher social standing than now. This is a point bearing directly upon the phenomena of the decline of churches, and is worthy of historical illustration at some length. For a long period in England, the ordinary parish minister was not only held in little social regard, but was an object of positive contempt. Eachard's "Causes of the Contempt of the Clergy and Religion," published in 1670, mentions the "ignorance and poverty" of the clergy as among the chief He complains that the pay of chaplains in great houses was little better than a cook's or butler's wages; and, referring to the custom of dismissing the clergyman from the dinner table before the last course (which appears also in the novelists and other writers of the eighteenth century), he describes the parson as "sent from a table, picking his teeth, with his hat under his arm, while the knight and my lady eat up the tarts and chickens." Herbert is careful to give his "Country Parson" full rules for rebuking and putting down contempt, or, failing in that, for enduring it with dignity; since he "knows well that both for the general ignominy that is cast upon the profession, and much more for those rules which, out of his choicest judgment, he hath resolved to observe, he must be despised." Therefore he must "endeavor that none shall despise him; especially in his own parish he suffers it not to his utmost power; for that where contempt is, there is no room for instruction." He must be at pains to rebuke contempt "by his holy and unblamable life," "by a courteous carriage and winning behavior," "by a bold and impartial reproof, even of the best in the parish, when occasion requires," and even by the exaction of legal penalties when the contempt is obstinate and goes "so far as to do any thing punishable by law." But if it be impossible to avoid the contempt, or inexpedient to punish it, then the parson must bear it in a "humble way," "or else in a slighting way," "or in a sad way," "or else in a doctrinal way," "or lastly in a triumphant way," - these being "the five shields wherewith the godly receive the darts of the wicked." In another chapter, Herbert addresses himself especially to private chaplains, whom he counsels "not to be oversubmissive and base, but to keep up with the lord and lady of the house, and to preserve a boldness with them and all, even so far as reproof to their very face when occasion calls, but seasonably and discreetly." When Herbert, who was a courtier and of noble birth, resolved to devote himself to the Church, - a thing very unusual at that time, even the bishops of Elizabeth's reign bearing neither famous nor influential names, - "he did," says Walton, "at his return to London, acquaint a court friend with his resolution, who persuaded him to alter it as too mean an employment, and too much below his birth and the excellent abilities and endowments of his mind. To whom he replied: 'It hath been formerly judged that the domestic servants of the King of Heaven should be of the noblest families on earth. And though the iniquity of the late times have made clergymen meanly valued, and the sacred name of priest contemptible, yet I will labor to make it honorable by consecrating all my learning and all my poor abilities to advance the glory of that God that gave them; knowing that I can never do too much for him that hath done so much for me as to make me a Christian. . . . '"

Many historical circumstances combine both to illustrate and to explain the low social estimation in which clerical persons were held. Political considerations account for some of it. English Reformation and the constantly varying and shifting religious policy of the government brought the clergy into unfavorable relations with the State. During the continual veering of the wind around all the disputed points of doctrine and polity which preceded and followed the Revolution, the clergy as a whole displayed a pliability which, though it admitted of much extenuation, was nevertheless to a certain degree ridiculous. In its extreme examples, it tumbled quite over into servility and sycophancy, and was made the object of satire by contemporary wits. Elizabeth, throughout her reign, regarded her clergy with great suspicion so far as their preaching was concerned. She even restrained it, declaring that three or four preachers were enough for a county; and in the general drift of this judgment I must say that I agree with that far-sighted woman. Besides these collateral circumstances, the English Reformation had a very direct effect upon the social rank of the clergy. In the Catholic hierarchy, the regular or monastic clergy were the aristocratic class, while the secular clergy, or parish priests, were regarded as comparatively plebeian. When the Reformation overthrew the colleges and monastic houses of the regulars, and turned them adrift, the reformed clergy took the place of the Roman Seculars, and appeared like the dregs of a profession which had lost its patrician class. The Catholic nobles hated them as heretics; the reformed nobles despised them, and rejoiced to be rid of the powerful social rivalry of the old ecclesiastical aristocracy. They were abased and impoverished. Poverty was afterwards very extreme among the poorer of the beneficed clergy, and still more oppressive in the miserable class of the stipendiary curates, performing for the smallest pittance the duties of absentee incumbents.

The undesirableness of the clergy as suitors in marriage was a well-defined and obstinate feature of their social inferiority. Originally the whole order shared in the proscription. The ban was lifted first, though slowly, from the lower grades, and "long after a country rector was looked upon as a fit mate for the daughter of a gentle yeoman or small squire, his bishop would have been thought guilty of presumption in aspiring to the hand of a baron's, or even a baronet's, daughter." How entirely different a spirit has come over society, and particularly over its gentler half, it is needless to remark. Jæffreson gravely discusses the causes of the change, and of the undeniable inclination on the part of women, even of the highest rank, towards marriage with clerical persons. But in elder days, Margaret Charlton was thought by her kindred and friends to have lowered herself socially by becoming the wife of Richard Baxter; although that intrepid woman was so far from sharing their notions that she herself first besought the privilege, and only by eloquent and zealous pleading, it is related, barely escaped the mortification of a refusal. Her husband made it up to her afterwards by enshrining her virtues with his pen in a "Breviate" of her life. George Herbert married the gentle Jane Danvers, a modest and tender-hearted girl of a wealthy and ancient lineage. At their first meeting, writes Walton, "a mutual affection entered into both their hearts, as a conqueror enters into a surprised city; and love, having got such possession, governed and made them such laws and resolutions as neither party was able to resist; insomuch that she changed her name into Herbert the third day after this first interview." Although, it is true, the parties had been very warmly recommended to each other by their friends, it is impossible not to suspect that the serious Walton unjustifiably romances in this description of the sudden ardor and impatience of their love, Herbert himself, writing afterward in his "Priest to the Temple," says: "If he [the parson] be married, the choice of his wife was made rather by his ear than by his eye; his judgment, not his affection, found out a fit wife for him, whose humble and liberal disposition he preferred before beauty, riches, or honor:" and he proceeds with a curious justification of the value of a humble disposition in a woman, in that a wise and loving husband whom he does not scruple to call "the good instrument of God to bring woman to heaven," reversing the theory of the relation now in vogue - could produce, out of humility, any special grace of faith, patience, meekness, love, obedience, etc. This theory he proceeded to put in practice when, about three months after marriage, he informed his submissive bride of his presentation to be Rector of Bemerton. Thinking of the aristocratic birth and education of his wife in contrast with that contempt of the clergy which he afterwards commented upon in the "Country Parson," he said to her, after kissing her with grave courtesy: "You are now a minister's wife, and must now so far forget your father's house as not to claim a precedence of any of your parishioners; for you are to know that a priest's wife can challenge no precedence or place, but that which she purchases by her obliging humility; and I am sure places so purchased do best become them. And let me tell you that I am so good a herald as to assure you that this is truth." This advice of Herbert literally reflects the social opinion of his day. A clerical wife was placed in theory, though not rigidly in practice, in point of social precedence, below even very humble persons among her husband's parishioners. Moreover, the differences of rank which obtained in the ecclesiastical order did not extend their privileges and honors to the wives as well as to the clergymen themselves, in such manner

as the ladies of noble houses partake of their husband's rank. "The bishop," says Jæffreson, "was a lord of Parliament, but his wife was plain 'Mistress,' and to this day is styled less honorably than the dame of any tradesman who has been knighted. In the eye of social law and etiquette, a primate's wife was no higher personage than the wife of a country attorney." Herbert's maxims in regard to the coolness and prudence to be observed by clergymen in selecting a wife express faithfully the current opinion. It was the common view that a priest should have no regard to his personal inclinations in his choice. The gratification of preference was reserved for less sanctified Benedicts. The marrying rector must use his judgment to discover and wed a woman acceptable and serviceable to his parish, or must even, as in the case of Richard Hooker, acquiesce submissively in a selection made for him by others, - a principle which sometimes had sad results.

To the above considerations historical candor will compel us to add that some, if not much, of this contempt of the clergy was deserved and caused by opprobrious clerical character. When we call to mind the kind of clergyman know as a "buck-parson" in the eighteenth century, and remember the testimony of essayist and novelist to the no great rarity of this "fox-hunting" ecclesiastic, to whom Sunday is as dull "as to any fine lady in town," and who "leaps from his horse at the church door after following a pack of hounds, huddles on his surplice, and gabbles over the service with the most indecent mockery of religion," we must at least agree with the doubt of one writer "whether the contempt in which the clergy were held ought to be considered as the cause or the effect of such habits." No doubt there was a mutual action and reaction, contempt and ill-desert feeding each other. Chaucer's description of the monk among his Canterbury pilgrims proves that the sporting ecclesiastic of the last century descended lineally from the gay and active monkish Don of the fourteenth century, who was "an out-rider that loved venerie;" and

> "Ful many a deinte hors hadde he in stable: And whan he rode, men mighte his bridel here Gingeling in a whistling wind as clere, And eke as loude, as doth the chapell belle.

Greihoundes he hadde as swift as foul of flight: Of pricking and of hunting for the hare Was all his lust, for no cost wolde he spare."

The difference was one of moral estimation. The "buck" of Miss Edgeworth's time figures in her stories to be reproached; or, if endured, was by no means admired. But in citing this passage of Chaucer as authority for a portrait of the affluent, sportloving class among the monks of Wycliffe's England, Jæffreson remarks upon the pains the poet is at "to show that the ecclesiastic was in thorough accord with the prevailing opinion of his time." "Nor may it be supposed," he says, "that the costume, appointments, and venatory taste of his hunting clergymen, were at variance with the social opinion of ordinary gentle folk, at a time when field sports were the universal and most eagerly followed of aristocratic diversions, and when the superior nuns of the country were remarkable for the richness of their jewelry and the fastidious daintiness of their costume, and ordinarily went on journeys with small greyhounds at their heels." Our own times have not entirely escaped the "buck," and he seems to thrive in many different zones of culture and civilization. A recent traveler in Siberia describes the clergyman at Oudskoi as so devoted to gambling that it was necessary more than once during the writer's short stay in the place "to ring the churchbells the second and even the third time to call him from his game in order to conduct the services;" and adds: "They have a saying in this country that 'he is so great a rascal they will not even make a priest of him." I have known some "bucks" more or less full-grown, and have seen modest ministers listen with mortification while laymen expressed the disgust with which they have heard coarse jests and stories from a clergyman of this sort.

But there can be little doubt that clerical turpitude is much rarer now, all things considered, than ever before. To recur to a previous remark, the value and regard which in elder days attached to the institution of the Church has transferred itself to the minister as a man, and made a moral demand upon the profession, to which it has responded well. The moral quality of the religious teacher, whether only a minister or making the more august, not to say presumptuous, professions of a clergyman, is a matter

to be treated delicately, in respect both of its importance and of its fair fame. Every one feels the justice and necessity of the rule of Paul: "I keep under my body and bring it into subjection; lest that, by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast-away." But the moral qualification has always been the most difficult to estimate and procure, as is very natural on many accounts; and hardly ever have the ministers of religion been dealt justly with in this regard. By one class they are too much praised; by another, too much decried; and neither take into account, or even understand, the dangers and difficulties of the position. A celebrated minister, whose pronounced heresies never called into dispute the spontaneous elevation of his piety, used to say that he had found ministers, as a class, no better than any other class. This dictum, often denied, if not denounced, I must candidly admit, falls in very nearly, if not quite, with my own experience. Taking all things together, and after sharing in both clerical and lay callings, I cannot say that I have found a purer moral atmosphere among ministers than exists among business men, especially among intelligent mechanics. Indeed, moral agitations transpire in recesses so personal and private that I suspect no occupation could be much better off than another in this respect. Different kinds of faults there are, but differences in degree are not so obvious. So much should be allowed; but if it be then said that this argues special discredit to ministers, since, owing to their comparative withdrawal from the turmoil of life, their elevation above social ambition, and other advantages tending to refine and elevate character, they ought to be better than their fellows, it is sufficient to answer that such a remark never could be made by any one who had experienced for an hour in his own person the equally severe and peculiar temptations of this walk in life. No one who has known them will be likely to think that greater seductions beset the conscience in any lot, and many deem them peculiarly insidious. A minister, whose fame is as white in morals as it is enviable in literature, said he hoped his son would not incline to his profession, on account of its temptations. Moreover, as a wise and good man said when he heard of a married couple who were unhappy, "Peradventure they were unhappy before," so when clerical misdemeanors are too much emphasized, it is pertinent to ask whether the same evils did not exist before in the secular world out of which the minister must come.

In a comparative view of the moral quality of ministers and of other classes of men, it is important to keep in mind two considerations. If, in the first place, ministers are really no more admirable in point of morals than other men, it is not so much because they are worse than they appear as because other classes are better than they seem to be. And this involves no hypocrisy or pretension on one side or the other. The occupation of the minister is such as necessarily to set him up for inspection from a moral point of view, so that his virtues have the advantage of conspicuous publicity and high appreciation, while his faults appear, from the same cause, in unenviable contrast and prominence. On the other hand, men in any other private walk are not, as it were, officially invested with virtue as their marketable qualification; and their merits, being brought into no strong light, do not obtrude conspicuously, and must be ascertained generally by the gradual process of intimate acquaintance. And however much, in the second place, may be said of the demerits of the clergy at any past time, or even in the present, it should not be forgotten that in spite of its peculiar temptations, - nay, by reason of them, when they are triumphantly overcome, - the order has been illustrated in every age by examples of saintly character seldom equaled in any class and surpassed in none. Not only from poetry, but from history, and from our own experience, looks out upon us with sweet and mild benediction the kindly presence of some country parson, or even, though more rarely, some city minister, deeply attached to his people, and the friend and counsellor of high and low; sincere in doctrine or reproof; "unpractised to fawn;" "more skilled to raise the wretched than to rise;" impartial in hospitality, and rich in charity; assiduous in the tender offices of his pastoral duty, and adorning his venerable place with meek and unaffected solemnity. In terms that handed down the substance, if not the very words, of his sweet sketch to Goldsmith, over a lapse of five hundred years, Chaucer depicts the good country minister of his day. There must have been many such in the interval beginning with that "poure persone of a toun" and ending with sweet Auburn's "village preacher;" and they still exist.

The bearing of the social standing of the minister upon the decline of churches is very obvious; for if the minister is held personally in high respect, treated on the one hand as well as a man of any other calling and of equal excellence, and on the other with that additional honor which civilized communities accord to intellectual eminence, it follows that it is not the function of the teacher of religion and morality which has fallen into disrepute, but the ecclesiastical forms and connections which are entangled with it. Indeed, it appears to be the admitted worthiness of preaching which props up the crumbling house that it inhabits. The present ecclesiastical methods belong to a past age. The more seriously disposed of the present time are puzzled how to get along with them. The lighter-minded heedlessly throw them away, and are left without the balance and stay supplied by instituted sentiments, which are essential to most people and useful even to the best. What to do; how to build a better shelter for that religious teaching; and how to institute wisely that social religious life which thoughtful people believe we cannot eradicate if we would, and would not if we could, - are serious questions of the hour. The tendency and actual effects of the "necessity of pleasing" are obvious enough. No great and delicate office can endure dictation by the interests or tastes of its constituents. We have had painful illustrations elsewhere to what condition it may reduce the judiciary, and it is the difficulty under which the whole elective system of government staggers. The critical objection is plain; but how to do better, the constructive problem, is not easy of solution. If the minister, once elected, held by a tenure independent of the people's pleasure, it is difficult to see how, in that case, he could escape the necessity of being agreeable, in doctrine and otherwise, to some power that would, in effect, be a hierarchy. Some suggestion may be obtained from the progress of society in the division of labor. These are not the days of universal workmanship or universal scholarship, and no minister, or other teacher, should be expected to enlarge on every topic that can interest mankind and on every passing crisis of thought or of events. The result of such an effort is a pernicious deluge of crudeness. Here I recur again to the excessive quantity of preaching as a morbid excrescence which should be courageously cut off. Any measure which will limit the quantity of preaching and the number of preachers we may be very sure will improve the quality. This would not cut off the exercise of religious feeling, the sanctities of worship. The bearing of these upon the idea of an institution constitutes in itself a separate and a delicate topic. But such deep experiences and needs of human nature may be safely trusted to obtain at least so much provision as their proper life requires. Beyond this, we need a great and, so to express it, a reserved pulpit. The eminence that sufficed once is getting diffused. Let the preacher be as learned and able as he may, he will be waked up now and then by surprise at the excellent diction and vigorous mind displayed by some parishioner in a letter to a newspaper, — a quiet man, whose modesty makes no intellectual pretension, but does pass in strict review the pretension of his teacher, and decides upon it unerringly.

Vain babbling and crude "sensationalism" are too amusing and exciting to be put down by exhortation or derision. But they may be displaced. The profound religious instincts of humanity *instituted*, and instituted wisely according to the wants and genius of the time, will be equally potent to attract the wise and the simple, and to check the profane.

J. VILA BLAKE.

## MUSINGS UPON DEITY.

I.

THERE was a time when all seemed plain and clear; Or, if in mystery immersed, the end Ran circling into cause, without a fear Lest the great order of the All should bend, Or crack into division of the plan Built by the Soul Supreme, who gave to man The thought that might unlock as with a key At least the outer courts of mystery. But now, with deeper thought, still deeper shoots The unknown strata-realm, the hidden cause; And more and more entangled spread the roots Of life's eternal tree. Vast Nature's laws Traverse each other - fight for victory. The wolf and lamb both dear to God must be. Scorpion and snake he made, as well as man. Spider and fly are equal in the plan Of his great providence. The hawk and dove Are foes, but both protected by his love. The teeming earth is still their procreant mother. "He feedeth them," - though one feed on the other. One half the world devours the other half; And millions groan while other millions laugh. That death may triumph, life incessant grows. No favorites cold impartial Nature knows. The strong survive; but only circumstance Helps them to live, - and this seems born of chance. The weak may live, if elements but prove Propitious, — earth below and skies above. All is conditioned; but no final plan For all creation can be known to man.

#### II.

Yet in its place each serves some hidden end; Nor can it live, unless that unseen Friend Be near - that vast benign Intelligence We cannot know — which some name Providence, Some Nature, and some God; the Power that lurks In cells and atoms, and in all things works For purposes beyond our sight and ken, From stage to stage of growth, - from apes to men, It may be, - so with science most profound Philosophers of modern days expound. But never may their speculations cloud That clear-eyed common-faith, too large to shroud Itself in matter; for it still must see O'erruling and indwelling Deity, Creator and Sustainer, Heart and Soul, Pervading the illimitable whole.

#### III.

Why clings the soul to God when all seems dark? To Duty — when the last dull, glimmering spark Of virtue in a nation's life and creed Goes out, and manhood lies a trampled weed? To Immortality - when atheists climb To thrones sustained by fashionable crime? To Brotherhood — when slaves themselves confess They are but beasts whom Nature cannot bless? What power is this which lives when all is dead, And lifts through rotting worlds its godlike head, And owns a heaven-born origin, nor aims To show ancestral titles to its claims? Account for it who can. To me it seems A light divine, whose primal solar beams Illumine man, and not a self-born glow By evolution bred through stages slow. Leave me this dream at least, O sciolists, Nor shroud me in your speculative mists!

### IV.

Thou - so far, we grope to grasp thee! Thou - so near, we cannot clasp thee! Thou - so wise, our prayers are heedless! Thou - so loving, they are needless! In each noble thought thou shinest; Earth and dross to gold refinest. In each deed of love thou warmest: Evil into good transformest. Soul of all, and moving centre Of each moment's life we enter; Breath of breathing, light of gladness, Infinite antidote of sadness; All-preserving ether flowing Through the worlds, yet past our knowing, -Never, never past our loving; Never from our life removing; Still creating, still inspiring; Never of thy creatures tiring. Artist of thy solar spaces, And thy humble human faces; Mighty glooms and splendors voicing; In thy plastic work rejoicing; Through benignant law connecting Best with best - and all perfecting. Though all human races claim thee, Thought and language fail to name thee! Mortal lips be dumb before thee! Silence only may adore thee!

CHRISTOPHER P. CRANCH.

## WORK AND WEALTH.

I HAVE chosen the above terms in preference to Labor and Capital, because they convey more exact ideas. The word labor carries with it the impression of compulsory, or servile, toil. Capital is a word which economists themselves cannot satisfactorily define, and to which they apply only an arbitrary meaning. The things signified by work and wealth are subject to no equivocal interpretation, are understood by all, and stand to each other in the relation of a natural sequence.

Speaking from the standpoint of the trader, from which political economists mainly speak, Adam Smith lays down this fundamental proposition: "It was not by gold or silver, but by labor, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased." For him the term labor was appropriate, because, in his time, a large proportion of the world's work was performed by bondmen or by hirelings, even more the mere dependents of the legal possessors of the world's wealth than are the workers of to-day.

Starting from this comprehensive, but exact, proposition that work is the only source from which wealth can be produced or purchased as an axiom, the opposite of which is simply unthinkable, let us direct our attention to an inquiry into the manner in which wealth to appearance is transferred so often in exchange for no equivalent in labor. Even the trader may be interested in the attempt to account for the fact that wealth, at first purchasable only by work, comes to be possessed mainly by those who do no work.

The thing which a man has produced by his work, and which is an object of desire to himself and others, can be transferred in several different ways. The natural or simplistic methods are: (1) Force, involving robbery, theft, and, in an advanced stage, cheating, overreaching, and advantage-taking of every

description; (2) Gift, involving partial and invidious bestowments, as well as noble generosities; (3) Hazard, involving all kinds of gaming, and, in the progress of society, all speculative ventures.

The rational method, and one which is arrived at only by culture and the recognition of social obligations, is MUTUAL EXCHANGE.

With the earlier methods, as they have existed in the past, we need have no quarrel. They were the only ones possible under the condition of social and moral development then obtaining. Robbery is the main element of organic and animated life. The carnivorous animals all support life by drawing it from orders less powerful or aggressive than themselves, and even the herbivorous sustain life by devouring vegetable life. Man destroys the lives of the creatures beneath him that he may eat their flesh and robe himself with their furs and skins. He robs the sheep of its fleece, the silk-worm of its web, that he may clothe himself. That he pursues a similar course with his fellow is not to be wondered at. Only a conception of the brotherhood of man and the real dignity of work can win him from his tendency to devour the substance of the weak and simple who fall into his hands, instead of producing wealth for himself.

The rude man, who has spent hours in the forest gathering fagots, but lies down at night without fire, while another enjoys the genial warmth those same fagots yield while burning, may have transferred their possession in several different ways. He may, with a certain degree of equity, have exchanged them for different products which the other had worked to obtain; he may have engaged in some game of chance, and lost them wholly; or he may have been met by a stronger man, while returning laden, and deprived of his fagots by force. Or, he already may have been reduced to a bond-slave, his life having been spared in war on condition of his submission to a life of slavery; and thus have given his captor the perpetual ability to purchase wealth with his and his children's toil.

From the mental state which results from such motives as sway the successful warrior and slave-holder, to that of the enlightened moralist and economist who discovers that, if another has created wealth which he himself desires, the true thing to do is to create something which the other will equally desire, that so the transfers may be mutually agreeable and beneficial, is a distance which requires ages of toil and struggle to overcome.

It may be urged that in the capture and management of slaves, who would not willingly work if left to themselves, a certain necessary work was performed, and a larger production of wealth obtained. If we were to admit this as regards the past, it would serve as no justification for the continuance of slavery; but it should also be considered that the robber class, until taught by the toil of the industrious that labor will produce or purchase wealth, never seeks to subject the toilers to slavery. Besides, all experience shows that slavery, so far from promoting industry, begets a general repugnance to work on the part of both slave and slave-owner: thus the thing urged in its justification is seen to have been caused mainly by itself.

It was not till after centuries of advancement that civilized nations began to discourage chattel slavery. Its entire abolition in our country is a recent event. But by its abolition we have by no means reached any thing like an equitable system of exchange. We still have class legislation, protecting the vast accumulations of wealth and ownership of land in unlimited quantities, just as incompatible with justice as the older tyranny.

To be able to purchase wealth with others' labor, it is not at all necessary to own their bodies. The strong assumed "property in man" and "property in the soil" at the same time. Now, since the soil is absolutely essential to the application of labor to productive uses, he who has an exclusive claim to it can lay labor under any tribute he pleases, or deny it opportunity to employ itself or be employed at all. Since ownership in man has been abolished, private ownership of land is the chief basis, the great fulcrum, of all devices for purchasing wealth by the work of others.

By the workers themselves this power is little understood, because it affects them indirectly. They come in immediate contact with their employers, and questions of raising or lowering wages, lengthening or shortening hours, attract their attention and divert it from more fundamental questions. They hardly reflect that their employers are also subject to the competitive struggle, and are often broken down by the operation of the same

law which shortens the rations, and renders more and more precarious the employment, on which the laborer depends.

The indifference of the workingmen to this question of the land, and their failure to obtain even enough of it to enable them to rear homes for themselves and families, has a curious, as well as sad, result. Quite twenty-five per cent of the earnings of laborers, clerks, and mechanics who do not own a home of their own, goes to the landlords for rent. In many instances, this is for structures which have been paid for a hundred times over, and are not worth in their material the labor of pulling down and carrying away. It is true that a portion of this rent comes back in payment of repairs, taxes, etc., but still leaving a large percentage for which labor receives no return whatever, and may almost be said to yield voluntarily, thus permitting others, to that extent, to purchase wealth with their unrequited toil.

Had our Government established a system of easy access to the soil through nationalization of the land or a judicious limitation to private ownership, the questions arising between employer and employed would have a ready solution. On the recurrence of a depression in business, general or special, the parties feeling themselves crowded would betake themselves to the cultivation of the soil, or some self-employment; or at least enough would do so to relieve the overstocked labor market, thus increasing the demand for the things which had been overproduced.

Out of our semi-feudal land system grow also many of the giant evils which afflict our commerce and finance. The man who has no land must hire it or pay for its use, before he can apply his labors in cultivation, however willing and capable he may be. This basic necessity of borrowing is the foundation of all other borrowing; paying for the use of land is the basis of all rent and usury and speculative profit of every description. Distressed by unnatural dispossession and deprivation, people are in no condition to resist the temptation to borrow any thing which promises relief, and to pledge themselves to pay therefor impossible rates of interest. The poor man, to free himself from present deprivation, borrows the means to do a little business; the man of considerable means borrows that he may do more business; and for the result, we have most of the real estate and much of the

personal property of both in the hands of the money lender through foreclosures. A large proportion of all transfers of real estate, especially for the last three years, has been through foreclosures, and to avoid foreclosures.

An annual half-billion does not cover the amount which goes into or through the hands of corporations in the form of interest in this country, not to mention the enormous rentals, private speculative profits, etc.

The industrious man, who purchases by his work any desired wealth, gets only one-half, or less, himself,—the other half going to the usurer, landlord, or profit-monger. These are enabled to purchase, or get recognized possession of, this other half through unlimited control of land, and the system of usance and annuities growing up from that basis.

It may be said with too much truth that workingmen get now more than they wisely use; but it is still truer that, in proportion as their share in what they have produced is diminished, they become more and more indifferent to saving, and more and more shiftless and unreliable.

It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to point out what is right and equitable between employer and employed under our system of wages. When any considerable portion of mankind desires equity and mutualism in industry and division, there will be no difficulty in arriving at exact conclusions. My object will be more than realized, if I can draw attention to these things as they actually exist, and to the positive relation which work and wealth sustain to each other, the truth in regard to which can only be ascertained by careful analysis.

Into all production of wealth only two factors enter: (1) the raw material — the soil or its spontaneous productions; (2) human effort. However complex or extended, in the last analysis only these two elements are found. It is not the carbon and nitrogen, the salts and gases, of which our food and clothing are composed, which we produce as wealth, but that specific form and aptitude for use which our work has wrought or effected.

According to that ingenious political economist, Bastiat, even when we purchase things with money or by barter, we do not exchange things, but forms of service. The inference, however, which he draws from this truthful proposition — that, therefore,

any one in possession of wealth to whatever amount must necessarily have rendered an equivalent service for that wealth (either by himself, or through an ancestor or donor) - is so monstrous as to be accepted only by specialists in "exact science." On the contrary, we find mutuality of service nowhere recognized as at all requisite in the business transactions of the world. We might as well look for it under the chattel system, where men and women are bought and sold, and where labor does not have to be purchased with equivalent service, but can be enforced by the lash. Adam Smith says: "It is impossible for one to become excessively rich without making many others correspondingly poor." This is a result which could not possibly arise from any mutual exchange of services, or from any honest transfers of equivalents, any more than we can have an equation with one side plus and the other minus. Hence it follows that, where inordinate wealth exists, it has been purchased by the labor of others than the possessors, and through transfers by force, fraud, or hazard.

To produce or have wealth at all, human effort must be put forth. Even the spontaneous productions of Nature cannot constitute wealth, until taken out of their natural state. The savage who has fagots and game in store for a week has wealth, as compared with him who has to gather a daily supply. Application and frugality seem the only requisites for its acquirement. By a wise division of labor and special adaptation of functions, the wealth of the world has been vastly increased; but we must not let the complexity of work and diversity of employments confuse our ideas in regard to the main question, — namely, the source of wealth, and the equity or iniquity of the present method of distribution.

As society advanced from the simply savage state, the search, capture, and transportation of natural wealth was followed by various handicrafts which added value thereto. It was work, nothing less and nothing more, of hand and brain which formed social wealth from the resources of Nature. In all these elaborate transformations, we can discover no other earthly agency, nor indeed make any material distinction in the essential character of these varied services. One and all are necessary to each other. By no logic can we decide that one service is more important than another, except in the utility of its product.

If one has discovered, another secured, and a third transported the prize to the place where it is needed for consumption, we can decide no otherwise than that the pay of each should be proportioned to the time employed in labor and the useful result accomplished. Even the labor necessary to divide and distribute it comes in justly for a share.

So far all must be plain in regard to the facts involved in our question. It seems to me the principles must also be clear. But it will be answered that still the distinctions in life and the inequalities of distribution of which we complain have been transmitted to us from previously existing conditions, and result from the operations of forces that can be traced back through every form of civilization. This is, however, very far from proving that they exist in accordance with elementary principles or any rational interpretation of law. Really it comes to this, — whether we will continue the essential injustice, while dropping the barbaric methods of the savage, or attempt a truly scientific solution of the problem of work and wealth.

In the discovery, procurance, and manipulation of natural productions, I have indicated all the steps in the production of wealth. Services in the preservation or conservation of wealth are equally entitled to consideration, but cannot be yielded a superior claim. With our inequitable division, and the disorganized methods of distribution which it begets, the number of traders becomes sadly disproportioned to the number of actual producers; and since those despoiled are chiefly those who perform the most useful labor, the smart and shrewd seek the more indirect methods of obtaining wealth. And just here the principle of competition, which political economists seem to think ought to reconcile the wealth producers to starvation, does not work with facility, for no one can do a business at a loss, and hence society has to support numbers to do the work which one might do.

I may, in this connection, refer to the instrumentality of money or currency, serviceable in moving crops and the work of distribution generally. Its importance, however, is mainly due to the want of mutualism in our distributive system and of equity in our methods of exchange.

A charge for the time-use of this instrument, in defiance of the sentiments of all moralists from Moses and Cato to Ruskin and Palmer, has been enforced by our laws, because labor was at the mercy of the few who hold the soil, and because operations could be made to pay dividends out of the wealth purchased by the labor of the poor and simple. Chattel slavery enabled the planter to pay interest. Land monopoly enables the capitalist to assume that there is a usufruct to wealth. In return, usury has been the great lever by which millions of homes have been alienated, and gone to swell the domain of avarice and love of lordly domination.

As war was the parent of slavery, by which whole families, tribes, and nations were reduced to bondage, - made "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to the victors, - so it has been employed to enslave labor by the creation of immense national debts, the mere interest of which is an onerous tax upon the worker. Hazard has also played as large, if not so conspicuous, a part as war in reducing labor to the condition of dependence and distress. The liberty of self, wife, and children, in barbaric times, was often staked. And when this was not done, borrowing to prolong play was practised, as to-day in Turkey and in some Christian and even republican countries, upon conditions and at rates which can have no termination but in life-long bondage or peonage. To relieve present distress, or deluded by the hope of acquiring the ability to live by others' labor, many people to-day, who would despise the mere gambler, fall into a similar fatuity, and wake from it only to find themselves slaves to the power they expected to use to lay others' labor under contribution.

I am not urging sympathy for these dupes. I am only pointing out some of the causes, still in operation, which have resulted in making the few the actual masters of labor, and given them the ability to purchase wealth without work of their own. In our country and time we do not enforce gambling debts as they do in Turkey; but we do enforce contracts to pay interest, often just as oppressive, and only outwardly less barbarous and inhuman.

In thus tracing the working of these crude methods, we find that the productive labor of our time has its inheritance, through the wage system, serfdom, and slavery, from primitive subjection to force; or through speculative trade, from the hazard which ruined the victim without permanently benefiting the winner. It is not important to our purpose to inquire whether the plunderers or plundered are more to blame, or the greater sufferers. This is plain; with the land in the hands of the hereditary or speculative lord, the laborer has no resource for self-employment, however fit or unfit he may be.

The workingman can obtain independence now only by the possession of exceptional powers, or by special good fortune, and then only through schemes and operations which raise one at the expense of many.

The inheritance of the property class consists of a transmission of power attained by forceful conquest, or by the varied forms of hazard, fraud, and corruption. With their wealth they inherit generally the tendency to take advantage of the necessities of others, and to apply new methods of overreaching when the spirit of progress will no longer tolerate the old ones.

I do not make this application to individuals, but only to those given to the shrewd use of wealth; well I know that many parvenus far outdo, in management, those who inherit wealth.

In this country we have changed some things to suit republican prejudices. For instance, our land is no longer entailed in a family. Yet it is all falling into the hands of a class; and although the great fortunes sometimes change to other hands, they are controlled by those with still greater, and their attitude and relation to industry remain the same. Of the large fortunes now enjoyed in New York and New England, many had their foundations laid by successful privateers and slave traders; and by other methods no less discordant with principles of natural justice.

The immense fortunes made by two well-known citizens in the generation now past are quite exceptional, and yet they well illustrate the present divorced relation between work and wealth. In a certain sense, both were industrious workers. Each has said of himself that, when he worked in the ordinary way, his income was trifling. It was only after long struggle, in which many worthy men went to the wall, that their fortunes began to accumulate with great rapidity. Both were greatly indebted to our civil war, which reduced whole populations to poverty, left the nation three billions in debt, and sacrificed a million lives. It is also worthy of note that a great banker at our national capital was made rich by privileges granted him to

trade during the Mexican war. When it is said in justification of these men that they did not go outside the acknowledged rules of business, it is admitting that our systems of trade, finance, etc., are essentially the same as in the barbarous ages whose forms we have discarded.

Another great estate, also recently left in the city of New York, was mainly inherited, being now in the possession of the third generation. In mentioning these instances I disclaim any purpose of judging the men. They were what inheritance and environment made them. My only purpose is to show the irrational and fatal policy which places in the hands of any men, however good or great, the power to purchase, ad libitum, wealth with other people's work. I am quite well aware that for many years to come this remonstrance will remain measurably unheeded. The workers are so depressed with hardship, or so readily elated with the prospect of success in some exceptional field, that they are quite unwilling to look away from prospects of temporary relief to the consideration of broad questions of reform, even if they were less idiotically joined to party, labeled republican or democratic, by leaders who form a mutual ring, whichever party attains power, and conspire to make the plunder of public funds and public trusts a fine art.

But from the operation upon the public mind of works like those of Spencer, Mill, Lewes, and Ruskin, much is to be hoped. Our own country, also, has the names of men, not unknown to fame, who are deeply impressed with the importance of this vital social and ethical problem. Its development promises to take form like this:—

First, As a civil right, —freedom of access to the soil and opportunity of self-employment;

Second, As a principle of law,—the partnership of all concerned in the production of wealth requiring division of labor;

Third, As a matter of commercial ethics, — equivalents of service in all exchanges.

In connection with these developments in the intellectual and ethical field, it occurs to me that there is a probability, at least, of a movement which shall greatly hasten the downfall of our barbarous system of division, and the approach of the era when work shall be the only recognized title to wealth. Within the

present century, men like Robert Owen, Peter Cooper, Gerrit Smith, and many others who could be mentioned, have shown, with more or less success, that it is "noble to live for others," and that personal interests may be subordinated to social aims. It seems to me no dream of romance to indulge the faith that, at a time near at hand, a class of true men and women will arise and form an order, which will abstain from preying on the results of others' toil. These social knights-errant will scorn to rely on the efforts of others for their support, or to apply to their own use, in any way, that for which another has wrought. They will no more consider the necessity or weakness of their toiling fellow a reason why they should overreach and plunder him, than would the model knight of the days of chivalry have considered that the weakness and defenceless state of a persecuted woman was a reason why he should outrage rather than protect her. These will organize industries on an equitable basis, promote emigration to districts where the exactions of landlords are less intolerable, and turn the current of many now questionable, though well-intended, charities into channels of self-employment and self-help. It is not too much to hope that they will be able ultimately to change the application of the vast amount of labor and wealth now expended in "plans of salvation" to save the souls of men in a future world, into broadly beneficent measures of industrial organization and social renovation, and thus render possible the coming of the "kingdom of heaven upon the earth," under the equitable rule of which it "shall be given to every one according to his work."

J. K. INGALLS.

# THE ETHICS OF JESUS.

TESUS is the central figure in the Christian system.

To him, as a part of the Deity, is prayer addressed from every Trinitarian church in Christendom; to him as a perfect model of excellence do his followers enthusiastically point; to him alone do they profess to render obedience as their one Master (see Matt. 23:8); the primary duty of the believer is to imitate him as the "Great Exemplar;" and his words are supposed to furnish a perfect code of morals, beside which the ethics of other teachers are comparatively valueless.

I write to-day for the great mass of people who, owing to this exclusive laudation of Jesus by the Christians, scarcely know that there ever have been in the world any great teachers of morals except Jesus.

I write for the thousands who cannot, or at least do not, lift their eyes above and beyond the narrow horizon of their own theological environment; who fancy that the race has been chiefly guided ever since Adam by the precepts of a Hebrew book; and who believe that the words of the Sermon on the Mount are treasures absolutely unparalleled in the history of mankind. It is before these, who are not likely to investigate the subject for themselves, that I desire to present some of the corresponding precepts of the ante-Christian sages, and thus to estimate the relative position of Jesus as a moral teacher. I cannot expect, however, that this comparison of Jesus with other ethical masters will prove acceptable to the believer in the Deity of the Hebrew martyr. It is distasteful to the average Christian to find that the world is not solely indebted to Jesus for its light upon great moral questions. The more nearly a sage like Buddha approaches in character and doctrine to Jesus of Nazareth, the more jealously do Christians exclaim of their Master, "Never man spake like this man." They will tolerate no rival, for they feel that to place Jesus in the category of human seers is practically to dethrone him.

Our business, however, is, if possible, to set aside all prejudice; to look dispassionately at the comparative teachings of Jesus and other masters; and to estimate relatively by contrast, and absolutely by an examination of those precepts peculiarly his own, the rank of the sage of Nazareth as an expounder of ethics. I say as an expounder of ethics, for it is in this capacity only that I desire to study Jesus at this time. Of his religious instruction,—of what he taught concerning man's relations to God,—I have nothing in this article to say. The common claim that Jesus, as a moral teacher, is the light of the world, is the only one which I now propose to consider.

In reference to the sources of our information upon the teachings of these various sages only a word is here needful.

To enter upon the vexed discussion of the historical accuracy of the four Gospels, the Dhammapada or Path of Virtue of Buddha, the writings of Confucius and Mencius as given us by Dr. Legge, the words of Socrates as recorded by Plato, and the precepts of the Jewish Talmud, is manifestly impossible in an essay of this length.

It is best, then, in the present discussion, to agree to waive all historical doubts, and to accept as genuine the teachings of Jesus, Confucius, Buddha, and the rest, as we find them crystallized in the various forms in which they have come down to us.

The great maxim of conduct, which throughout Christendom is almost distinctively associated with Jesus, and for the utterance of which he has received the encomiums of nearly nineteen centuries, is called the "Golden Rule." If we look, however, at the words of Confucius (B. C. 551) and Hillel, the renowned Jewish Rabbi (died A. D. 10), we see that not only was this idea not promulgated for the first time by Jesus, but that even the phraseology of its various teachers is strikingly similar.

# GOLDEN RULE.

TESUS.

All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so

CONFUCIUS (negatively).

Tsze Kung asked saying: "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of

to them: for this is the law and the prophets. — Matt. 7:12.

Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. — Matt. 22:39. practice for all one's life?"

Confucius said: Is not Reciprocity such a word?

What ye do not wish done to yourselves, do not do to others. — Anal., Book 15, 23.

What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not display in the treatment of his inferiors; what he dislikes in inferiors, let him not display in the service of his superiors; what he hates to receive on the right, let him not bestow on the left. This is the principle with which, as with a measuring square, to regulate one's conduct. — Great Learning, Sect. 10.

## (Positively.)

In the way of the superior man there are four things, to not one of which have I as yet attained: To serve my father, as I would require my son to serve me; to serve my prince, as I would require my minister to serve me; to serve my elder brother, as I would require my younger brother to serve me; to set the example in behaving to a friend, as I would require him to behave to me! — Doctrine of the Mean, XIII.

## HILLEL.

The whole law is contained in this one rule: Whatever you would not wish your neighbor to do to you, do it not to him!

# JEWISH LAW.

Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. — Lev. 19:18.

#### TALMUD.

Let the honor of thy neighbor be to thee like thine own.

It is worthy of notice that Jesus himself does not claim that this rule is original with him, but gives it as a résumé of, or at least a deduction from, his nation's "law and prophets;" which, moreover (see above), was the identical remark of his own countryman, the Rabbi Hillel, who died when Jesus was ten

years old, and of whose wisdom, meekness, and piety the records of the Talmud are full.

Another celebrated passage from the Sermon on the Mount, the great compendium of the moral teachings of Jesus, is that commencing at the seventh chapter.

#### TESUS.

Judge not, that ye be not judged.

For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.

And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine

own eye.

Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to cast the mote out of thy brother's eye.—Matt. 7: I-5.

# MENCIUS (B. C. 371).

The disease of men is this, that they neglect their own fields and go to weed the fields of others. What they require from others is great, while what they lay upon themselves is light.—Works of Mencius, Book 7.

Never has a man who has bent himself been able to make others straight. — Works, Book 3.

#### BUDDHA.

Not the failures of others, not their sins of commission or omission, but his own misdeeds and negligences should the sage take notice of. — Dhammapada, ch. 4, sect. 50. See also ch. 18, 252, and 253.

Let no one forget his own duty for the sake of another's. — Dhammapada, ch. 166.

## Confucius.

To assail one's own wickedness and not assail that of others, is not this the way to correct cherished evil? — Anal., Book 12, 21.

#### HILLEL.

Do not judge thy neighbor, till thou hast stood in his place.

We thus observe that this idea also is not at all original with Jesus, but was expressed centuries before him by other great moral teachers.

Moreover, their statement of the precept is preferable to that of Jesus for this reason: Jesus urges as a motive for not judging others that such persons will themselves be judged; that they are to have the same measure which they mete out; in other words, that they will receive "tit for tat." But no such motive is expressed by the others. On the contrary, Confucius enforces his precept by presenting it as a means of correcting cherished

evil! It cannot be questioned for a moment which of the two is the nobler spring of action.

The necessity of *inward purification* has been repeatedly urged as a precept peculiar to Christianity. Let us look at this point.

#### JESUS.

Now do ye Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter; but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness.—Luke 11:39.

Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outwardly, but are within full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness.

Even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity. — Matt. 23: 27, 28.

Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?

Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. — Matt. 7:16 and 17.

#### BUDDHA.

What is the use of platted hair, O fool! What is the use of a raiment of goat skins? Within thee there is ravening, but the outside makest thou clean!

—Dhammapada, Book 26, 394.

#### CONFUCIUS.

I hate a semblance which is not the reality. I hate the darnel, lest it be confounded with the corn. I hate glibtonguedness, lest it be confounded with rightcousness. — Works, Book 7, 37.

From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider that self-cultivation is the root of every thing. It cannot be when the root is neglected that what should spring from it will be well-ordered! — Great Learning, sect. 6 and 7.

## MENCIUS.

What distinguishes the superior man is what he preserves in his heart!—Works, Book 4, 28.

He whose goodness is a part of himself is the real man! — Works, Book 7, 2.

See also at length the Hebrew prophets. Isaiah 1:11-16. — Hosea 6:6. — Amos 5:21 and following. — Micah 6:6-8.

It should be added in this connection that Dr. Legge, of the London Missionary Society, speaks thus of the doctrine of Mencius:—

"The great object of Mencius in his writings is to rectify men's hearts. According to him, if the heart be rectified, we recognize at once the goodness of the nature. All good actions have their root in the rectifying of the heart and in making the thoughts sincere."—"Life of Mencius."

If we consider the paramount importance which Jesus attached

to the possession of *Righteousness*, we shall see it duplicated in the teachings of Socrates and the great Chinese moralists.

## JESUS.

Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.—Matt. 6:33.

For what is a man profited if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? — Matt. 16:26.

#### CONFUCIUS.

The superior man in every thing considers righteousness to be essential. He brings it forth with humility; he completes it with sincerity.—Anal., 15, 17.

The man of virtue will even sacrifice his life to preserve his virtue complete.

— Anal., 15, 8.

The superior man holds righteousness to be of the highest importance.

—Anal., 17.

#### MENCIUS.

If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go, and choose Righteousness! — Works, 6, 10.

## SOCRATES (B. C. 469).

The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death, but in avoiding unrighteousness!—Plato, Apology.

I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul! — Plato, Apology.

But then, O my friends, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect to the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity!

There is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom!—Plato, Phædo

Here, too, I think an unprejudiced critic will allow that the moral tone of the Grecian and Eastern teachers is in advance of that of Jesus. The Hebrew master adds to his precept, to "seek righteousness," the tempting motive, "and all these things shall be added unto you!" The reward in this case is very practical,

since the context shows that "all these things" refer to the provision for food, drink, and raiment. Moreover, in the other precept quoted from Jesus, we find the words profit, gain, and exchange; which raise us to no higher motives of action than those of rewards and punishments. As contrasted with this, the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, to cling to virtue rather than life for virtue's sake alone, are certainly to be ranked higher than those of Jesus.

The statement is constantly made by Christians that, whereas other moral teachers directed their followers to love their *friends*, Jesus was the only one who taught love to *enemies* as a duty. Let us examine this also.

## JESUS.

Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you. — Matt. 5: 43 and 44.

Then came Peter and said, Lord, how oft shall my brother sin against me and I forgive him? till seven times?

Jesus saith unto him, I say not unto thee, until seven times, but until seventy times seven. — Matt. 18:21.

## BUDDHA.

Let a man overcome anger by love!

Let him overcome evil by good!—

Dhammapada, 17, 223.

Hatred ceases by love! - Dhamma-pada, 1, 5.

Let us live happily, then, not hating those who hate us! Let us dwell free from hatred among men who hate!—Dhammapada, 15, 197.

## Confucius.

Benevolence is to love all men. — Anal., 12, 22.

## RABBI ABOTH NASTRAN.

He is a hero who makest his enemy his friend.

## SANHEDRIN.

Suffer thyself to be cursed, but do not thou curse others.

## SYNOPSIS, SOHAR.

A man ought every night to forgive the fault of him that offendeth him.

INSTITUTES OF MENU (B. C. 1200).

Returning good for evil is enumerated among the ten primary duties.— Chap. 6, 92.

By forgiveness of injuries the wise are purified. — *Ibid*, 107.

If ye do good to them which do good

But love ye your enemies, &c. — Luke 7:34.

to you, what thank have ye?

Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do! — Luke 23:34.

#### ZEND AVESTA.

"Oh, blessed Ormuzd (God), pardon my offences against thee, even as I pardon those done against myself. — Vendidad Sadè.

#### HINDU PRECEPT.

He who is kind to those that are kind to him does nothing great. To be good to the offender is what the wise call good. — Punchatantra, 4, 9.

## SOCRATES.

We ought not to retaliate, or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him!

— Plato, Crito.

I bear no resentment towards my accusers or my condemners! — Plato, Apology.

Thus the overcoming of anger by love was, as we see, taught by Gautama Buddha six centuries before Christ, and the doctrine of forgiveness is found on the lips of many sages. It is frequently urged by Christians that the words, "Ye have heard that it hath been said," as contrasted with the "But I say unto you" of Jesus, denote that their master inculcated something entirely new to the world and opposed to all that ever had been taught before. This assertion, as we have seen, is plainly erroneous.

In these antithetical statements Jesus certainly makes an advance upon a few of the more meagre and revengeful articles of the old Jewish law and the traditional explanation of them by some of the scribes and expounders of that law. But the ideas are not peculiar to Jesus; and the most striking one of them all, "love to enemies," had been promulgated centuries before his time.

Let us look at other precepts of Jesus.

# HUMILITY.

## JESUS.

Verily I say unto you, except ye be converted and become as little chil-

## MENCIUS.

The great man is he who does not lose his child's heart. — Works, Book 4, 12. dren, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven. — Matt. 18:3, 4.

Whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.—Matt. 23: 12.

## RABBI JEHUDA BEN LEVI.

If a man be of a humble spirit, the Scriptures consider him as having offered all sacrifices. — Sanhedrin (Mishna), 43.

#### TALMUD.

He who raises himself up will be humiliated; he who humiliates himself will be lifted up.—See London Quarterly Review, Vol. 122.

#### SINCERITY BEFORE GOD.

# TESUS.

God is Spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth. — John 4: 24.

## INSTITUTES OF MENU.

O friend to virtue, that supreme spirit, which thou believest one with thyself, resides in thy bosom perpetually, and is an all-knowing inspector of thy virtue or thy crime.

The wicked have said in their hearts, "None sees us." Yes: the gods see them, and the spirit within their own breasts. — VIII, 91 and 85.

# SUBJECTION OF THE FLESH.

## TESUS.

If thy foot offend thee, cut it off; it is better for thee to enter halt into life than, having two feet, to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched.—Mark 9:45.

#### RABBINICAL TEACHING.

It is better for me that I should be burned in this world with a little fire, than that I should be burned in the world to come with a devouring flame. — Targum, Genes., 38, 26.

# DEGREES OF GUILT.

# TESUS.

That servant which knew his lord's will and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.—Luke 12:47.

## RABBI SIMEON.

He who hath learned the words of the law and doeth them not is more guilty than he who has learned nothing. — Debarim Rabba, sect. 7.

#### CARE FOR THE FUTURE.

JESUS.

Take no thought for your life, what

RABBINICAL PRECEPT.

He who created the day, created the

ye shall eat or what ye shall drink ...

Take therefore no thought for the morrow, for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. — Matt. 6:25 and 34.

food thereof. Whosoever hath whereof to eat to-day and saith "But shall I eat to-morrow?" he is of little faith.—Schabbath (tract of the Mishna), 131.

## INFLUENCE OF THE GOOD.

## TESUS.

Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid.

-- Matt. 5:14.

Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your father which is in heaven. — Matt. 5:16.

#### BUDDHA.

Good people shine from afar like the snowy mountains. — Dhammapada, 22, 304.

He whose evil deeds are covered by good deeds, brightens up this world, like the moon when freed from clouds.

— Dhammapada, 13, 173.

### MENCIUS.

Great men rectify themselves, and others become rectified. — Works, 7, 19.

#### HINDU PRECEPT.

The sweet scent of flowers is lost on the breeze, but the fragrance of virtue endures for ever. — Ramayana.

## EVIL SPEAKING.

#### JESUS.

But I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment. — Matt. 12:36.

## BUDDHA.

Beware of the anger of the tongue, and control thy tongue. Leave the sins of the tongue, and practise virtue with thy tongue. — Dhammapada, 17, 232.

# MENCIUS.

What future misery have they, and ought they, to endure, who talk of what is not good in others!—Works, 4, 9, Part II.

## UNOSTENTATIOUS CHARITY.

## JESUS.

Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them.

... That thine alms may be in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret, himself shall reward thee openly. — Matt. 6:1 and 4.

## RABBINICAL TEACHING.

Whosoever lendeth to any one in public, with him God dealeth according to justice; but he who does it secretly, with him rests the blessing.—Sohar, 4.

He who gives charity in secret is greater than Moses himself. — Quoted

from Talmud in London Quarterly Review, vol. 122.

## INSTITUTES OF MENU.

By proclaiming a gift, its fruit perishes. — IV, 237.

## HINDU PRECEPT.

The gift bestowed with right purpose on one who cannot repay it, is called a real gift! — Hitopadesa, 1, 14.

Lend, hoping for nothing again. — Luke 6:35.

### MERCY.

## JESUS.

Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. — Matt. 5:7.

But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. — Matt. 6:15.

## RABBINICAL TEACHING.

Whosoever hath mercy on men, on him will God have mercy; but he that showeth no mercy to men, neither to him will God show mercy.—Schabbath, 883.

## BUDDHA.

My law is a law of mercy for all!

— Burnouf, p. 198.

# UNIVERSAL LOVE.

## JESUS.

For the son of man is come to save that which was lost. — Matt. 18:11.

## BUDDHA.

Whoever loves, will feel the longing to save, not himself, but all others. Let him say to himself: When others are learning the truth, I will rejoice at it, as if it were myself. When others are without it, I will mourn the loss as my own. We shall do much if we deliver many; but more, if we cause these to deliver others, and so on without end. So shall the healing word embrace the world, and all who are sunk in the ocean of misery be saved.—Wultke, 2, 563.

My law is a law of mercy for all! Proclaim it freely to all men, rich and poor alike! It is large as the spaces of heaven that exclude none!—Koeppen, p. 130.

#### CONFUCIUS.

A man should overflow in love to all.

— Anal., 1, 6.

The good man loves all men. All within the four seas are his brothers.

— Quoted in Johnson's "China."

#### INSTITUTES OF MENU.

Let not injustice be done in deed or in thought, nor a word be uttered that shall cause a fellow-creature pain!—II, 161.

## HINDU PRECEPT.

To the noble, the whole world is a family! — Hitopadesa, 1,64.

Let the wise man give up his goods for the sake of his neighbor; for the sake of the good, let him even give his life!— Ibid, 1, 38.

The good have mercy upon all! — Ibid, 1, 10.

Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother and my sister and mother. — Mark 3:35.

Parable of the Good Samaritan. — Luke 10:30.

# IMITATION OF GOD IN KINDNESS TO THE JUST AND UNJUST.

#### JESUS.

Love your enemies, etc. (see above under topic "Love to enemies"), that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.

. . . Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. — Matt. 5.

#### SENECA.

It diverts not the Almighty from being gracious, even though we daily abuse his bounties.

What then ought we to do, but that very thing which is done by God himself,—namely, give to the ignorant and persevere to the wicked!

#### RABBI AFHU.

The day on which rain is sent is greater than the resurrection of the dead, for this pertains to the just alone, but rain to the just and unjust.

— Jaarith, 71, Mishna.

## LENDING.

## TESUS.

Give to every man that asketh of thee; and of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again.—Luke 6: 30.

#### BUDDHA.

Give, if thou art asked, from the little thou hast; thus wilt thou go near the gods.—Dhammapada, 17, 224.

The teaching of Jesus here, as we shall later attempt to show more fully, is an impracticable one, and one in direct opposition to the necessities of society. Jesus here makes no reservation.

His followers are bidden to give to *every* man that asketh, and no attempt is to be made to recover stolen property.

The following extracts do not pertain strictly to ethics, but deserve to be noticed on account of their remarkable parallelism.

## HATRED OF THE WICKED TO THE GOOD.

### TESUS.

If the world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you. If ye were of the world, the world would love its own, but because ye are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you.—John 15:18.

The time cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service. — John 16:2.

#### SOCRATES.

This is what will be my destruction, if I am destroyed . . . , the envy and detraction of the world which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more. There is no danger of my being the last of them! — Plato, Apology.

## THE ISOLATION OF GENIUS.

## TESUS.

Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip?—John 14:9.

Are ye also yet without understanding? — Matt. 15:16.

Yet I am not alone, for the Father is with me. — John 16: 32.

#### Confucius.

The master said: "Alas! there is no one that knows me. Tse Kung said: "What do you mean by thus saying that no one knows you?" The master replied: "I do not murmur against Heaven, nor do I grumble against men. There is Heaven, — that knows me! — Anal., 14, 37.

#### MENCIUS.

If a prince acknowledge you and follow your counsels, be perfectly satisfied. If no one does so, be the same!
— Works, 7, 9.

# SIMILAR PARABLES.

# JESUS.

The familiar parable of the wise and foolish virgins (Matt. 25:1-14), concluding with the words: "Watch therefore; for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of Man cometh."

See also the figure of the "King and the wedding garments." — Matt. 22:11.

#### JEWISH TALMUD.

There was a king who bade all his servants to a great repast, but did not indicate the hour. Some went home, and prepared themselves, and stood ready at the door of the palace. Others said, There is ample time; the king will let us know beforehand. Of a sudden the king summoned them, and those that came in their best garments were received, but the foolish

ones, who came in slovenliness, were turned away in disgrace. Repent today, lest to-morrow ye be summoned! —See article "Talmud," London Quarterly Review, vol. 122.

## CHILDREN OF GOD.

## JESUS.

Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the *children of* God. — Matt. 5:9.

#### TALMUD.

And we, if we are called the servants of God, are also called his children.

## SIMILAR VIEW OF THE NEXT WORLD.

## JESUS.

They which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more, for they are equal unto the angels. — Luke 20: 35.

#### TALMUD.

In the next world there will be no love and no labor, no envy, no hatred, no contest. The righteous will sit with crowns on their heads, glorying in the splendor of God's majesty.

## PAUCITY OF THE TRULY WISE.

#### JESUS.

Because strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it. — Matt. 7:14.

For many are called, but few chosen.

— Matt. 20: 16.

#### CONFUCIUS.

Those who know virtue are few. — Anal., 15, 3.

It is all over! I have not seen one who loves virtue as he loves beauty!

— Anal., 15, 12.

### MENCIUS.

The way of truth is like a great road. The evil is that men will not seek it. — Works, 6, 2.

## BUDDHA.

This world is dark. Few only can see here. Few only go to heaven, like birds escaped from a net. — Dhammapada, 13, 174.

## THEIR POVERTY.

### JESUS.

Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head. — Luke 9:58.

### Confucius.

With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow, I still have joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness are to me but as a floating cloud. — Anal., 7, 15.

#### SOCRATES.

I am in the uttermost poverty through my service of the God. — Plato, Apology.

### KINGDOM OF HEAVEN WITHIN.

## JESUS.

The kingdom of God cometh not with observation . . . For behold the kingdom of God is within you. — Luke 17:20.

#### CONFUCIUS.

Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous, and lo! virtue is at hand.

— Anal., 7, 29.

#### MENCIUS.

Kaou has never understood righteousness, because he makes it something external. — Works, 2, 16.

The path of duty lies in what is near; yet men seek for it in what is remote!

— Works, 4, 10.

Much is made by Christians of the fact that Jesus regarded not the persons of men, and that he freely associated with publicans and sinners. It is even frequently asserted that no teacher, save Jesus, ever preached a gospel to the poor. Jesus certainly deserves all praise for his comprehensive charity, but this admirable quality was no more a characteristic of Jesus than of Socrates and Gautama Buddha. Five centuries before Christ. Buddha exclaimed: "Birth and eminence do not make the right to be honored; not by birth, but by conduct, is one a low person." "Ananda, one of the earliest disciples, sitting once beside a well, asked a drink of water from a chandâla woman, who was drawing water from the well. She answered, 'How dost thou ask water of me, an outcast, who may not touch thee without offence?' Ananda answered: 'My sister, I ask not of thy caste. I ask thee water to drink.' And Buddha took her among his disciples" (Burnouf, p. 205). "Look closely," says Buddha, "and you shall see no difference between the body of a prince and the body of a slave. What is essential may dwell in the most miserable frame "(Ibid., p. 209).

Johnson, in the introduction to his "Oriental Religions," says:
"The Chinese Buddhist priest prays at morning that the music

of the bell which wakens him to his matins 'may sound through the whole world, and that every living soul may gain release, and find eternal peace in God. The Buddhist Saviour vows to manifest himself to every creature in the universe, and never to arrive at Buddhahood till all are delivered from sin into the divine rest.' What else, or wherein better, is the claim of the Christian or the Jew?"

"Others were not like him," says Xenophon of Socrates, "friends of the common people!" (Memo. I, 2, 60).

Let us pause here to survey the ground over which we have advanced. The foregoing words of Jesus have, as we have seen, all met their counterparts in the precepts of other masters, in most cases long anterior to him. Some of them are even synonymous with instruction given in the Rabbinical schools of his own age and nation! "Like all the rabbis of the time," says Rénan, "Jesus expressed his doctrine in concise aphorisms. Some of these maxims come from the books of the Old Testament. Others were the thoughts of more modern sages, especially of Antigonus of Soco, Jesus, the son of Sirach, and Hillel, which were known to him, not through learned studies, but as proverbs often repeated. The synagogues were rich in maxims very happily expressed, which formed a sort of current proverb literature" (Vie de Fésus, ch. 5). Does Jesus teach the rule of reciprocity? So do Confucius and Hillel. Does Jesus inculcate selfcondemnation rather than condemnation of others? So do Mencius, Buddha, and Confucius. Does Jesus labor for the poor and outcast? Not more nobly than does Buddha. Does Jesus rebuke hypocrisy? Not one whit more emphatically than do the Eastern sages or the prophets of his own people. Does Jesus urge love to enemies, forgiveness, humility, benevolence, and unostentatious charity? None the less are these duties inculcated by other moral teachers. Indeed, some of the commands of the Hebrew master are found to be inferior to those of the Chinese or Indian sages, because of the lower motives of action urged for their performance.

Looking, then, at the comparative purity of ethical teaching expressed in these two columns, do we find as yet any reason to exalt the words of Jesus over those of Confucius, Mencius, Socrates, or Buddha? I think that no one, free from prejudice and

judging simply from the teachings thus far considered, will assign any such superiority to the doctrine of the sage of Nazareth.

It remains to examine some points in the ethical teachings of Jesus which are more peculiarly his own. One very remarkable precept in the code of morals laid down by Jesus is that which commands non-resistance. Let us compare the ideas of Confucius with those of Jesus on this point.

#### NON-RESISTANCE.

## JESUS.

But I say unto you that ye resist not evil (or more probably, that ye resist not the evil doer); but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if a man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain. — Matt. 5: 39.

Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again. — Luke 6:30.

#### CONFUCIUS.

Some one said: "What do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?" Confucius said: "With what then will you recompense kindness? Recompense INJURY with JUSTICE, and recompense kindness with kindness!"—Anal., 14, 36.

The doctrine of non-resistance here advocated by Jesus is something not simply impossible for society to practise, but is a maxim which would be in the highest degree harmful to society, if put into operation. An injury done to the rights or possessions of an individual is a menace to the community at large. and hence it is due to society that such an injury be properly resented and justly punished. Imagine for a moment a country in which this law of non-resistance prevailed. It would be the favorite retreat for the depraved and vicious of every grade, from the swaggering "Ring"-manipulator to the ferocious highwayman and rioter. Society could not exist under any such passive system. On the contrary, the words of Confucius exhibit the only means of good government, - the prompt recompensing of injury by JUSTICE. This is by no means the doctrine of retaliation, - an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; it is the doctrine of the just preservation of equal rights, which is the foundation of law and order in good society. At present we are living under a system of law and equity framed in accordance with the principle of Confucius, not that of Jesus. When and where our system fails is precisely when and where we fail to recompense an injury done to the individual or to society by prompt and efficient justice, or precisely when and where the instructions of Jesus on this point are obeyed.

It requires but a slight acquaintance with the precepts of Jesus to see that with him the incentives to virtue are frequently rewards and punishments; but the great extent to which these are employed is only realized upon a careful study of his teachings. Take, for example, the Beatitudes. In every case a reward is promised, and virtue is not taught for its own sake.

The poor in spirit (or, as Luke has it, simply *the poor*) are blessed, for theirs is to be the Kingdom of God. The meek are likewise blessed; not for any intrinsic value in meekness as a virtue, but because they are to "inherit the earth."

So the merciful are blessed, because they are in turn to receive mercy, and the persecuted and reviled are bidden to rejoice, because "great is their reward in heaven!" Does Jesus command his disciples to forgive men their trespasses? He enforces it with the promise, "and your heavenly Father will also forgive you!" Does he urge them to confess him before men? He holds out as a reward for so doing that he will also confess them before his Father in heaven! "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you"—what? that he does a noble deed to be commended by himself and God? He does not say that, but adds, "he shall in no wise lose his reward."

Again: "Every one that hath forsaken houses or brethren or sisters or father or mother or wife or children or lands for my name's sake, shall receive a hundred fold and shall inherit everlasting life!"

Again: "Give," says Jesus; but adds as an incentive, "and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down and shaken together and running over, shall men give into your bosom!"

In the first phrases of the following verses it would seem that Jesus gave a rule for pure, disinterested action, but mark the italicized conclusion:—

<sup>&</sup>quot;If ye love them which love you, what thank have ye? for sinners also love those

that love them. And if ye do good to them which do good to you, what thank have ye? for sinners also do even the same. And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners to receive as much again. But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend hoping for nothing again; and your REWARD shall be great and ye shall be called the children of the Highest!"

So also in the following: "When thou makest a dinner, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, neither thy kinsmen, nor thy rich neighbors; lest they also bid thee again and a recompense be made thee; but when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind; and thou shalt be blessed, for they cannot recompense thee." Thus far nothing could be more noble and disinterested. But now all is spoiled by these concluding words, whose shadow seems fated to fall upon his finest precepts: "For thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just!" (Luke. 14. 12-14).

"Verily I say unto you," exclaims Jesus, "ye which have followed me, when the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel!"

"If any man serve me," he continues, "him will my Father honor!" In the sixth chapter of Matthew secret prayer and private charity are taught with the incentive, "And thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall reward thee openly!" "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness" is the precept of Jesus; but, as we have seen above, the reward is immediately attached to the command in the words, "and all these things [worldly advantages] shall be added unto you!"

Passing over many more of a similar nature, if we look now at passages where the moral precepts of Jesus are enforced with threats of punishment, we shall find them equally numerous. "Take heed," says Jesus, "that ye do not your alms before men to be seen of them." Why? Because such an act indicates a hypocritical state of soul, and renders the deed devoid of virtue? No such motive is urged. The incentive is this: "Otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven!" "If ye forgive not men their trespasses," says the Hebrew teacher, "neither will your Father forgive your trespasses!" "Judge not," is the command of Jesus. Why? "That ye be not judged!" "Whosoever shall offend one of these little ones that

believe in me, it is better for him that a mill-stone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea!" "Agree with thine adversary quickly, . . . lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison!" "Whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Vain fellow' [Raca], shall be in danger of the council: and whosoever shall say, 'Thou fool,' shall be in danger of hell "Cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth!" Such are a few examples of the incentives of reward and punishment held out by Jesus in his moral teachings. By far the greater number of his precepts are thus enforced, and therefore do not present the loftiest motives to action, nor constitute the noblest kind of ethical instruction. The fact is that Jesus, as a teacher of morals, appealed directly, and in the strongest possible manner, to the hopes and fears of men. He talked continually of the "Kingdom" which he had come to establish on earth, in the speedy establishment of which his followers were to be abundantly recompensed for their self-denials, while his enemies, and even those simply indifferent to him, were to be punished with corresponding severity. Those who had confessed him were then to be acknowledged by him; and those who had denied him were to be by him denied. Those who had believed on him were to be saved; those who had disbelieved were to be damned. If any house or city should not receive his disciples with a cordial welcome, they would fare worse in the day of judgment than the overwhelmed cities of Sodom and Gomorrah. Whereas whosoever should receive a prophet in the name of a prophet, should receive a prophet's reward. Those who heard his words and acted upon them were compared to a house founded upon a rock; those who disregarded his precepts were likened, on the contrary, to a house destined to fall in ruin on the shifting sands. He that was not for him was against him. There is a power in this kind of teaching, a power which still has a great influence upon the masses to whom the gospel is preached; but it is not, nevertheless, the noblest method of presenting virtue. According to the incentives which Jesus almost invariably employs, a man is either bribed or frightened into obedience.

Now, if we look at the mode of teaching used by Confucius,

we shall see a marked difference. The Chinese sage - to whose honor a temple is erected in every Chinese city down to those of the third order - aimed exclusively at fitting men for pure and honorable conduct in this life. His teaching was ethical, not religious. He urged men to attain to perfect virtue, as the true aim of living. Heaven and hell do not enter at all into the list of incentives to virtue in his code. His precept is to practise virtue for virtue's sake. He did not talk much about "spiritual beings" or a future life, probably for the very good reason that he did not know much about them. His definition of wisdom was "to give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them." With all this, it would not be fair to charge him with being an atheist, for we find these words upon his lips: "He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray;" "I do not murmur against Heaven;" and "There is Heaven; that knows me!"

It will be remembered that I am not comparing in this article the *religious* teachings of Jesus with those of others, but simply his *ethical* precepts. In this comparison we have found Jesus almost constantly appealing to rewards and punishments to induce men to follow his instructions in morality. We have found Confucius, on the other hand, teaching morality for its own pure sake alone, without any mention of reward or punishment. Which teacher, then, stands in this respect upon the nobler basis of morals?

In Mencius, the great follower of Confucius, there is visible the same purity of ethical instruction. The nearest approach to any threat of punishment joined to his teachings is found in the words already cited under "evil speaking,"—"What future misery have they, and ought they, to endure, who talk of what is not good in others!" But that this "future misery" merely refers to the misery consequent upon such conduct in this life is highly probable from the fact that there is, in all the words of Mencius, no other passage capable of being construed into a reference to the result of men's actions in a future existence.

With Buddha the incentive of rewards and punishments is quite common. We find in the Dhammapada numerous passages like the following: "The evil doer suffers in this world, and he suffers in the next. The virtuous man is happy in this world,

and he is happy in the next." According to Buddha, the good will attain unto "Nirvana, which is the highest happiness" (Dh. 23), and "the bad will go to hell" (Dh. 126). "Righteous people go to heaven; the fool goes to hell." "The uncharitable do not go to the world of the gods" (Dh. 177). "He who says what is not goes to hell."

These extracts have the real evangelical ring to them. They are as plain and forcible as most of the declarations of Jesus, though we miss in the Dhammapada some of the more terrible allusions to future torment in which Jesus indulges; such as, "Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched;" "Where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth; "and "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire!" Moreover, it is to be remarked that the "hell" of Buddha was not a place of *endless* torment, but possessed "Heavens of refuge" for repentant souls. Can we say as much of the "hell" of Jesus?

It must, however, be borne in mind that Buddha, although appealing to rewards and punishments, does so much less often than does Jesus. Therefore, in this instance also, we find that, as a rule, the moral precepts of Jesus are not based upon as high and noble motives as are those of Buddha, and nowhere in the whole range of Jesus's words do we find any thing like the following noble sentiments: "Let thy motive lie in the deed, and not in the reward! Perform the duty, whether it terminate in good or ill. This is devotion" (Bhagavad Gita, chap. 2). "The path of virtue is to be pursued with no view to emolument" (Mencius, 7, 33). It will doubtless be replied to this that no motives, except those which appeal directly to the desires and fears of men, will have much influence in winning them to virtue, or reclaiming them from vice. The space of this article does not permit of a discussion of this subject. It is doubtless true that, with the masses of humanity, the incentives of rewards and punishments are the strongest. It is also probably true that the teaching of virtue for its own sake only to the thoroughly abandoned would be merely casting pearls before swine. And yet I claim that in a Divine Master, or even in the most perfect of human teachers, we should expect one half, at least, of his ethical precepts to be uttered without the adjunct of a bribe or a threat. We should, I think, reasonably anticipate that, if he were the only infallible source of ethical instruction, he would, at least half the time, inculcate moral purity from its own inherent loveliness and for its own sake alone. In both these expectations we are disappointed.

On the subject of riches, the teaching of Jesus was quite peculiar. Buddha had said: "One is the road that leads to wealth; another is the road that leads to Nirvana." But Jesus, not content with similarly saying, "Ye cannot serve God and riches" (mammon), demands the utter renunciation of wealth in the case of the young man who inquired of him the way of life. "If thou wilt be perfect," he says, "go and sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." It is to be parenthetically remarked that here too Jesus instantly adds, as an additional inducement, "and thou shalt have treasure in heaven!" Lest this should be called a special case, requiring peculiar treatment, let us examine other words of a similar nature. "Sell that ye have," exclaims Jesus in a general precept (Luke 12: 33), "and give alms." "Woe unto you that are rich! for ye have received your consolation. Woe unto you that are full! for ye shall hunger" (Luke 6: 24). "Verily I say unto you, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven. It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God" (Matt. 19: 23).

The parable of Dives and Lazarus reveals the same bitter feeling towards the rich. Dives is not represented as having committed any sin, save the one of being rich and having neglected to invite Lazarus to come in from the steps and eat at his sumptuous table. As Lazarus, however, is represented as being "full of sores," we can hardly wonder at the taste of Dives in this particular. Lazarus, on the other hand, is not said to have possessed any other merit than that of being a beggar and the recipient of canine blandishments. Yet when they die, Jesus represents Lazarus as carried by angels to Abraham's bosom, while Dives is plunged into torments similar to those of Tanta-Moreover, Father Abraham, when appealed to by Dives, remarks this only: "Son, remember that thou in thy life-time received'st thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things; but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented." This is compensation with a vengeance! That the hatred of riches in se

and the praise of poverty in se were strikingly shown forth in the teachings of Jesus cannot be better proven than by the immediate conduct of his disciples whom he had thus instructed. No sooner was he dead than "all that believed had all things common, and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need" (Acts 2:44). "Neither was there any among them that lacked; for as many as were possessors of lands and houses sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, and laid them down at the apostles' feet" (Acts 4: 34). James, too, imitates his master in bidding rich men weep and howl in view of the miseries which shall come Thus we see that Jesus rebuked the possession of wealth in itself, as not only dangerous, but wrong. He makes no distinction between a proper and improper use and amount of riches, but utters one broad and sweeping denunciation of them. Those Christian millionaires, therefore, who regard Jesus as the infallible Teacher whose words are divinely authoritative, should, in consistency, sell their fine houses and clothes, take a humble cottage, dismiss their servants, and give the balance of their incomes to the judicious nourishment and instruction of the poor and degraded. Impracticable? Absurd? Perhaps; but then let us agree that Fesus was impracticable and absurd; for he commanded just that and nothing less. He would, in all probability, do so again to-day, were he to come among us, and would unquestionably receive from some of his wealthy worshippers merely an astonished shrug and stare.

This hatred of riches on the part of Jesus resembles very much the idea of the Essenes, one of the prominent Jewish sects in his day. And it is probable that he derived it from them. Of these Josephus says (Wars of the Jews, Book II, chap. 8) "These are despisers of riches. No one is found among them who hath more than another, for it is a law among them, that those who come to them must let what they have be common to the whole order; so that among them there is no appearance of poverty or excess of riches. . . Many of them live in every city. . . Every one gives what he has to him that wanteth it. . Although there be no requital made, they are fully allowed to take what they want of whomsoever they please."

A peculiar feature in Jesus's code of morals is his prohibition

of all oaths. "Swear not at all," he says (it is needless to say, not meaning here "Take not the name of God blasphemously," but "Do not strengthen your assertions by any appeal to the Deity"). This precept is not only daily disobeyed by the majority of believers in the infallibility of Jesus, but those who persist in following his instructions in this particular have been frequently exposed to great inconvenience for so doing. This idea also was a dominant one among the Essenes. "Swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it worse than perjury; for they say that he who cannot be believed without swearing by God is already condemned" (Josephus, Book II, chap. 8, "Wars of the Jews").

The law which Jesus lays down upon the subject of divorce is explicit: "It hath been said," remarks Jesus, "whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement. But I say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery." Is this precept, on the whole, an advantageous one for society to follow? Experience in countries where it has been attempted, and where divorce for any other cause than fornication has been refused, has proved that this rule is far too narrow to meet the exigencies of a complicated society. This precept also is therefore quietly set aside and violated by the followers of Jesus, who at the same time inconsistently claim to regard him as a Divine and absolutely infallible teacher.

We have already seen that Jesus, in common with all other great moral teachers, rebuked hypocrisy and cant most scathingly. There is, however, a step beyond this, which Jesus unhesitatingly takes, and for which he deserves all praise. Jesus ranked practical morality far in advance of ritualism. It is true, he is not the only teacher who does this. The institutes of Menu (4. 204) contain these words: "A wise man should constantly perform all the moral duties, though he perform not constantly the ceremonies of religion! He who purifies himself in the river of a subdued spirit, the waters of which are truth, its waves compassion, and its shores holy temper, will be liberated from this world; but liberation cannot be obtained by any outward observance!" But Jesus seems to have emphasized this with peculiar force.

He gives continual evidence that he placed no high value upon the ceremonial observances of his nation. Every allusion which he does make to "giving tithes of mint, anise, and cummin," "making broad phylacteries," praying "in the temple," etc., by no means tends to make us regard such actions as important. He seems, indeed, to have observed his nation's feasts, but never issues any precepts in regard to them. Observance of religious ceremonials he does not include among the deeds which will be rewarded when he comes in his new kingdom. He strenuously objects to long public prayers, intimating that they are only made for display. Those who are to be admitted into heaven are the ones who have fed the hungry, clothed the naked, visited the sick and imprisoned; but those who cry "Lord, Lord, have we not in thy name done many wonderful works?" will be shut out. As regards the Sabbath, he "broke" it repeatedly, and defended himself for it on three separate occasions, because he had done so in acts of kindness. "It is lawful to do well on the Sabbath day," he exclaims. "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath." For these bold protests against bigoted formalism, even when it is not attended with hypocrisy, let us give to the teacher of Nazareth the praise which is due to him. But let us lament that his precepts and example in this regard have been so poorly obeyed by his disciples. The High Church mummeries; the endless ceremonials and Saint's days of Catholicism; the "vain repetitions" of most of the church services; and our unjust Sunday laws, - all attest how grievously Christians have misunderstood their master.

What now are the conclusions to be drawn from this review

of the ethical teachings of Jesus of Nazareth?

I. He uttered many noble precepts, for which the world is better; but every one of them had been substantially uttered by others before his time.

2. Some of his best teachings had been already said in his own nation, and even by his own contemporaries.

3. Many of his most remarkable moral precepts are inferior to the analogous teachings of other masters, because supported

by the selfish incentives of rewards and punishments.

4. Some of his doctrines, such as the non-resistance of evil and the community of goods, are utterly unsuited to society, and inferior to the corresponding precepts of other teachers.

5. Taking his instruction as a whole, Jesus cannot be said to have taught virtue for virtue's sake, since he almost invariably appealed to men's desires and fears as motives to right action.

6. Jesus deserves especial (though not sole) honor for having placed little or no value upon what may be called *sincere formalism*, in comparison with the far higher duties of *practical morality*; although in his denunciations of *hypocrisy*, he was fully equaled, by other ethical teachers.

Finally, as a light, but not the light, of the world, Jesus is entitled to the respect and reverence due to all great and good men, "the fragrance of whose virtue endures for ever," and who by their precepts have rendered the race wiser, better, and purer. As an expounder of ethics, he will always be recognized as one of its great masters, yet only as one among brethren. For not alone from the slopes of Palestine rises a lofty mountain peak to reflect the glorious dawn of moral truth to the darkened world beneath; but rather, as we journey backward up the stream of Time, do we discover one height of progress answering to another, until we stand admiringly before a glittering chain of snowy summits, from whose sunlit glory we catch refulgent beams, and in whose lustrous splendor we find our inspiration and our hope.

JOHN L. STODDARD.

# TO A MAN ABOUT TOWN.

A REPROACH.

You scorn the world that worships you;
(You worshipped it while it was far);
You treat it when it comes to sue
Like haughty, autocratic Czar,
And when it bows before your feet,
With bitter sneers its smiles you meet.

Too large-limbed were you for its dance;
You should not wear its cramping dress.
Your strength might carry mighty lance,
And gaily forth to combat press.
Your breath came deep and strong and clear;
You panted in thin atmosphere.

Your roots that struck so strong and deep A vigorous foothold all around,
You trimmed them close, they only creep
With feeble claspings through the ground.
Your kingly head with branches topped,—
By your own hand your crown was lopped.

You cut away your strongest roots,
You stunted all your honest growth;
How can you hope to bear rich fruits?
You strangled blooms and seed cups both.
And this you did with open eyes,
To please a world you now despise.

Your soul was sent you half divine; You starve and waste its angel grace; And so you "dwindle, peak, and pine," And soul dies out within your face. O Hercules! you distaff hold, Nor fight the Nemean lion bold.

Your individual force and power
Is rubbed out by the frictions small
Of every foolish, idle hour,
Of every shallow, idle call.
God stamped you with his finest die;
You've blurred his noble image: Why?

If you had chosen a career
Where your great gifts you might have used,
And, careless of neglect or sneer,
Such paltry favors had refused,
You then would own a fulfilled life,
Whose honors were hard won in strife.

You surely then would own a friend,
And not this host of flatterers fond,
Whose fleeting loves but condescend
To claim some trivial, careless bond
That binds them to the brilliant man
Who any moment shame them can.

Why do you choose what you despise?
Join now the crowd of working men,
And lend to them your speech, your eyes,
Your robust strength, your thought, and then
You will not loiter on the street,
Nor scorn the busy crowd you meet.

EMILY E. FORD.

# CHAUNCEY WRIGHT.

THE sudden and untimely death of Mr. Chauncey Wright, in September, 1875, was an irreparable loss not only to the friends whose privilege it had been to know so wise and amiable a man, but to the interests of sound philosophy in general. To some, perhaps, there may seem to be extravagance in speaking of any such loss to philosophy as irreparable; for in the great work of the world we are accustomed to see the ranks close up as heroes fall by the way, and when we come to reckon up the sum of actual achievement, in our thankfulness over the calculable results obtained we seldom take heed of those innumerable unrealized possibilities upon which in the nature of things we can place no just estimate. Of course it is right, as it is inevitable, that this should be so. There is, however, a point of view from which it may be fairly urged that the work which rare and original minds fall short of doing because of straitened circumstances or brevity of life does never really get done at all, Something like it gets performed, no doubt, but it gets performed in a different order of causation; and though there may be an appearance of equivalence, the fact remains that, from the sum of human striving, an indefinite amount of rich and fruitful. life has been lost. True as this is in the case of exact science. it is still more obviously true in speculative science or philosophy. For the work of a philosopher, like the work of an artist, is the peculiar product of endless complexities of individual character. His mental tone; his shades of prejudice; his method of thought, - are often of as much interest and value to mankind as any of the theories which he may devise; and thus it not seldom happens that personal familiarity with the philosopher is itself a most instructive lesson in philosophy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Philosophical Discussions. By CHAUNCEY WRIGHT. With a Biographical Sketch of the Author by Charles Eliot Norton. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1877. 8vo.

In the case of Chauncey Wright, none save the friends who knew the rich treasures of his mind as shown in familiar conversation are likely to realize how great is the loss which philosophy has sustained in his death. For not only was he somewhat deficient in the literary knack of expressing his thoughts in language generally intelligible and interesting, but he was also singularly devoid of the literary ambition which leads one to seek to influence the public by written exposition. Had he possessed more of this kind of ambition, perhaps the requisite knack would not have been wanting; for Mr. Wright was by no means deficient in clearness of thought or in command of language. The difficulty - or, if we prefer so to call it, the esoteric character - of his writings was due rather to the sheer extent of their richness and originality. His essays and review-articles were pregnant with valuable suggestions, which he was wont to emphasize so slightly that their significance might easily pass unheeded; and such subtle suggestions made so large a part of his philosophical style that, if any of them chanced to be overlooked by the reader, the point and bearing of the entire argument was liable to be misapprehended. His sentences often abounded in terse allusive clauses or epithets which were unintelligible for want of a sufficient clew to the subject-matter of the allusion: in the absence of an exhaustive acquaintance with the contents of the author's mind, the reader could only wonder, and miss the point of the incidental remark. Of such sort of obscure, though pregnant, allusion we have an instance in the use made of the conception of a "spherical intelligence" in the essay on "The Evolution of Self-Consciousness," where the brief reference to the Platonic Timæus is by no means sufficient to relieve the strain upon the reader's attention. It is this too compact suggestiveness which makes this remarkable essay so hard to understand, and the exuberance of which half tempted Mr. Wright to give to the paper the very esoteric title of "The Cognition of Cogito." A writer who kept the public in his mind would not proceed in this way, but would more often give pages luminous with concrete illustrations where Mr. Wright only gave sentences cumbrous with epigrammatic terseness. If Mr. Wright did not keep the public in mind while writing, it was not from the pride of knowledge, for no feeling could have been more foreign to him;

and there was something almost touching in the endless patience with which he would strive in conversation to make abstruse matters clear to ordinary minds. It was because, as a writer, he thought in soliloquy, using his pen to note down the course of his reasoning, but failing to realize the difficulty which others might find in apprehending the numerous and far-reaching connotations of phrases to him entirely familiar.

It was only some such circumstances as these, joined to a kind of mental inertness which made some unusually strong incentive needful to any prolonged attempt at literary self-exposition, that prevented Chauncey Wright from taking rank, in public estimation, among the foremost philosophers of our time. An intellect more powerful from its happy union of acuteness with sobriety has probably not yet been seen in America. In these respects he reminds one of Mr. Mill, whom he so warmly admired. Though immeasurably inferior to Mill in extent of literary acquirement, he was hardly inferior to him in penetrating and fertile ingenuity, while in native soberness or balance of mind it seems to me that Wright was, on the whole, the superior. In reading Mr. Mill's greater works, one is constantly impressed with the admirable thoroughness with which the author's faculties are disciplined. Inflexible intellectual honesty is there accompanied by sleepless vigilance against fallacy or prejudice; and while generous emotion often kindles a warmth of expression, yet the jurisdiction of feeling is seldom allowed to encroach upon that of reason. Nevertheless, there are numerous little signs which give one the impression that this wonderful equipoise of mind did not come by nature altogether, but was in great part the result of consummate training, - of unremitting watchfulness over Some of his smaller political writings and the "Autobiography" entirely confirm this impression, and show that in Mr. Mill's mind there were not only immense enthusiasms, but even a slight tinge of mysticism. All the more praiseworthy seems his remarkable self-discipline in view of such circumstances. Mr. Wright, though so nearly in harmony with Mr. Mill in methods and conclusions, was very different in native mental temper-An illustration of the difference is furnished by the striking remarks in which Mr. Mill acknowledges - in common with his father - a preference for the experience-philosophy on

utilitarian grounds: it obliges men to try their beliefs by tests that are perpetually subject to criticism, and thus affords no room for doctrines which, by reason of some presumed sanctity, men may find an excuse for trying to impose on one another. That there is profound truth in this no one can deny; but prejudice and partisanship are liable to grow out of any such practical preference for a given form of philosophy, and one cannot readily imagine Mr. Wright as influenced, even slightly, in his philosophic attitude by such a consideration of utility. His opinions were determined only by direct evidence, and to this he always accorded a hospitable reception. A mind more placid in its working, more unalloyed by emotional prejudice, or less solicited by the various temptations of speculation, I have never known. Judicial candor and rectitude of inference were with him inborn. On many points his judgment might need further enlightenment, but it stood in no need of a rectifying impulse. No craving for speculative consistency, or what Comte would have called "unity" of doctrine, ever hindered him from giving due weight to opposing, or even seemingly incompatible, considerations. For, in view of the largeness and complexity of the universe, he realized how treacherous the most plausible generalizations are liable to prove when a vast area of facts is to be covered, and how great is the value of seemingly incongruous facts in prompting us to revise or amend our first-formed theories.

With these mental characteristics Mr. Wright seems to have been fitted for the work of sceptical criticism, or for the discovery and illustration of specific truths, rather than for the elaboration of a general system of philosophy. As our very sources of mental strength in one direction may become sources of mental weakness in another, as we are very likely to have what the French would call "the defects of our excellences," so we may perhaps count it as a weakness, or at least a limitation, in Mr. Wright that he was somewhat over-suspicious of all attempts at constructing ideally coherent and comprehensive systems. That there is coherency throughout the processes of Nature he would certainly have admitted, in so far as belief in the universality of causation is to be construed as such an admission. But that there is any such discernible coherency in the results of causation as would admit of description in a grand series of all-embracing

generalizations, I think he would have doubted or denied. Such denial or doubt seems, at least, to be implied in his frequent condemnation of cosmic or synthetic systems of philosophy as metaphysical "anticipations of Nature," incompatible with the true spirit of Baconism. The denial or doubt would have referred, it is true, not so much to the probable constitution of Nature as to the possibilities of human knowledge. He would have argued that the stupendous group of events which we call the universe consists so largely of unexplored, or even unsuspected, phenomena that the only safe generalizations we can make concerning it must needs be eminently fragmentary; and if any one had asked whether, after all, we have not great reason to believe that throughout the length and breadth and duration of the boundless and endless universe there is an all-pervading coherency of action, such as would be implied in the theorem that all Nature is the manifestation of one Infinite Power, - to any such question he would probably have held that no legitimate answer can be given.

In this general way of looking at things we have the explanation of Mr. Wright's persistent hostility to the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. This hostility is declared in his earliest essay, entitled "A Physical Theory of the Universe," and it is maintained in the paper on "German Darwinism," published only three days before his death, wherein great pains are taken to show that Mr. Spencer's philosophy is utterly un-Baconian and unscientific, as resting, not upon inductive inquiry, but upon "undemonstrated beliefs assumed to be axiomatic and irresistible." In the first and last of my many conversations with Mr. Wright - in July, 1862, and in July, 1875 — I found myself charged with the defence of Mr. Spencer's philosophy against what then seemed, and still seems, to me a profound misunderstanding of its true character and purpose. As the point is one which goes as far as any other toward illustrating Mr. Wright's philosophic position, and as it has an immediate bearing on the vexed question of science and religion, I will crave the reader's indulgence while I illustrate it briefly here.

Doctors are proverbially known to disagree, whether they be doctors in philosophy or in medicine; but I have often thought that an interesting case might be made out by any one who should endeavor to signalize the half-hidden aspects of agreement

rather than the conspicuous aspects of difference among philosophic schools. Certainly, in the controversy which has been waged of late years concerning the sources of knowledge and the criterion of truth, one is inclined to suspect that a greater amount of antagonism has been brought to the surface than is altogether required by the circumstances. In old times, when you were asked why you believed that things would happen in future after much the same general fashion as in the past, there were two replies which you could make. If you were a believer in Locke, you would say that you trusted in the testimony of experience; but here the follower of Leibnitz would declare that you were very unwise, since experience can only testify to what has happened already, and, so far as experience goes, you haven't an iota of warrant for your belief that the sun will rise to-morrow morning. Your trust in the constancy of Nature must be derived, therefore, from some principle inherent in the very constitution of your mind, implanted there by the Creator for a wise and beneficent purpose. Once this transcendentalist argument was thought to have great weight, but of late years it has fallen irredeemably into discredit. For to-day the empiricist retorts with crushing effect that, precisely because we are wholly dependent on experience and have no other quarter to go to for rules of belief and conduct, we cannot apply to the future any other rules of probability than those with which our experience of the past has furnished us. If we had any criterion of belief independent of experience, then we might perhaps be able to believe that on the earth a million years hence, or on Mars to-day, a piece of redhot iron would not burn the hand. Were we not strictly hampered by experience, we might doubt the universality of causation. But being thus strictly hampered, we must either imagine the future under the same rules as those under which we remember the past, or else subside into a kind of mental chaos and form no expectations whatever. To this view of the case transcendentalism has as yet made no satisfactory rejoinder.

Our faith in the constancy of Nature results, therefore, from our inability to overcome or "go behind" the certified testimony of experience. Such is the primary psychological fact, about which there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Wright and Mr. Spencer would disagree. But this, like many other facts, has two

sides; or, at least, there are two possible ways of interpreting it, and here arises the misunderstanding. On the one hand, our belief in the constancy of Nature may be the result of an immense induction or counting up of the whole series of events which show that Nature is not capricious; or on the other hand it may be the generalization of a simple assumption which we make in every act of experience, and without which we could not carry on any thinking whatever. The first alternative is the one defended by Mr. Wright in common with Mr. Mill, while the second is the one more prominently insisted upon by Mr. Spen-To me it seems that Mr. Spencer's view is the more profound and satisfactory; but I fail to see that there is necessarily any such antagonism between the two as is implied in recent controversies on the subject. On the other hand, it seems clear to me that the two views are simply two complementary aspects of the same fundamental truth. At first sight it may seem very bold to assert that in every act of our mental lives we make such a grand assumption as that of the constancy of Nature; but it is very certain that, in some form or other, we do keep making this assumption. Every time that the grocer weighs a pound of sugar and exchanges it for a piece of silver, the practical validity of the transaction rests upon the assumption that the same lump of iron will not counterbalance one quantity of sugar to-day and a different quantity to-morrow; and a similar assumption of constancy in weight and exchangeability is made regarding the The indestructibility of matter and the continuity or persistence of force are taken for granted, though neither the grocer nor his customer may have received enough mental training to understand these axioms when stated in abstract form. Nay more, though they may be superstitious men, believing in a world full of sprites and goblins; though they may be so ignorant as to suppose that, when wood is burned and water dried up, some portions of matter are annihilated, - yet, in each of these little practical transactions of life, they go upon the same assumption that the philosopher goes upon when, with his wider knowledge and deeper insight, he rules out the goblins and declares that no matter is ever destroyed. Without this assumption in some form we could not carry on the work of life for a single day. The assumption, moreover, is absolutely unconditional:

no occurrence ever shakes our reliance upon it. I set my clock to-day, and depend on its testimony to-morrow in starting on a journey: if I miss the train, I may conclude that the clock was not well regulated, or that it has begun to need cleaning; but it never occurs to me that my confidence in the mechanical laws of cog-wheels and pendulums has been at all misplaced.

This universal and unqualified assumption of the constancy of Nature is, in a certain sense, a net result of experience, inasmuch as we find it tested and verified in every act of our conscious lives. Acting on the principle that "a pound is a pound, all the world around," we find that our mental operations harmonize with outward facts. Doubt it, if we could, and our mental operations would forthwith tumble into chaos. Experience, therefore, — by which is meant our daily intercourse with outward facts, — continually forces upon us this assumption. Along with whatever else we are taught about ourselves and the world, there comes as part and parcel the ever-repeated lesson that the order of Nature may be relied on. In this sense the belief may be said to be a net result of all our experience.

But this is by no means an adequate account of the matter. The case has another aspect, to which neither Mr. Mill nor Mr. Wright has done justice. How can the constancy of Nature be said to be proved by experience, when we begin by assuming it in each of the single acts of experience which, taken together, are said to prove it? Does not this look like reasoning in a circle? We are told that the constancy of Nature is proved for us by an unbroken series of experiences, beginning with our birth and ending with our death; and yet not one of this series of experiences can have any validity, or indeed any existence, unless the constancy of Nature be tacitly assumed to begin with. It is the balance, we are told, which assures us that no particle of matter is ever lost; but in weighing things in a balance we must take it for granted that the earth's gravitative force is uniform, - is not one thing to-day and another to-morrow; nay, we must also assume that the present testimony of our senses will continue to be consistent in principle with their past testimony. Whatever system of forces we estimate or measure, in support of our implicit belief in the constancy of Nature we must sooner or later appeal to some fundamental unit of measurement which is invariable. Without some such constant unit we cannot prove that the order of Nature is uniform: but we cannot prove the constancy of such a unit without referring it to some other unit, and so on for ever; while to assume the constancy of such a unit is simply to assume the whole case.

It would seem, therefore, that our belief in the trustworthiness of Nature is not properly described when it is treated simply as a vast induction. It should rather be regarded as a postulate indispensable to the carrying on of rational thought, - a postulate ratified in every act of experience, but without which no act of experience can have any validity or meaning. It is for taking this view of the case that Mr. Spencer is charged with rearing a system of philosophy upon "undemonstrable beliefs assumed to be axiomatic and irresistible." Considering that the undemonstrable belief in question is simply the belief in the constancy of Nature, one would be at a loss to see what there is so very heinous in Mr. Spencer's proceeding, were it not obvious that we have here struck upon a grave misconception on the part of Mr. Wright. Misled, no doubt, by some ambiguity of expression, Mr. Wright supposed Mr. Spencer to be laying down some everlasting principle, of universal objective validity, and quite independent of experience. To do this would undoubtedly be to desert science for metaphysics; but Mr. Spencer has not done any thing of the kind. As I said before, there has probably been an excess of controversy on this point. For my own part, without retreating from any position formerly taken, I should be willing, for all practical purposes, to waive the question altogether. Whether our belief in the uniformity of Nature be a primary datum for rational thinking, or a net result of all induction, or whether, with the authors of the "Unseen Universe," we prefer to call it an expression of trust that the Deity "will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion," - whichever alternative we adopt, our theories of the universe will be pretty much the same in the end, provided we content ourselves with a simple scientific coördination of the phenomena before us. And this is all that has been aimed at in the attempt to construct a synthetic, or cosmic, system of philosophy. There has been no further

<sup>&</sup>quot; Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy," Part I, chap. iii; Part II, chaps. i, xvi.

transcending of experience than is implied in the assumption that the order of Nature is the same in the Pleiades and in the Solar System until we learn to the contrary; and it would be difficult to set aside Mr. Spencer's proceedings as un-Baconian without so drawing the line as to exclude Newton's comparison of the falling moon to the falling apple, — the grand achievement which first extended the known dynamic order of Nature from the earth to the heavens.

Our knowledge of the universe is no doubt well nigh infinitely small, - how small we cannot know. The butterfly sailing on the summer breeze may be no farther from comprehending the secular changes in the earth's orbit than man is from fathoming the real course and direction of cosmic events. Yet, if throughout the tiny area which alone we have partially explored we everywhere find coherency of causation, then, just because we are incapable of transcending experience, we cannot avoid attributing further coherency to the regions beyond our ken, so far as such regions can afford occasion for thought at all. The very limitations under which thinking is conducted thus urge us to seek the One in the Many; yet, if our words are rightly weighed, this does not imply a striving after "systematic omniscience," nor can any theistic conception which confines itself within these limits of inference be properly stigmatized as contrary to the spirit of science.

One of the most marked features of Mr. Wright's style of thinking was his insuperable aversion to all forms of teleology. As an able critic in "The Nation" observes, to Mr. Wright "such ideas as optimism or pessimism were alike irrelevant. Whereas most men's interest in a thought is proportional to its possible relation to human destiny, with him it was almost the reverse." But the antagonism went even deeper than this. Not only did he condemn the very shallow teleology of Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises, but any theory which seemed to imply a discernible direction or tendency in the career of the universe became to him at once an object of suspicion. As he was inclined to doubt or deny any ultimate coherency among cosmical events, he was of course indisposed to admit that such events are working together toward any assignable result whatever. From his peculiar point of view it seemed more appropriate to

look upon phenomena as drifting and eddying about in an utterly blind and irrational manner, though now and then evolving, as if by accident, temporary combinations which have to us a rational appearance. "Cosmical weather" was the tersely allusive phrase with which he was wont to describe this purposeless play of events, as if to liken the formation and dissipation of worlds to the capricious changes of the wind. So strong a hold had this notion acquired in his mind, that for once it warped his estimate of scientific evidence, and led him to throw aside the well-grounded nebular hypothesis in favor of the ill-conceived and unsupported meteoric theory of Mayer. In Mr. Wright's mind it was an insuperable objection to the nebular hypothesis that it seems to take the world from a definable beginning to a definable end, and such dramatic consistency, he argued, is not to be found amid the actual turmoil of Nature's workings. It would be improbable, he thought, that things should happen so prettily as the hypothesis asserts: in point of fact Nature does so many things to disconcert our ingenious formulas! To the general doctrine of evolution, of which the nebular hypothesis is a part, Mr. Wright urged the same comprehensive objection. The dramatic interest of the doctrine, which gives it its chief attraction to many minds, was to Mr. Wright prima facie evidence of its unscientific character. The events of the universe have no orderly progression like the scenes of a well-constructed plot, but in the manner of their coming and going they constitute simply a "cosmical weather."

Without pausing over the question whether dramatic completeness belongs properly to metaphysical theories only, or may sometimes also be found in doctrines that rightly lay claim to scientific competence, we may call attention to the interesting fact that Mr. Wright's objection reveals a grave misunderstanding of the true import of the doctrine of evolution in general, as well as of the nebular hypothesis in particular. The objection — if it be admitted as an objection — applies only to the crude popular notion of the doctrine of evolution, that it is all an affair of progress, wherein a better state of things (that is, better from a human point of view) keeps continually supplanting a less excellent state, and so on for ever, or at least without definite limit. That Mr. Wright understood the doctrine in this crude way was evi-

dent from the manner in which he was wont to urge his antiteleological objection both in his writings and in conversation. In criticising the nebular hypothesis, for instance, he was sure to let fall some expression which showed that in his mind the hypothesis stood for a presumptuous attempt to go back to the beginning of the universe and give some account of its total past career in terms of progress. But the nebular hypothesis, as it is now held by evolutionists, does not make any such attempt at The nebular hypothesis traces, from indications in the present structure of the solar system, the general history of the process by which the system arose out of a mass of vaporous or nebulous matter. That process has been a species of evolution in so far as it has substituted a determinate and complicated for an indeterminate and simple arrangement; and in so far as it has resulted in the production of the earth or whatever other planet may be the abode of conscious intelligence, it has been a kind of progress judged with reference to human ends. But so far from this evolution or progress being set down as a universal or eternal affair, it is most explicitly regarded as local and temporary. Throughout the starry groups analogous changes are supposed to be going on, but at different stages in different systems, just as the various members of a human society coëxist in all stages of youth, maturity, or decline; while here and there are nebulæ in which the first steps of development have not yet become apparent, and circumstances can be pointed out under which one of these masses might now and then fail to produce a system of worlds at all. Not only is there all this scope for irregular variety, but the theory further supposes that in every single instance, but at different times in different systems, the process of evolution will come to an end, the determinate complexity be destroyed, and the dead substance of extinct worlds be scattered broadcast through space, to serve, perhaps, as the raw material for further local and temporary processes of aggregation and evolution. This view is held as scientifically probable by many who have not been helped to it by Mr. Spencer's general arguments; but whoever will duly study the profound considerations on the rhythm of motion, set forth in the rewritten edition of "First Principles," will see that it is just this endlessly irregular alternation of progress and retrogression, of

epochs of life with epochs of decay, which the doctrine of evolution asserts as one of its leading theorems. In this respect the accepted name of the doctrine, though perhaps not unfortunate, is but imperfectly descriptive, and is therefore liable to mislead. What the doctrine really maintains is the universal rhythmic alternation of evolution and dissolution, only that our attention is preëminently attracted to the former aspect of the twofold process, as that which is at present uppermost in our own portion of the universe. In no department of Nature, whether in the heavens or on the earth, in the constitution of organic life or in the career of human society, does the doctrine of evolution assert progress as necessary, universal, and perpetual, but always as a contingent, local, and temporary phenomenon.

But what better phrase could we desire than "cosmical weather" whereby tersely to describe the endlessly diversified and apparently capricious course of Nature as it is thus set forth in the doctrine of evolution? As the wind bloweth where it listeth, but we know not whence it came, nor whither it goes, so in the local condensations and rarefactions of cosmical matter which make up the giant careers of stellar systems we can detect neither source nor direction. Not only is there no reference to any end which humanity can recognize as good or evil, but there is not the slightest indication of dramatic progress toward any dénouement whatever. There is simply the never-ending onward rush of events, as undiscriminating, as ruthless, as irresistible as the current of Niagara or the blast of the tropical hurricane.

This is a picture which ought to satisfy the most inexorable opponent of teleology. For my own part, I can see nothing very attractive in it, even from a purely speculative point of view, though it is as striking a statement as can well be made of the meagreness of our knowledge when confronted with the immensity of Nature. The phrase "cosmical weather" happily comports with our enormous ignorance of the tendency of events. But as terrestrial weather is after all subject to discoverable laws, so to an intelligence sufficiently vast the appearance of fickleness in "cosmical weather" would no doubt cease, and the sequence of events would begin to disclose some dramatic tendency, though whether toward any end appreciable by us or not it would be idle to surmise.

In the discussion of such questions, called up by Mr. Spencer's philosophy, Mr. Wright always appeared in the light of a most consistent and unqualified positivist. He hardly could be called a follower of Comte, and I doubt if he even knew the latter's works save by hearsay. But he needed no lessons from Comte. He was born a positivist, and a more complete specimen of the positive philosopher has probably never existed. He went as far as it was possible for a human thinker to go toward a philosophy which should take no note of any thing beyond the content of observed facts. He always kept the razor of Occam uncased and ready for use, and was especially fond of applying it to such entities as "substance" and "force," the very names of which, he thought, might advantageously be excluded from philosophical terminology. Sometimes he described himself as a positivist, but more often called himself a Lucretian, - the difference between the two designations being perhaps not great. As a champion of Lucretius, I remember his once making a sharp attack upon Anaxagoras for introducing creative design into the universe in order to bring coherence out of chaos. What need, he argued, to imagine a supernatural agency in order to get rid of primeval chaos, when we have no reason to believe that the primeval chaos ever had an existence save as a figment of the metaphysician! To assume that the present orderly system of relations among things ever emerged from an antecedent state of disorder is, as he justly maintained, a wholly arbitrary and unwarrantable proceeding. No one could ask for a simpler or more incisive criticism upon that crude species of theism which represents the deity as a power outside the universe and coercing it into orderly behavior.

Although, like all consistent positivists, Mr. Wright waged unceasing war against Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy, there was yet one portion of the doctrine of evolution which found in him a most eminent and efficient defender. In spite of his objections to evolution in general, Mr. Wright thoroughly appreciated and warmly espoused the Darwinian theory of the origin of species by "descent with modifications." His most important literary work was done in elucidation and defence of this theory. Of all his writings, by far the clearest and most satisfactory to read is the review of Mr. Mivart's "Genesis of Species," which

Mr. Darwin thought it worth while to reprint and circulate in England. Its acute and original illustrations of the Darwinian theory give it very great value. The essay on phyllotaxy, explaining the origin and uses of the arrangements of leaves in plants, is a contribution of very great importance to the theory of natural selection. So, too, in a different sense, is the paper on the evolution of self-consciousness, which is the most elaborate of Mr. Wright's productions, but so full of his worst faults of style that, even after much cross-questioning of the author, I never felt quite sure that I had grasped his central meaning.

It was in such detached essays or monographs as these that much was to have been expected from Mr. Wright, especially in the application of Darwinian conceptions to the study of psychology. Could he have been induced to undertake an elaborate treatise, we should have seen the philosophy of Mill and Bain carried to its furthest development and illustrated with Darwinian suggestions by a writer not in sympathy with the general doctrine of evolution, — an interesting and instructive spectacle. But I doubt if Mr. Wright would ever have undertaken an extensive work. To sit down and map out a subject for systematic exploration would have been a proceeding wholly foreign to his habits. His thinking had that defect which we find in Schubert's music, - lack of artistic form, inability to bring up concisely when once set going. Once launched out on a shoreless sea of speculation, he would brood and ponder for weeks, while bright determining thoughts would occur to him at seeming haphazard, like the rational combinations of phenomena in his theory of "cosmic weather." To his suggestive and stimulating conversation this unsystematic habit gave additional charm. An evening's talk with Mr. Wright always seemed to me one of the richest of intellectual entertainments, but there was no telling how or where it would end. At two o'clock in the morning he would perhaps take his hat and saunter homeward with me by way of finishing the subject; but on reaching my gate a new suggestion would turn us back, - and so we would alternately escort each other home perhaps a dozen times, until tired Nature asserted her rights and the newly opening vistas of discussion were regretfully left unexplored. I never knew an educated man who had read so little, except Mr. Herbert Spencer; but, like

Mr. Spencer, whom he resembled in little else, Mr. Wright had an incomprehensible way of absorbing all sorts of knowledge, great and small, until the number of diverse subjects on which he could instruct even trained specialists was quite surprising. There were but few topics on which he had not some acute suggestion to offer; and with regard to matters of which he was absolutely ignorant - such as music - his general good sense and his lack of impulsiveness prevented his ever talking foolishly. This lack of impulsiveness, a kind of physical and intellectual inertness, counted for a great deal both in his excellences and in his shortcomings. His movements were slow and ponderous, his mild blue eye never lighted with any other expression than placid good humor, and his voice never varied its gentle monotony. His absolute freedom from egotism made him slow to take offence, and among the many accidents of controversy there was none which could avail to ruffle him. The patient deference with which he would answer the silly remarks of stupid or conceited people was as extraordinary as the untiring interest with which he would seek to make things plain to the least cultivated intelligence. This kind of patient interest, joined with his sweetness of disposition and winning simplicity of manner, made him a great favorite with children. He would amuse and instruct them by the hour together with games and stories and conjurer's tricks, in which he had acquired no mean proficiency.

Along with this absence of emotional excitability Mr. Wright was characterized by the absence of æsthetic impulses or needs. He was utterly insensible to music, and but slightly affected by artistic beauty of any sort. Excepting his own Socratic presence, there never was any thing attractive about his room, or indeed any thing to give it an individual character. In romance, too, he was equally deficient: after his first and only journey to Europe, I observed that he recalled sundry historic streets of London and Paris only as spots where some happy generalization had occurred to him.

But romantic sentiment, æsthetic sensitiveness, and passionate emotion, — these are among the things which hinder most of us from resting content with a philosophy which applies the law of parsimony so rigorously as to cut away every thing except the actuality of observed phenomena. In his freedom from all such

kinds of extra-rational solicitation Mr. Wright most completely realized the ideal of the positive philosopher. His positivism was an affair of temperament as much as of conviction; and he illustrates afresh the profound truth of Goethe's remark that a man's philosophy is but the expression of his personality. In his simplicity of life, serenity of mood, and freedom from mental or material wants, he well exemplified the principles and practice of Epicurus, and he died as peacefully as he had lived, — on a summer's night, sitting at his desk with his papers before him.

It is a bitter thing to lose a thinker of this mould, just in the prime vigor of life, and at a time when the growing habit of writing seemed to be making authorship easier and pleasanter, so that in years to come we were likely to have had even richer and brighter thoughts from the pen that must now for ever lie idle. The general flavor of Mr. Wright's philosophy — unsystematic, but fruitful in hints — may be gathered well enough from the papers which Mr. Norton has carefully collected in this memorial volume. But the best that can now be done in the way of editing will give but an inadequate impression of Chauncey Wright to those who have not listened to his wise and pleasant talk. To have known such a man is an experience one cannot forget or outlive. To have had him pass away, leaving so scanty a record of what he had it in him to utter, is nothing less than a public calamity.

JOHN FISKE.

## SOME CONSIDERATIONS IN ETHICS.

IN what respect, if in any, does our knowledge of right and wrong differ from our other knowledge? Are the methods appropriate for obtaining information concerning the wickedness or righteousness of actions different from, or similar to, those adequate to acquaint us with the other qualities of things? Is there required, or does there exist, any separate means or specialized sense or faculty, differing in nature or function from the other senses, as the eye for instance differs from the ear, in order to enlighten us as to those characteristics of actions which denote goodness or badness? For the purpose of judging of the excellence of a man's life, is it necessary to refer to any criteria differing in kind, or demanding different treatment, from those used in acquiring knowledge in any other branch of the inquiry after truth? Is the correctness of a proposition in ethics to be demonstrated by the use of any other mental powers than those called into action in substantiating any general statement in natural history or physics? Is the classification of actions into good and bad a process like, or unlike, that by which we classify animals or flowers or the inorganic substances? Why do we declare that a certain course of action is wicked? What makes it wicked, and not right? Upon what basis do we make the distinction? Is it some feeling or emotion? If this be so, what is the nature of this feeling; from what does it arise; and whence comes its binding force? Does this basis consist in some intellectual perception? Then, upon what qualities of things, or tendencies of events, does this perception rest, and in what manner does there follow from it a classification of acts into those that are good and those that are bad?

All these inquiries are only parts of another wider question, and the answers to them taken together form the complete an-

swer to it. In its general form, it is: What is our theory of right and wrong? It is upon this general subject of ethics, being the widest generalization of all our thinking upon right and wrong, and by inferences from which we establish practical rules for public and private right living, that it is proposed to offer a

few considerations in the present paper.

All men, of course, who have beliefs about the morality of actions, have also back of, or underlying, these special beliefs in individual cases some general theory or first principles applicable to all actions. The general theory is held more or less clearly and thoroughly, according to the intelligence of persons. To it they refer always tacitly, and, when called upon, expressly, and from it they deduce their particular moral judgments in all stated instances. They ascribe correctness to the latter only so far as these accord with, and rest for their validity upon, those previously established generalizations. Certainly, this reference to the first principles underlying all moral judgments should always be made, though without doubt this is too seldom consciously done. It surely is demanded in order to make our decisions in special instances consistent, and without such reference it is impossible to think intelligently upon the subject. For to predicate goodness of any special act without reason, - that is, without either bringing the act under some general rule applying to all acts of the same class, or without understanding that our judgment in regard to it is ultimate, and why it is ultimate, - is evidently to stultify one's self. There is not opportunity in the compass of the present article to examine the whole question which has been introduced. Nor is such the intention. It is purposed only to suggest a few considerations which are regarded as essential to the proper treatment of the subject.

It has frequently been pointed out that all knowledge is in reality only a perception of likeness and unlikeness among things around and within us, together with inferences resting upon these perceptions; and that, at each step in acquiring knowledge, our information depends upon the observation of new differences and the drawing of new distinctions. The final analysis of the process of obtaining knowledge, — whether it be the first indefinite and crude knowledge of an infant, such as the distinguishing of a strange face from a familiar one, or the widest

scientific generalization of a Newton, or even the still wider philosophic ones of later thinkers, — shows that the process in all cases is in kind the same, and consists, in fact, simply in the establishment of different ideas within us correctly corresponding to the likenesses and unlikenesses in objects around us or feelings within us, and of sequences of ideas in harmony with the external order of events. The attainment of knowledge upon subjects into which moral considerations enter is by no means an exception to this general statement.

Let us begin by referring to a familiar distinction. Every human action may be regarded from two separate standpoints, and in each instance the action must be judged by different criteria, according as it is looked upon from one or the other of these points of view. The marked contrast between these criteria, and the apparent antagonism which sometimes is found in the decisions arrived at from looking upon human conduct from one or the other of these different points of observation, can be the most vividly realized by considering the lives of any of the ecclesiastics of the Middle Ages, who were the most distinguished among the men of their time for intelligence, piety, and goodness, but who lived at a time when conduct which we now in more enlightened days condemn was believed by all not only to be right, but also to be commended as especially pious and desirable. If we examine the lives of these men, taking into consideration the purity of their desires, the unselfishness of their motives, their unswerving loyalty to their highest ideas of duty, their unquestioning obedience to what they regarded as divine commands, we must have praise and not blame as the result of our examination. But if we look at their lives without reference to the unselfishness of the motives involved, and consider their acts and conduct in the light of modern advancement, with all the narrowness and bigotry which they displayed and the fruit which these characteristics inevitably bear, the persecutions which they favored and in which they rejoiced, their incorrect and crude ideas of Deity, their unworthy ideas of manhood, their days degraded by superstitious rites and disgraceful penances, - in brief, if we consider all those misapplications of endeavor and energy which made up so large a part of the life of the ecclesiastic in the age in which they lived, and if we compare these with what we now regard as the proper contents of a good life, we must, on the contrary, decide that the lives of these men were far from good. Thus, while we praise and admire the men, we are compelled to judge that their endeavors were misdirected and unworthy, and that their lives were full of evil-doing.

And with no necessary inconsistency. For it is an apparent and familiar truth that an act in reference to its motive is one thing, but that the same act, when considered by itself and in reference to its necessary results alone, is quite another thing. From the consideration of the one we obtain a judgment of the moral worth of the agent; from that of the other, a judgment simply of the rightness or wrongness of the act. Nor can we, it may be suggested, infer at our pleasure from one of these phases to the other. The honest unselfishness of a man by no means necessitates goodness in any of his actions. Neither does the excellence of an action prove the doer of it to be good. These inferences from one judgment to the other may be made, however, as a matter of probability in cases where the experience of mankind justifies it.

There is, then, a distinction which must not be lost sight of between our judgment of the subjective morality of conduct regarded relatively to the intention, and that of the objective morality of conduct considered out of relation to motive. Conduct may be subjectively praiseworthy and objectively blamable. The English philanthropists, in their endeavor to suppress the slavetrade, obtained the passage of a law relating to the construction of vessels. They soon found that the enforcement of this law only made the slave-trade more barbarous, and were as eager to have the law repealed as they had been to have it enacted. Again, actions in themselves good may be relatively wicked, as when one saves a person from drowning with the intention of robbing him afterwards. The two remaining cases, — one of agreement in demerit, and the other of agreement in excellence, of conduct considered in these two lights, - make up the four possible combinations, one of which obtains in each supposable instance.

There is not much real disagreement among people in regard to the criterion of the subjective excellence of conduct. All seem to be at one in regarding the quality of the motive as the

single and only test. No matter how wrong in itself the action may be, or how disastrously it may result, provided it be done with unselfish intention, we all are ready to approve of and praise the doer. In fact, the nature of the conduct itself does not enter at all into consideration, except for the purpose of judging of the internal impulse or purpose. When that is found, the problem is solved. There is, indeed, no real disagreement upon this point: but the greater portion of the civilized world, who accept the belief that the distribution of praise and blame by the divine mind which they desire to imitate depends upon the reception or rejection of certain intellectual judgments, and not upon the motives of conduct, - upon belief, and not upon intention. would be logically compelled to deny this conclusion that the test of the subjective goodness of conduct is to be found in the motive alone; yet, as a matter of fact, they are happily inconsistent, and practically act according to this rule when called upon to approve or disapprove.

Concerning the basis of our judgment of the objective morality of conduct, there is a wide disagreement among those who have thought upon the matter, though all are agreed that generally the motive forms no part of it. In so far, however, as conduct reacts upon the doer, and influences him and others who are acquainted with the motive, this, though no longer the sole criterion, becomes one of the qualities of the action, and, as such, is properly treated as one of the many factors which enter into the problem. For all other persons, the test must be sought elsewhere and without reference to the internal cause of the action.

It is because this general and fundamental distinction is not always kept in view, and also because there is a lack of accuracy in the use of language, that the holding of some intellectual opinions is frequently called wicked, or the acceptance of certain scientific theories is declared to be morally wrong. Now, there is no question that the assertion of a certain opinion, or the announcement of a belief in some statement of physical fact, may be made from selfish motive or harmful design, and on that account be within the sphere of rules of morality; but it seems evident that the opinion itself, or the belief in so far as it is honestly held, being the result of an intellectual process of observation and inference, is properly to be judged only by the canons

of correct thinking, and not by reference to principles of ethics. An opinion about facts may be correct or incorrect, but it is difficult to see how, if honestly arrived at, it can be right or wrong. Propositions about external things may be true or untrue, according as the subjective order of our ideas is in complete or incomplete harmony with the external order of events; but where is there place for moral merit or demerit unless, in addition to the propositions, there is ground for the imputation of beneficial or harmful purposes in stating them? It is to be observed in this connection that it is common to include beliefs and opinions within the sphere of ethical rules only in those branches of human knowledge which are regarded as having an immediate or important effect upon human welfare. We may conclude, indeed, that a person must be lacking in intelligence who denies that the world is spheroidal, but it is not customary to hold that such a person is wicked on account of such a denial. On the other hand, we are very ready to impute wickedness to any one who holds and expresses opinions that are opposed to those which we cherish upon any question about political or social institutions, or in relation to religious tenets. Yet the questions concerning the best form and the proper functions of government, the social relations most appropriate for a community, or the correct conceptions of the nature of Deity, are in reality only questions of fact, and are to be settled no less by intellectual processes than is the problem of the form of the earth.

In questions of sociology and theology most men found so much of their judgment upon inherited feeling and acquired educational prejudice that, as would naturally be expected, they are apt, supposing that feeling different from theirs must be wrong, to ascribe the origin of antagonistic beliefs to this wrong feeling. It is only with difficulty that they admit that those who disagree with them are honest. So we find that to hold a conception of Deity less spiritual than the current one is to act in a manner which proves inherent wickedness, on the ground that the conception is materialistic in its tendencies: to hold one that is more spiritual, or less anthropomorphic, is no less wicked on the plea that the conception is atheistical. An opinion that government should be more centralized is also wicked because such a government tends to despotism; one that government should be

less centralized is no less wicked, since such a government is an-A proposition in social science that social arrangements should be less free is wicked, because it is degrading to human dignity; one that they should be freer is also wicked, being licentious. And so throughout the whole series. Yet all these propositions concerning theological, political, and social subjects are about matters of fact, and are the same in kind as those of trigonometry or natural history. One person does not find in the facts of meteorology that regular sequence of antecedent cause and consequent effect which he perceives in other better understood portions of Nature. Therefore, he prays for pleasant weather, although he never seeks, as did those living in former ages, by such means to cause the sun to stand still or an ominous comet to go away. A second, indeed, expects an interference with the existing order of things no more in the sequences of weather than he does in the power of gravitation, but, nevertheless, supposes that he has good grounds for a belief in the probability of supernatural obstruction of the regular order of events in cases of severe illness or unusual pestilence. Therefore, he uses his best endeavors by supplication to obtain that obstruction. A third differs from these two in being convinced that all physical events occur in a fixed order, but still believes that interference is probable in spiritual things, and depends upon the efficacy of petition to obtain for himself and others strength of will, tenderness of heart, or patience under tribulation. A fourth, who has a different conception of prayer, and who believes that all events external and internal continue in a fixed order of regularity, simply tries to bring his conduct into harmony with this regularity. Now, the ideas of these four persons concerning the nature of things are widely different and mutually exclusive. Only one of them can be correct, and three of them must be incorrect: but no reason can be found why one of these men should accuse the other three of wickedness. Species may have been created by means of natural forces which are still in action around us, or their creation may have required others which do not now exist. This is a question of fact, a problem to be decided by extended observation, careful research, and rigidly logical mental operations. It seems entirely uncalled for that those holding the latter of these views should start out in a confident search. not only for the seeds, but also for the full developed plant of wickedness in the innermost hearts of those who agree in holding the former theory.

While such a restriction as has been suggested in the foregoing seems to be necessary, an enlargement of the sphere of ethics until it embraces all possible human actions also appears to be demanded. It is difficult to predicate goodness or badness of an action considered out of relation to the motive inducing it, except so far as it has results. It would seem that, for an action to be good, it must be good for something, and have some beneficial effect. It seems impossible to conceive of any goodness inhering in an action which has no results whatever. Were such an action possible, it would appear to be ethically neutral or ultra-moral. But as all events have results, even to the position of Fichte's noted grain of sand, all events may properly be classed as moral or immoral. If this be so, there can be no acts morally indifferent, and no conduct that is outside the rules of ethics. Of all possible courses of action under any special state of circumstances, one is best; all others must be immoral. It is true that there are questions in æsthetics to be solved by reference to appropriate tests, but yet these are also questions in ethics. In so far as the gracefulness or awkwardness of actions, for instance, have effects upon the human race, just so far must gracefulness or awkwardness be moral or immoral. A similar truth obtains in relation to matters of taste. There can be no neutral ground between the kingdoms of right and wrong, in which taste or decorum or respectability or custom is sole and supreme ruler. These are only deputies at most, and the empire of morality is coëxtensive with all possible conduct. So also must it be extended not only to all conduct towards human beings, but also to the treatment of animals and plants, and still further to our dealings with all inanimate things.

The use of the word Law suggests another consideration. The criticism upon the current misconception of the real import of the phrase "Law of Nature" in regard to physical events is familiar and trite. Nevertheless, this misconception is so insinuating, and seems so much to be involved in the meaning of the word law, that even the most careful writers repeatedly use forms of expression which show that, though they cannot be ignorant

of the real limitations of the meaning of the word when used concerning physical events, they yet find it exceedingly difficult to keep these limitations in view. And so, though no one really questions that a law of Nature is only a generalized statement of observed facts and of inferences from such facts, or - what to the theist is the same — a statement of God's method of action. yet it is very common to hear of things "obeying" the laws of their nature, or of events happening "on account of" or "through the agency of" some physical law. A law in hydrostatics "causes," it is said, water to become level and to stand at equal heights in opposite arms of a bent tube. A stone falls "because" the law of gravitation "compels" it to fall; while, in a correct statement of the matter, the law only alleges that stones, unless prevented, do fall, and not that they must. And the same limitation obtains in regard to the contents of every physical law.

The argument is that, because human law is composed of edicts or commands, a physical law must be of the same nature. and consist of an edict of some power which matter obeys. Because the two things happen to be called by the same name, it is inferred that they must necessarily be alike. This is much like saying that the "Republic" under Thiers must be similar to the "Republic" of the United States; that a "Communist" of Paris must be identical in doctrine with a "Communist" of Oneida; or that the "spring" of a watch can differ in no respect from the "Spring" of the year. Now, the sum of all our knowledge is that events occur in certain sequences, and that things exist in certain relations. The "why" of these sequences and relations we do not know, however many generalizations we may make. This volume would fall to the floor, if the reader did not prevent it. Why it would fall no one knows. Nor is the fact understood any more clearly because it is also known that all other things on the surface of the earth tend likewise to fall, which is a statement of the law of gravitation. The tendency of other things to fall does not explain why this book would fall.

Is not a misconception similar to this one frequently shown by our use of the phrase "violation of moral law"? In what respect do the laws of actions which involve questions of ethics differ in kind from the laws of other portions of Nature? A

physical law is only a generalized statement of an observed regularity in physical things. Is a moral law any thing more than a generalized statement of observed regularity of antecedent and consequent in moral things? Must there necessarily be, in the content of such a law, any thing like an edict or in the nature of a command or directing statute? The law of gravitation that matter tends to fall toward the earth does not seem to contain any command that we should not fall from high precipices, Does the moral law that lying is harmful any more command us not to lie? And as we do not abuse our freedom so much as to fall from precipices simply because it is not forbidden by the law of gravitation, so there seems to be no danger that we should use all our energy in telling lies simply because we find nothing involved in the law of moral things in the nature of an edict against lying. There appears to be no ground for regarding the moral law as composed of commands, except this insinuating fallacy founded upon a misconception of the word law. And this misconception arises from an incorrect idea of what human law is. For this, on analysis, will be found to be not so much a collection of commands to do or not to do, as a series of authoritative declarations that certain acts will be followed by certain results, which were not in the previous order of events, and which have been arbitrarily added for certain purposes by the power making and announcing the law.

Besides, the assumption of an edict does not help us in any respect in deciding what are the grounds or reasons of morality. For the query immediately arises, concerning the reason of the existence of the edict, what the intention or purpose was in making it. Why was it made just as it is assumed to be, and not otherwise? To this question there is first the answer that we do not know, which is a confession that the assumption of an edict does not aid us at all in obtaining the ultimate test of rightness or wrongness in conduct. This reply demands that we should be satisfied with arbitrary commands, the reasons of which are unknown, and be content with the view that acts are wrong simply because they are forbidden, even though they are forbidden unreasonably and from causes which it is impossible for us to investigate. There is also the second answer that conduct is commanded or forbidden, according as it is for our benefit or

harm. The real test in this view is to be sought in the resulting benefits or disadvantages of conduct. Then why not say so at first and once for all? It is unnecessary to take two steps, when one of them will do as well. The assumption of authoritative commands either gives no explanation whatever, or by a circuitous route brings us back to the proposition that the test of morality is found in the beneficial or harmful effects of conduct. It would seem to be better not to use an assumption which is proved to be unnecessary for the purpose, and to go straight to the conclusion that the fundamental principle of ethical philosophy is that all morality is summed up in the disinterested service of the human race. To attempt to explain by reference to divine command is to forget that "God, while being the cause of all things, is the explanation of none."

But if questions in morality are to be settled upon the theory of authoritative command, the belief in the existence of these commands must be justified. This can be done only on two The first is that these commands are to be found among things divinely revealed to us and contained in written documents now in our possession. Whether this proposition be true or not, the argument of this discussion does not call for an opinion. All that is here claimed is that, even if we assume that this proposition is true, it gives us no help whatever in finding a logical basis for our theory of morality. The existence and genuineness of these writings are to be decided by the methods applicable to the treatment of those of other writings, - that is, by the use of our faculties of observation and inference. Their authenticity is a matter of historical research. They are to be interpreted by the same canons of philological criticism as those appropriate in the case of other printed and written documents. When these processes are completed, the claim is made upon the results obtained that the moral precepts contained in these documents are divinely revealed, and therefore binding. Upon the validity of this claim no opinion is intended to be expressed. If we assume that it is entirely valid, and ask for information of those asserting it as to the ground upon which they rest their assertion that these precepts are divinely revealed, we are answered, as the question is usually answered, that the proof is to be found in the internal evidence of the documents themselves. Further inquiry will show that by internal evidence is meant that the books contain the purest and highest code of morality the world has ever seen. But why is this code called the purest and best? The only possible answer is that it is so called because, if its precepts were universally obeyed, the effect would be more strikingly beneficial to the whole human race than that which would follow the enforcement of any other proposed code; that there would be no further need of creating crime or of inflicting punishment; and that all men would be so completely in harmony with each other and with social requirements that civilization would approach perfection. Now, what is this conclusion to which we are necessarily brought, though by a circuitous course, in attempting to account for the belief that the commands upon which morality depends are revealed and written, but the one at which we have previously arrived in attempting to account for the origin and purpose of the commands themselves? By either attempt on the part of those who would explain the matter by reference to commands, they after all come back to this simple proposition that the morality of actions is to be tested by their beneficial or harmful effects upon the human race.

But it may be said that the commands are revealed not indeed in writing, but in the course of Nature and in the effects of conduct. Advantageous conduct implies a command, and disadvantageous conduct a forbidding, even though no written rules exist. This may be so, and we are willing here to grant it. Yet, after granting it, we are still as remote as before from finding a basis for moral rules. For the commands must in this case also be accounted for, and our belief in them justified; and to account for them and for our belief in them we shall be again compelled to assert the main proposition to which we have come so many times. If we try to explain our belief in the existence of the unwritten commands or the origin or purpose of them, we shall inevitably find ourselves, by the same steps which have been already denoted, compelled to say that both the belief and the origin are to be accounted for only by asserting anew that main proposition. Those who favor the view that acts are right or wrong because they are commanded or forbidden sum up their argument by saying that a certain course of conduct is beneficial; that, therefore, it is enjoined; and that, because enjoined, it is right: instead of saying, in a still briefer summary, that the act is beneficial, and, because beneficial, right. It will be seen that they interpolate a command and draw a conclusion from it, when they cannot account for their belief in the command or for the reason of the command's existence, except by assuming the very proposition which they afterwards infer from the command, — a course of reasoning that is evidently circular.

If the suggestions which have been briefly presented are well founded; if, in our search through the moral as well as the physical world, we do not find any thing in the nature of authoritative command, but only order and regular sequence, - it is difficult to perceive how the solution of a question in ethics differs from that of one in chemical physics as far as instrumentalities and method are concerned. Our emotions evidently are not sufficient means with which to solve a problem in chemical combination: neither are they adequate to decide for us whether conduct is moral or immoral. It is not claimed by any one under any view of the subject that the moral sense or conscience has the power of informing us what, in a stated condition of circumstances, is the right course of action. The most that is claimed by any writer upon morals is that conscience gives only the first simple general axioms of conduct in accordance with which we are to regulate our lives, but that it never can be a trustworthy guide in the complicated affairs of social life until these are analyzed, simplified, and reduced to their first elements. Others assert even less than this, and claim that conscience does not give any rules whatever in regard to specific conduct in stated cases, but only enjoins upon us to do what is right after we have found out by other means what course of conduct is in fact right. They allege only that conscience enforces the obligation of doing our duty after we have decided by appropriate tests what our duty really is, - making conscience the guide in our choice of and obedience to motives, and limiting its functions to the province of subjective morality. They look upon conscience as the impulse to right conduct, and as useful only when we have already settled which line of conduct is right. To them it is analogous to the steam which propels the vessel, and not to the pilot who holds the helm and selects the course. Under either of these views of conscience, the acquiring of knowledge concerning the objective morality of any specific act or particular line of conduct is still left to be exclusively an affair of intellectual research, and not of emotion or feeling.

T. F. BROWNELL.

### THE REVOLUTION.

THERE is no pause. Still blow resounds on blow,
The order old making to shake and reel
From base to pinnacle. To dust brought low,
Crescent and Cross the shock of ruin feel.
Shallow Reaction tries in vain to stem
The Revolution's surge, which more and more,
Drowning tiara, throne, and diadem,
Spreads undulating wide from shore to shore.
What though Priest, Kaiser, Sultan, King still sit
Sceptred and crowned above the encroaching flood?
Belshazzar's legend is above them writ,
And they grow pale before Man's altered mood.
Voices of Revolution, trumpet-clear,
Byron and Shelley, lo, your day is near!

B. W. BALL.

# SYSTEM OF ECONOMICAL CONTRADICTIONS:

OR,

#### THE PHILOSOPHY OF MISERY.

By P. J. PROUDHON.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY THE EDITOR.

#### CHAPTER III.

ECONOMIC EVOLUTIONS. — FIRST PERIOD. — THE DIVISION OF LABOR.

THE fundamental idea, the dominant category, of political economy is VALUE.

Value reaches its positive determination by a series of oscillations between *supply* and *demand*.

Consequently, value appears successively under three aspects: useful value, exchangeable value, and synthetic, or social, value, which is true value. The first term gives birth to the second in contradiction to it, and the two together, absorbing each other in reciprocal penetration, produce the third: so that the contradiction or antagonism of ideas appears as the point of departure of all economic science, allowing us to say of it, parodying the sentence of Tertullian in relation to the Gospel, *Credo quia absurdum*: There is, in social economy, a latent truth wherever there is an apparent contradiction, *Credo quia contrarium*.

From the point of view of political economy, then, social progress consists in a continuous solution of the problem of the constitution of values, or of the proportionality and solidarity of products.

But while in Nature the synthesis of opposites is contemporary with their opposition, in society the antithetic elements seem to appear at long intervals, and to reach solution only after long and tumultuous agitation. Thus there is no example—the idea even is inconceivable—of a valley without a hill, a left without a right, a north pole without a south pole, a stick with but one end, or two ends without a middle, etc. The human body, with its so perfectly antithetic dichotomy, is formed integrally at the very moment of conception; it refuses to be put together and arranged piece by piece, like the garment patterned after it which, later, is to cover it.<sup>1</sup>

In society, on the contrary, as well as in the mind, so far from the idea reaching its complete realization at a single bound, a sort of abyss separates, so to speak, the two antinomical positions, and even when these are recognized at last, we still do not see what the synthesis will be. The primitive concepts must be fertilized, so to speak, by burning controversy and passionate struggle; bloody battles will be the preliminaries of peace. At the present moment, Europe, weary of war and discussion, awaits a reconciling principle; and it is the vague perception of this situation which induces the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences to ask, "What are the general facts which govern the relations of profits to wages and determine their oscillations?" in other words, what are the most salient episodes and the most remarkable phases of the war between labor and capital?

If, then, I demonstrate that political economy, with all its contradictory hypotheses and equivocal conclusions, is nothing but an organization of privilege and misery, I shall have proved thereby that it contains by implication the promise of an organization of labor and equality, since, as has been said, every systematic contradiction is the announcement of a composition; further, I shall have fixed the bases of this composition. Then, indeed, to unfold the system of economical contradictions is to lay the foundations of universal association; to show how the products of collective labor *come out* of society is to explain how

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A subtle philologist, M. Paul Ackermann, has shown, using the French language as an illustration, that, since every word in a language has its opposite, or, as the author calls it, its antonym, the entire vocabulary might be arranged in couples, forming a vast dualistic system. (See Dictionary of Antonyms. By Paul Ackermann. Paris: Brockhaus & Avenarius. 1842.)

it will be possible to make them *return* to it; to exhibit the genesis of the problems of production and distribution is to prepare the way for their solution. All these propositions are identical and equally evident.

## §1. — Antagonistic effects of the principle of division.

All men are equal in the state of primitive communism, equal in their nakedness and ignorance, equal in the indefinite power of their faculties. The economists generally look at only the first of these aspects; they neglect or overlook the second. Nevertheless, according to the profoundest philosophers of modern times, La Rochefoucault, Helvétius, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Jacotot, intelligence differs in individuals only qualitatively, each having thereby his own specialty or genius; in its essence, — namely, judgment, — it is quantitatively equal in all. Hence it follows that, a little sooner or a little later, according as circumstances shall be more or less favorable, general progress must lead all men from original and negative equality to a positive equivalence of talents and acquirements.

I insist upon this precious datum of psychology, the necessary consequence of which is that the hierarchy of capacities henceforth cannot be allowed as a principle and law of organization: equality alone is our rule, as it is also our ideal. Then, just as the equality of misery must change gradually into equality of well-being, as we have proved by the theory of value, so the equality of minds, negative in the beginning, since it represents only emptiness, must reappear in a positive form at the completion of humanity's education. The intellectual movement proceeds parallelly with the economic movement; they are the expression, the translation, of each other; psychology and social economy are in accord, or rather, they but unroll the same history, each from a different point of view. This appears especially in Smith's great law, the division of labor.

Considered in its essence, the division of labor is the way in which equality of condition and intelligence is realized. Through diversity of function, it gives rise to proportionality of products and equilibrium in exchange, and consequently opens for us the

road to wealth; as also, in showing us infinity everywhere in art and Nature, it leads us to idealize our acts, and makes the creative mind — that is, divinity itself, mentem diviniorem — immanent and perceptible in all laborers.

Division of labor, then, is the first phase of economic evolution as well as of intellectual development: our point of departure is true as regards both man and things, and the progress of our exposition is in no wise arbitrary.

But, at this solemn hour of the division of labor, tempestuous winds begin to blow upon humanity. Progress does not improve the condition of all equally and uniformly, although in the end it must include and transfigure every intelligent and industrious being. It commences by taking possession of a small number of privileged persons, who thus compose the élite of nations, while the mass continues, or even buries itself deeper, in barbarism. It is this exception of persons on the part of progress which has perpetuated the belief in the natural and providential inequality of conditions, engendered caste, and given an hierarchical form to all societies. It has not been understood that all inequality, never being more than a negation, carries in itself the proof of its illegitimacy and the announcement of its downfall: much less still has it been imagined that this same inequality proceeds accidentally from a cause the ulterior effect of which must be its entire disappearance.

Thus, the antinomy of value reappearing in the law of division, it is found that the first and most potent instrument of knowledge and wealth which Providence has placed in our hands has become for us an instrument of misery and imbecility. Here is the formula of this new law of antagonism, to which we owe the two oldest maladies of civilization, aristocracy and the proletariat; Labor, in dividing itself according to the law which is peculiar to it, and which is the primary condition of its productivity, ends in the frustration of its own objects, and destroys itself; in other words: Division, in the absence of which there is no progress, no wealth, no equality, subordinates the workingman, and renders intelligence useless, wealth harmful, and equality impossible.

All the economists, since Adam Smith, have pointed out the advantages and the inconveniences of the law of division, but at the same time insisting much more strenuously upon the first

than the second, because such a course was more in harmony with their optimistic views, and not one of them ever asking how a *law* can have *inconveniences*. This is the way in which J. B. Say summed up the question:—

"A man who during his whole life performs but one operation, certainly acquires the power to execute it better and more readily than another; but at the same time he becomes less capable of any other occupation, whether physical or moral; his other faculties become extinct, and there results a degeneracy in the individual man. That one has made only the eighteenth part of a pin is a sad account to give of one's self: but let no one imagine that it is the workingman who spends his life in handling a file or a hammer that alone degenerates in this way from the dignity of his nature; it is the same with the man whose position leads him to exercise the most subtle faculties of his mind. . . On the whole, it may be said that the separation of tasks is an advantageous use of human forces; that it increases enormously the products of society; but that it takes something from the capacity of each man taken individually." I

What, then, after labor, is the primary cause of the multiplication of wealth and the skill of laborers? Division.

What is the primary cause of intellectual degeneracy and, as we shall show continually, civilized misery? Division.

How does the same principle, rigorously followed to its conclusions, lead to effects diametrically opposite? There is not an economist, either before or since Adam Smith, who has even perceived that here is a problem to be solved. Say goes so far as to recognize that in the division of labor the same cause which produces the good engenders the evil; then, after a few words of pity for the victims of the separation of industries, content with having given an impartial and faithful exhibition of the facts, he leaves the matter there. "You know," he seems to say, "that the more we divide the workmen's tasks, the more we increase the productive power of labor; but at the same time the more does labor, gradually reducing itself to a mechanical operation, stupefy intelligence."

In vain do we express our indignation against a theory which, creating by labor itself an aristocracy of capacities, leads inevitably to political inequality; in vain do we protest in the name of democracy and progress that in the future there will be no nobility, no *bourgeoisie*, no pariahs. The economist replies, with the impassibility of destiny: You are condemned to produce

<sup>&</sup>quot; "Treatise on Political Economy."

much, and to produce cheaply; otherwise your industry will be always insignificant, your commerce will amount to nothing, and you will drag in the rear of civilization instead of taking the lead. — What! among us, generous men, there are some predestined to brutishness; and the more perfect our industry becomes, the larger will grow the number of our accursed brothers! . . . — Alas! . . . That is the last word of the economist.

We cannot fail to recognize in the division of labor, as a general fact and as a cause, all the characteristics of a LAW; but as this law governs two orders of phenomena radically opposite and destructive of each other, it must be confessed also that this law is of a sort unknown in the exact sciences, — that it is, strange to say, a contradictory law, a counter-law, an antinomy. Let us add, in anticipation, that such appears to be the identifying feature of social economy, and consequently of philosophy.

Now, without a RECOMPOSITION of labor which shall obviate the inconveniences of division while preserving its useful effects, the contradiction inherent in the principle is irremediable. It is necessary, —following the style of the Jewish priests plotting the death of Christ, —it is necessary that the poor should perish to secure the proprietor his fortune, expedit unum hominem pro populo mori. I am going to demonstrate the necessity of this decree; after which, if the parcellaire laborer still retains a glimmer of intelligence, he will console himself with the thought that he dies according to the rules of political economy.

Labor, which ought to give scope to the conscience and render it more and more worthy of happiness, leading through parcellaire division to prostration of mind, dwarfs man in his noblest part, minorat capitis, and throws him back into animality. Thenceforth the fallen man labors as a brute, and consequently must be treated as a brute. This sentence of Nature and necessity society will execute.

The first effect of *parcellaire* labor, after the depravation of the mind, is the lengthening of the hours of labor, which increase in inverse proportion to the amount of intelligence expended. For, the product increasing in quantity and quality at once, if, by any industrial improvement whatever, labor is lightened in one way, it must pay for it in another. But as the length of the working-day cannot exceed from sixteen to eighteen hours, when compen-

sation no longer can be made in time, it will be taken from the price, and wages will decrease. And this decrease will take place, not, as has been foolishly imagined, because value is essentially arbitrary, but because it is essentially determinable. Little matters it that the struggle between supply and demand ends, now to the advantage of the employer, now to the benefit of the employee; such oscillations may vary in amplitude, this depending on well-known accessory circumstances which have been estimated a thousand times. The certain point, and the only one for us to notice now, is that the universal conscience does not set the same price upon the labor of an overseer and the work of a hod-carrier. A reduction in the price of the day's work, then, is necessary: so that the laborer, after having been afflicted in mind by a degrading function, cannot fail to be struck also in his body by the meagreness of his reward. This is the literal application of the words of the Gospel: He that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath,

There is in economic accidents a pitiless reason which laugh's at religion and equity as political aphorisms, and which renders man happy or unhappy according as he obeys or escapes the prescriptions of destiny. Certainly this is far from that Christian charity with which so many honorable writers to-day are inspired, and which, penetrating to the heart of the bourgeoisie, endeavors to temper the rigors of the law by numerous religious institutions. Political economy knows only justice, justice as inflexible and unyielding as the miser's purse; and it is because political economy is the effect of social spontaneity and the expression of the divine will that I have been able to say: God is man's adversary, and Providence a misanthrope. God makes us pay, in weight of blood and measure of tears, for each of our lessons; and to complete the evil, we, in our relations with our fellows, all act like him. Where, then, is this love of the celestial father for his creatures? Where is human fraternity?

Can he do otherwise? say the theists. Man falling, the animal remains: how could the Creator recognize in him his own image? And what plainer than that he treats him then as a beast of burden? But the trial will not last for ever, and sooner or later labor, having been particularized, will be synthetized.

Such is the ordinary argument of all those who seek to justify

Providence, but generally succeed only in lending new weapons to atheism. That is to say, then, that God would have envied us, for six thousand years, an idea which would have saved millions of victims, a distribution of labor at once special and synthetic! In return, he has given us, through his servants Moses. Buddha, Zoroaster, Mahomet, etc., those insipid writings, the disgrace of our reason, which have killed more men than they contain letters! Further, if we must believe primitive revelation, social economy was the cursed science, the fruit of the tree reserved for God, which man was forbidden to touch! Why this religious depreciation of labor, if it is true, as economic science already shows, that labor is the father of love and the organ of happiness? Why this jealousy of our advancement? But if, as now sufficiently appears, our progress depends upon ourselves alone, of what use is it to adore this phantom of divinity, and what does he still ask of us through the multitude of inspired persons who pursue us with their sermons? All of you, Christians, protestant and orthodox, neo-revelators, charlatans and dupes, listen to the first verse of the humanitarian hymn upon God's mercy: "In proportion as the principle of division of labor receives complete application, the worker becomes weaker, narrower, and more dependent. Art advances; the artisan recedes!" I

Then let us guard against anticipating conclusions and prejudging the latest revelation of experience. At present God seems less favorable than hostile: let us confine ourselves to establishing the fact.

Just as political economy, then, at its point of departure, has made us understand these mysterious and dismal words: In proportion as the production of utility increases, venality decreases; so, arrived at its first station, it warns us in a terrible voice: In proportion as art advances, the artisan recedes.

To fix the ideas better, let us cite a few examples.

In all the branches of metal-working, who are the least industrious of the wage-laborers? Precisely those who are called *machinists*. Since tools have been so admirably perfected, a machinist is simply a man who knows how to handle a file or a plane: as for mechanics, that is the business of engineers and foremen. A

I Tocqueville, "Democracy in America."

country blacksmith often unites in his own person, by the very necessity of his position, the various talents of the locksmith, the edge-tool maker, the gunsmith, the machinist, the wheel-wright, and the horse-doctor: the world of thought would be astonished at the knowledge that is under the hammer of this man, whom the people, always inclined to jest, nickname brûle-fer. A workingman of Creuzot, who for ten years has seen the grandest and finest that his profession can offer, on leaving his shop, finds himself unable to render the slightest service or to earn his living. The incapacity of the subject is directly proportional to the perfection of the art; and this is as true of all the trades as of metal-working.

The wages of machinists are maintained as yet at a high rate: sooner or later their pay must decrease, the poor quality of the labor being unable to maintain it.

I have just cited a mechanical art; let us now cite a liberal industry.

Would Gutenberg and his industrious companions, Faust and Schöffer, ever have believed that, by the division of labor, their sublime invention would fall into the domain of ignorance - I had almost said idiocy? There are few men so weak-minded, so unlettered, as the mass of workers who follow the various branches of the typographic industry, - compositors, pressmen, type-founders, book-binders, and paper-makers. The printer, as he existed even in the days of the Estiennes, has become almost an abstraction. The employment of women in type-setting has struck this noble industry to the heart, and consummated its degradation. I have seen a female compositor - and she was one of the best - who did not know how to read, and was acquainted only with the forms of the letters. The whole art has been withdrawn into the hands of foremen and proof-readers, modest men of learning whom the impertinence of authors and patrons still humiliates, and a few workmen who are real artists. The press, in a word, fallen into mere mechanism, is no longer, in its personnel, at the level of civilization: soon there will be left of it but a few souvenirs.

I am told that the printers of Paris are endeavoring by association to rise again from their degradation: may their efforts not be exhausted in vain empiricism or misled into barren utopias!

After private industries, let us look at public administration. In the public service, the effects of parcellaire labor are no less frightful, no less intense: in all the departments of administration, in proportion as the art develops, most of the employees see their salaries diminish. A letter-carrier receives from four hundred to six hundred francs per annum, of which the administration retains about a tenth for the retiring pension. thirty years of labor, the pension, or rather the restitution, is three hundred francs per annum, which, when given to an almshouse by the pensioner, entitles him to a bed, soup, and washing. My heart bleeds to say it, but I think, nevertheless, that the administration is generous: what reward would you give to a man whose whole function consists in walking? The legend gives but five sous to the Wandering Jew; the letter-carriers receive twenty or thirty; true, the greater part of them have a family. That part of the service which calls into exercise the intellectual faculties is reserved for the postmasters and clerks: these are better paid; they do the work of men.

Everywhere, then, in public service as well as free industry, things are so ordered that nine-tenths of the laborers serve as beasts of burden for the other tenth: such is the inevitable effect of industrial progress and the indispensable condition of all wealth. It is important to look well at this elementary truth before talking to the people of equality, liberty, democratic institutions, and other utopias, the realization of which involves a previous complete revolution in the relations of laborers.

The most remarkable effect of the division of labor is the decay of literature.

In the Middle Ages and in antiquity the man of letters, a sort of encyclopædic doctor, a successor of the troubadour and the poet, all-knowing, was almighty. Literature lorded it over society with a high hand; kings sought the favor of authors, or revenged themselves for their contempt by burning them, — them and their books. This, too, was a way of recognizing literary sovereignty.

To-day we have manufacturers, lawyers, doctors, bankers, merchants, professors, engineers, librarians, etc.; we have no men of letters. Or rather, whoever has risen to a remarkable height in his profession is thereby and of necessity lettered: literature, like the baccalaureate, has become an elementary part of every profession. The man of letters, reduced to his simplest expression, is the *public writer*, a sort of writing commissioner in the pay of everybody, whose best-known variety is the journalist.

It was a strange idea that occurred to the Chambers four vears ago, - that of making a law on literary property! As if henceforth the idea was not to become more and more the allimportant point, the style nothing. Thanks to God, there is an end of parliamentary eloquence as of epic poetry and mythology; the theatre rarely attracts business men and savants; and while the connoisseurs are astonished at the decline of art, the philosophic observer sees only the progress of manly reason, troubled rather than rejoiced at these dainty trifles. The interest in romance is sustained only as long as it resembles reality; history is reducing itself to anthropological exegesis; everywhere, indeed, the art of talking well appears as a subordinate auxiliary of the idea, the fact. The worship of speech, too mazy and slow for impatient minds, is neglected, and its artifices are losing daily their power of seduction. The language of the nineteenth century is made up of facts and figures, and he is the most eloquent among us who, with the fewest words, can say the most things. Whoever cannot speak this language is mercilessly relegated to the ranks of the rhetoricians; he is said to have no

In a young society the progress of letters necessarily outstrips philosophical and industrial progress, and for a long time serves for the expression of both. But there comes a day when thought leaves language in the rear, and when, consequently, the continued preëminence of literature in a society becomes a sure symptom of decline. Language, in fact, is to every people the collection of its native ideas, the encyclopædia which Providence first reveals to it; it is the field which its reason must cultivate before directly attacking Nature through observation and experience. Now, as soon as a nation, after having exhausted the knowledge contained in its vocabulary, instead of pursuing its education by a superior philosophy, wraps itself in its poetic mantle, and begins to play with its periods and its hemistichs, we may safely say that such a society is lost. Every thing in it will become subtle, narrow, and false; it will not have even the advan-

tage of maintaining in its splendor the language of which it is foolishly enamored; instead of going forward in the path of the geniuses of transition, the Tacituses, the Thucydides, the Machiavels, and the Montesquieus, it will be seen to fall, with irresistible force, from the majesty of Cicero to the subtleties of Seneca, the antitheses of St. Augustine, and the puns of St. Bernard.

Let no one, then, be deceived: from the moment that the mind, at first entirely occupied with speech, passes to experience and labor, the man of letters, properly speaking, is simply the puny personification of the least of our faculties; and literature, the refuse of intelligent industry, finds a market only with the idlers whom it amuses and the proletaires whom it fascinates, the jugglers who besiege power and the charlatans who shelter themselves behind it, the hierophants of divine right who blow the trumpet of Sinai, and the fanatical proclaimers of the sovereignty of the people, whose few mouth-pieces, compelled to practise their tribunician eloquence from tombs until they can shower it from the height of rostrums, know no better than to give to the public parodies of Gracchus and Demosthenes.

All the powers of society, then, agree in indefinitely deteriorating the condition of the *parcellaire* laborer; and experience, universally confirming the theory, proves that this worker is condemned to misfortune from his mother's womb, no political reform, no association of interests, no effort either of public charity or of instruction, having the power to aid him. The various specifics proposed in these latter days, far from being able to cure the evil, would tend rather to inflame it by irritation; and all that has been written on this point has only exhibited in a clear light the vicious circle of political economy.

This we shall demonstrate in a few words.

## § 2. — Impotence of palliatives. — MM. Blanqui, Chevalier, Dunoyer, Rossi, and Passy.

All the remedies proposed for the fatal effects of parcellaire division may be reduced to two, which really are but one, the second being the inversion of the first: to raise the mental and moral condition of the workingman by increasing his comfort

and dignity; or else, to prepare the way for his future emancipation and happiness by instruction.

We will examine successively these two systems, one of which is represented by M. Blanqui, the other by M. Chevalier.

M. Blanqui is a friend of association and progress, a writer of democratic tendencies, a professor who has a place in the hearts of the proletariat. In his opening discourse of the year 1845, M. Blanqui proclaimed, as a means of salvation, the association of labor and capital, the participation of the workingman in the profits, - that is, a beginning of industrial solidarity. century," he exclaimed, "must witness the birth of the collective producer." M. Blanqui forgets that the collective producer was born long since, as well as the collective consumer, and that the question is no longer a genetic, but a medical, one. Our task is to cause the blood proceeding from the collective digestion, instead of rushing wholly to the head, stomach, and lungs, to descend also into the legs and arms. Besides, I do not know what method M. Blanqui proposes to employ in order to realize his generous thought, - whether it be the establishment of national workshops, or the loaning of capital by the State, or the expropriation of the conductors of business enterprises and the substitution for them of industrial associations, or, finally, whether he will rest content with a recommendation of the savings-bank to workingmen, in which case the participation would be put off till doomsday.

However this may be, M. Blanqui's idea amounts simply to an increase of wages resulting from the copartnership, or at least from the interest in the business, which he confers upon the laborers. What, then, is the value to the laborer of a participation in the profits?

A mill with fifteen thonsand spindles, employing three hundred hands, does not pay at present an annual dividend of twenty thousand francs. I am informed by a Mulhouse manufacturer that factory stocks in Alsace are generally below par and that this industry has already become a means of getting money by stock-jobbing instead of by labor. To SELL; to sell at the right time; to sell dear,—is the only object in view; to manufacture is only to prepare for a sale. When I assume, then, on an average, a profit of twenty thousand francs to a factory employing

three hundred persons, my argument being general, I am twenty thousand francs out of the way. Nevertheless, we will admit the correctness of this amount. Dividing twenty thousand francs, the profit of the mill, by three hundred, the number of persons. and again by three hundred, the number of working days, I find an increase of pay for each person of twenty-two and one-fifth centimes, or for daily expenditure an addition of eighteen centimes, just a morsel of bread. Is it worth while, then, for this, to expropriate mill-owners and endanger the public welfare, by erecting establishments which must be insecure, since, property being divided into infinitely small shares, and being no longer supported by profit, business enterprises would lack ballast, and would be unable to weather commercial gales. And even if no expropriation was involved, what a poor prospect to offer the working class is an increase of eighteen centimes in return for centuries of economy; for no less time than this would be needed to accumulate the requisite capital, supposing that periodical suspensions of business did not periodically consume its savings!

The fact which I have just stated has been pointed out in several ways. M. Passy I himself took from the books of a mill in Normandy where the laborers were associated with the owner the wages of several families for a period of ten years, and he found that they averaged from twelve to fourteen hundred francs per year. He then compared the situation of mill-hands paid in proportion to the prices obtained by their employers with that of laborers who receive fixed wages, and found that the difference is almost imperceptible. This result might easily have been foreseen. Economic phenomena obey laws as abstract and immutable as those of numbers: it is only privilege, fraud, and absolutism which disturb the eternal harmony.

M. Blanqui, repentant, as it seems, at having taken this first step toward socialistic ideas, has made haste to retract his words. At the same meeting in which M. Passy demonstrated the inadequacy of coöperative association, he exclaimed: "Does it not seem that labor is a thing susceptible of organization, and that it is in the power of the State to regulate the happiness of humanity as it does the march of an army, and with an entirely mathematical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Meeting of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, September, 1845.

precision? This is an evil tendency, a delusion which the Academy cannot oppose too strongly, because it is not only a chimera, but a dangerous sophism. Let us respect good and honest intentions; but let us not fear to say that to publish a book upon the organization of labor is to rewrite for the fiftieth time a treatise upon the quadrature of the circle or the philosopher's stone."

Then, carried away by his zeal, M. Blanqui finishes the destruction of his theory of cooperation, which M. Passy already had so rudely shaken, by the following example: "M. Dailly, one of the most enlightened of farmers, has drawn up an account for each piece of land and an account for each product; and he proves that within a period of thirty years the same man has never obtained equal crops from the same piece of land. The products have varied from twenty-six thousand francs to nine thousand or seven thousand francs, sometimes descending as low as three hundred francs. There are also certain products — potatoes, for instance — which fail one time in ten. How, then, with these variations and with revenues so uncertain, can we establish even distribution and uniform wages for laborers? . . ."

It might be answered that the variations in the product of each piece of land simply indicate that it is necessary to associate proprietors with each other after having associated laborers with proprietors, which would establish a more complete solidarity: but this would be a prejudgment on the very thing in question, which M. Blanqui definitively decides, after reflection, to be unattainable, — namely, the organization of labor. Besides, it is evident that solidarity would not add an obolus to the common wealth, and that, consequently, it does not even touch the problem of division.

In short, the profit so much envied, and often a very uncertain matter with employers, falls far short of the difference between actual wages and the wages desired; and M. Blanqui's former plan, miserable in its results and disavowed by its author, would be a scourge to the manufacturing industry. Now, the division of labor being henceforth universally established, the argument is generalized, and leads us to the conclusion that misery is an effect of labor, as well as of idleness.

The answer to this is, and it is a favorite argument with the people: Increase the price of services; double and triple wages.

I confess that if such an increase was possible it would be a complete success, whatever M. Chevalier may have said, who needs to be slightly corrected on this point.

According to M. Chevalier, if the price of any kind of merchandise whatever is increased, other kinds will rise in a like pro-

portion, and no one will benefit thereby.

This argument, which the economists have rehearsed for more than a century, is as false as it is old, and it belonged to M. Chevalier, as an engineer, to rectify the economic tradition. The salary of a head clerk being ten francs per day, and the wages of a workingman four, if the income of each is increased five francs, the ratio of their fortunes, which was formerly as one hundred to forty, will be thereafter as one hundred to sixty. The increase of wages, necessarily taking place by addition and not by proportion, would be, therefore, an excellent method of equalization; and the economists would deserve to have thrown back at them by the socialists the reproach of ignorance which they have be stowed upon them at random.

But I say that such an increase is impossible, and that the supposition is absurd: for, as M. Chevalier has shown very clearly elsewhere, the figure which indicates the price of the day's labor is only an algebraic exponent without effect on the reality: and that which it is necessary first to endeavor to increase, while correcting the inequalities of distribution, is not the monetary expression, but the quantity of products. Till then every rise of wages can have no other effect than that produced by a rise of the price of wheat, wine, meat, sugar, soap, coal, etc., — that is, the effect of a scarcity. For what is wages?

It is the cost price of wheat, wine, meat, coal; it is the integrant price of all things. Let us go farther yet: wages is the proportionality of the elements which compose wealth, and which are consumed every day reproductively by the mass of laborers. Now, to double wages, in the sense in which the people understand the words, is to give to each producer a share greater than his product, which is contradictory: and if the rise pertains only to a few industries, a general disturbance in exchange ensues,—that is, a scarcity. God save me from predictions! but, in spite of my desire for the amelioration of the lot of the working class, I declare that it is impossible for strikes followed by

an increase of wages to end otherwise than in a general rise in prices: that is as certain as that two and two make four. It is not by such methods that the workingmen will attain to wealth and — what is a thousand times more precious than wealth — liberty. The workingmen, supported by the favor of an indiscreet press, in demanding an increase of wages, have served monopoly much better than their own real interests: may they recognize, when their situation shall become more painful, the bitter fruit of their inexperience!

Convinced of the uselessness, or rather, of the fatal effects, of an increase of wages, and seeing clearly that the question is wholly organic and not at all commercial, M. Chevalier attacks the problem at the other end. He asks for the working class, first of all, instruction, and proposes extensive reforms in this direction.

Instruction! this is also M. Arago's word to the workingmen; it is the principle of all progress. Instruction! . . . It should be known once for all what may be expected from it in the solution of the problem before us; it should be known, I say, not whether it is desirable that all should receive it, — this no one doubts, — but whether it is possible.

To clearly comprehend the complete significance of M. Chevalier's views, a knowledge of his methods is indispensable.

M. Chevalier, long accustomed to discipline, first by his polytechnic studies, then by his St. Simonian connections, and finally by his position in the University, does not seem to admit that a pupil can have any other inclination than to obey the regulations, a sectarian any other thought than that of his chief, a public functionary any other opinion than that of the government. This may be a conception of order as respectable as any other, and I hear upon this subject no expressions of approval or censure. Has M. Chevalier an idea to offer peculiar to himself? On the principle that all that is not forbidden by law is allowed, he hastens to the front to deliver his opinion, and then abandons it to give his adhesion, if there is occasion, to the opinion of authority. It was thus that M. Chevalier, before settling down in the bosom of the Constitution, joined M. Enfantin: it was thus that he gave his views upon canals, railroads, finance, property, long before the administration had adopted any system in relation to the construction of railways, the changing of the rate of interest on bonds, patents, literary property, etc.

M. Chevalier, then, is not a blind admirer of the University system of instruction, — far from it; and until the appearance of the new order of things, he does not hesitate to say what he thinks. His opinions are of the most radical.

M. Villemain had said in his report: "The object of the higher education is to prepare in advance a choice of men to occupy and serve in all the positions of the administration, the magistracy, the bar and the various liberal professions, including the higher ranks and learned specialties of the army and navy."

"The higher education," thereupon observes M. Chevalier, I "is designed also to prepare men some of whom shall be farmers, others manufacturers, these merchants, and those private engineers. Now, in the official programme, all these classes are forgotten. The omission is of considerable importance; for, indeed, industry in its various forms, agriculture, commerce, are neither accessories nor accidents in a State: they are its chief dependence. . . . If the University desires to justify its name, it must provide a course in these things; else an *industrial university* will be established in opposition to it. . . . We shall have altar against altar, etc. . . ."

And as it is characteristic of a luminous idea to throw light on all questions connected with it, professional instruction furnishes M. Chevalier with a very expeditious method of deciding, incidentally, the quarrel between the clergy and the University on liberty of education.

"It must be admitted that a very great concession is made to the clergy in allowing Latin to serve as the basis of education. The clergy know Latin as well as the University; it is their own tongue. Their tuition, moreover, is cheaper; hence they must inevitably draw a large portion of our youth into their small seminaries and their schools of a higher grade. . ."

The conclusion of course follows: change the course of study, and you decatholicize the realm; and as the clergy know only Latin and the Bible, when they have among them neither masters of art, nor farmers, nor accountants; when, of their forty

<sup>&</sup>quot; "Journal des Economistes," April, 1843.

thousand priests, there are not twenty, perhaps, with the ability to make a plan or forge a nail, — we soon shall see which the fathers of families will choose, industry or the breviary, and whether they do not regard labor as the most beautiful language in which to pray to God.

Thus would end this ridiculous opposition between religious education and profane science, between the spiritual and the temporal, between reason and faith, between altar and throne, old rubrics henceforth meaningless, but with which they still impose upon the good nature of the public, until it takes offence.

M. Chevalier does not insist, however, on this solution: he knows that religion and monarchy are two powers which, though continually quarreling, cannot exist without each other; and that he may not awaken suspicion, he launches out into another revolutionary idea,—equality.

"France is in a position to furnish the polytechnic school with twenty times as many scholars as enter at present (the average being one hundred and seventy-six, this would amount to three thousand five hundred and twenty). The University has but to say the word. . . . If my opinion was of any weight, I should maintain that mathematical capacity is *much less special* than is commonly supposed. I remember the success with which children, taken at random, so to speak, from the pavements of Paris, follow the teaching of La Martinière by the method of Captain Tabareau."

If the higher education, reconstructed according to the views of M. Chevalier, was sought after by all young Frenchmen instead of by only ninety thousand as commonly, there would be no exaggeration in raising the estimate of the number of minds mathematically inclined from three thousand five hundred and twenty to ten thousand; but, by the same argument, we should have ten thousand artists, philologists, and philosophers; ten thousand doctors, physicians, chemists, and naturalists; ten thousand economists, legists, and administrators; twenty thousand manufacturers, foremen, merchants, and accountants; forty thousand farmers, wine-growers, miners, etc., — in all, one hundred thousand specialists a year, or about one-third of our youth. The rest, having, instead of special adaptations, only mingled adaptations, would be distributed indifferently elsewhere.

It is certain that so powerful an impetus given to intelligence would quicken the progress of equality, and I do not doubt that such is the secret desire of M. Chevalier. But that is precisely what troubles me: capacity is never wanting, any more than population, and the problem is to find employment for the one and bread for the other. In vain does M. Chevalier tell us: "The higher education would give less ground for the complaint that it throws into society crowds of ambitious persons without any means of satisfying their desires, and interested in the overthrow of the State; people without employment and unable to get any, good for nothing and believing themselves fit for any thing, especially for the direction of public affairs. Scientific studies do not so inflate the mind. They enlighten and regulate it at once; they fit men for practical life. . . ." Such language, I reply, is good to use with patriarchs: a professor of political economy should have more respect for his position and his audience. The government has only one hundred and twenty offices annually at its disposal for one hundred and seventy-six students admitted to the polytechnic school: what, then, would be its embarrassment if the number of admissions was ten thousand, or even, taking M. Chevalier's figures, three thousand five hundred? And, to generalize, the whole number of civil positions is sixty thousand, or three thousand vacancies annually; what dismay would the government be thrown into if, suddenly adopting the reformatory ideas of M. Chevalier, it should find itself besieged by fifty thousand office-seekers! The following objection has often been made to republicans without eliciting a reply: When everybody shall have the electoral privilege, will the deputies do any better, and will the proletariat be further advanced? I ask the same question of M. Chevalier: When each academic year shall bring you one hundred thousand fitted men, what will you do with them?

To provide for these interesting young people, you will go down to the lowest round of the ladder. You will oblige the young man, after fifteen years of lofty study, to begin, no longer as now with the offices of aspirant engineer, sub-lieutenant of artillery, second lieutenant, deputy, comptroller, general guardian, etc., but with the ignoble positions of pioneer, train-soldier, dredger, cabin-boy, fagot-maker, and exciseman. There he will

wait, until death, thinning the ranks, enables him to advance a step. Under such circumstances a man, a graduate of the polytechnic school and capable of becoming a Vauban, may die a laborer on a second class road, or a corporal in a regiment.

Oh! how much more prudent Catholicism has shown itself, and how far it has surpassed you all, St. Simonians, republicans, university men, economists, in the knowledge of man and society! The priest knows that our life is but a voyage, and that our perfection cannot be realized here below; and he contents himself with outlining on earth an education which must be completed in heaven. The man whom religion has moulded, content to know, do, and obtain what suffices for his earthly destiny, never can become a source of embarrassment to the government: rather would he be a martyr. O beloved religion! is it necessary that a bourgeoisie which stands in such need of you should disown you? . . .

Into what terrible struggles of pride and misery does this mania for universal instruction plunge us! Of what use is professional education, of what good are agricultural and commercial schools, if your students have neither employment nor capital? And what need to cram one's self till the age of twenty with all sorts of knowledge, then to fasten the threads of a mule-jenny or pick coal at the bottom of a pit? What! you have by your own confession only three thousand positions annually to bestow upon fifty thousand possible capacities, and yet you talk of establishing schools! Cling rather to your system of exclusion and privilege, a system as old as the world, the support of dynasties and patriciates, a veritable machine for gelding men in order to secure the pleasures of a caste of Sultans. Set a high price upon your teaching, multiply obstacles, drive away, by lengthy tests, the son of the proletaire whom hunger does not permit to wait, and protect with all your power the ecclesiastical schools, where the students are taught to labor for the other life, to cultivate resignation, to fast, to respect those in high places, to love the king, and to pray to God. For every useless study sooner or later becomes an abandoned study: knowledge is poison to slaves.

Surely M. Chevalier has too much sagacity not to have seen the consequences of his idea. But he has spoken from the bottom of his heart, and we can only applaud his good intentions: men must first be men; after that, he may live who can.

Thus we advance at random, guided by Providence, who never warns us except with a blow: this is the beginning and end of

political economy.

Contrary to M. Chevalier, professor of political economy at the College of France, M. Dunoyer, an economist of the Institute, does not wish instruction to be organized. The organization of instruction is a species of organization of labor; therefore, no organization. Instruction, observes M. Dunoyer, is a profession, not a function of the State; like all professions, it ought to be and remain free. It is communism, it is socialism, it is the revolutionary tendency, whose principal agents have been Robespierre, Napoleon, Louis XVIII, and M. Guizot, which have thrown into our midst these fatal ideas of the centralization and absorption of all activity in the State. The press is very free, and the pen of the journalist is an object of merchandise; religion, too, is very free, and every wearer of a gown, be it short or long, who knows how to excite public curiosity, can draw an audience about him. M. Lacordaire has his devotees. M. Leroux his apostles, M. Buchez his convent. Why, then, should not instruction also be free? If the right of the instructed, like that of the buyer, is unquestionable, and that of the instructor, who is only a variety of the seller, is its correlative, it is impossible to infringe upon the liberty of instruction without doing violence to the most precious of liberties, that of the conscience. then, adds M. Dunoyer, if the State owes instruction to everybody, it will soon be maintained that it owes labor; then lodging; then shelter. . . . Where does that lead to?

The argument of M. Dunoyer is irrefutable: to organize instruction is to give to every citizen a pledge of liberal employment and comfortable wages; the two are as intimately connected as the circulation of the arteries and the veins. But M. Dunoyer's theory implies also that progress belongs only to a certain select portion of humanity, and that barbarism is the eternal lot of nine-tenths of the human race. It is this which constitutes, according to M. Dunoyer, the very essence of society, which manifests itself in three stages, religion, hierarchy, and beggary. So that in this system, which is that of Destutt

de Tracy, Montesquieu, and Plato, the antinomy of division, like that of value, is without solution.

It is a source of inexpressible pleasure to me, I confess, to see M. Chevalier, a defender of the centralization of instruction, opposed by M. Dunoyer, a defender of liberty; M. Dunoyer in his turn antagonized by M. Guizot; M. Guizot, the representative of the centralizers, contradicting the Charter, which posits liberty as a principle; the Charter trampled under foot by the University men, who lay sole claim to the privilege of teaching, regardless of the express command of the Gospel to the priests: Go and teach. And above all this tumult of economists, legislators, ministers, academicians, professors, and priests, economic Providence giving the lie to the Gospel, and shouting: Pedagogues! what use am I to make of your instruction?

Who will relieve us of this anxiety? M. Rossi leans toward eclecticism: Too little divided, he says, labor remains unproductive; too much divided, it degrades man. Wisdom lies between these extremes; in medio virtus. Unfortunately this intermediate wisdom is only a small amount of poverty joined with a small amount of wealth, so that the condition is not modified in the least. The proportion of good and evil, instead of being as one hundred to one hundred, becomes as fifty to fifty: in this we may take, once for all, the measure of eclecticism. For the rest, M. Rossi's juste-milieu is in direct opposition to the great economic law: To produce with the least possible expense the greatest possible quantity of values. . . Now, how can labor fulfil its destiny without an extreme division? Let us look farther, if you please.

"All economic systems and hypotheses," says M. Rossi, "belong to the economist, but the intelligent, free, responsible man is under the control of the moral law. . Political economy is only a science which examines the relations of things, and draws conclusions therefrom. It examines the effects of labor; in the application of labor, you should consider the importance of the object in view. When the application of labor is unfavorable to an object higher than the production of wealth, it should not be applied. . . . Suppose that it would increase the national wealth to compel children to labor fifteen hours a day: morality would say that that is not allowable. Does that prove that political

economy is false? No; that proves that you confound things which should be kept separate."

If M. Rossi had a little more of that Gallic simplicity so difficult for foreigners to acquire, he would very summarily have thrown his tongue to the dogs, as Madame de Sévigné said. But a professor must talk, talk, talk, not for the sake of saying any thing, but in order to avoid silence. M. Rossi takes three turns around the question, then lies down: that is enough to make certain people believe that he has answered it.

It is surely a sad symptom for a science when, in developing itself according to its own principles, it reaches its object just in time to be contradicted by another; as, for example, when the postulates of political economy are found to be opposed to those of morality, for I suppose that morality is a science as well as political economy. What, then, is human knowledge, if all its affirmations destroy each other, and on what shall we rely? Divided labor is a slave's occupation, but it alone is really productive; undivided labor belongs to the free man, but it does not pay its expenses. On the one hand, political economy tells us to be rich; on the other, morality tells us to be free; and M. Rossi, speaking in the name of both, warns us at the same time that we can be neither free nor rich, for to be but half of either is to be neither. M. Rossi's doctrine, then, far from satisfying this double desire of humanity, is open to the objection that, to avoid exclusiveness, it strips us of every thing: it is, under another form, the history of the representative system.

But the antagonism is even more profound than M. Rossi has supposed. For since, according to universal experience (on this point in harmony with theory), wages decrease in proportion to the division of labor, it is clear that, in submitting ourselves to parcellaire slavery, we thereby shall not obtain wealth; we shall only change men into machines: witness the laboring population of the two worlds. And since, on the other hand, without the division of labor, society falls back into barbarism, it is evident also that, by sacrificing wealth, we shall not obtain liberty: witness all the wandering tribes of Asia and Africa. Therefore it is necessary—economic science and morality absolutely command it—for us to solve the problem of division: now, where are the economists? More than thirty years ago, Lemontey, de-

veloping a remark of Smith, exposed the demoralizing and homicidal influence of the division of labor. What has been the reply; what investigations have been made; what remedies proposed; has the question even been understood?

Every year the economists report, with an exactness which I would commend more highly if I did not see that it is always fruitless, the commercial condition of the States of Europe. They know how many yards of cloth, pieces of silk, pounds of iron, have been manufactured; what has been the consumption per head of wheat, wine, sugar, meat: it might be said that to them the ultimate of science is to publish inventories, and the object of their labor is to become general comptrollers of nations. Never did such a mass of material offer so fine a field for investigation. What has been found; what new principle has sprung from this mass; what solution of the many problems of long standing has been reached; what new direction have studies taken?

One question, among others, seems to have been prepared for a final judgment, - pauperism. Pauperism, of all the phenomena of the civilized world, is to-day the best known: we know pretty nearly whence it comes, when and how it arrives, and what it costs; its proportion at various stages of civilization has been calculated, and we have convinced ourselves that all the specifics with which it hitherto has been fought have been impotent. Pauperism has been divided into genera, species, and varieties: it is a complete natural history, one of the most important branches of anthropology. Well! the unquestionable result of all the facts collected, unseen, shunned, covered by the economists with their silence, is that pauperism is constitutional and chronic in society as long as the antagonism between labor and capital continues, and that this antagonism can end only by the absolute negation of political economy. What issue from this labyrinth have the economists discovered?

This last point deserves a moment's attention.

In primitive communism misery, as I have observed in a preceding paragraph, is the universal condition.

Labor is war declared upon this misery.

Labor organizes itself, first by division, next by machinery, then by competition, etc.

Now, the question is whether it is not in the essence of this organization, as given us by political economy, at the same time that it puts an end to the misery of some, to aggravate that of others in a fatal and unavoidable manner. These are the terms in which the question of pauperism must be stated, and for this reason we have undertaken to solve it.

What means, then, this eternal babble of the economists about the improvidence of laborers, their idleness, their want of dignity, their ignorance, their debauchery, their early marriages, etc? All these vices and excesses are only the cloak of pauperism: but the cause, the original cause which inexorably holds fourfifths of the human race in disgrace, - what is it? Did not Nature make all men equally gross, averse to labor, wanton, and wild? Did not patrician and proletaire spring from the same clay? Then how happens it that, after so many centuries, and in spite of so many miracles of industry, science, and art, comfort and culture have not become the inheritance of all? How happens it that in Paris and London, centres of social wealth, poverty is as hideous as in the days of Cæsar and Agricola? Why, by the side of this refined aristocracy, has the mass remained so uncultivated? It is laid to the vices of the people: but the vices of the upper class appear to be no less; perhaps they are even greater. The original stain affected all alike: how happens it, once more, that the baptism of civilization has not been equally efficacious for all? Does this not show that progress itself is a privilege, and that the man who has neither wagon nor horse is forced to flounder about for ever in the mud? What do I say? The totally destitute man has no desire to improve: he has fallen so low that ambition even is extinguished in his heart.

"Of all the private virtues," observes M. Dunoyer with infinite reason, "the most necessary, that which gives us all the others in succession, is the passion for well-being, is the violent desire to extricate one's self from misery and abjection, is that spirit of emulation and dignity which does not permit men to rest content with an inferior situation. . . . But this sentiment, which seems so natural, is unfortunately much less common than is thought. There are few reproaches which the generality of men deserve less than that which ascetic moralists bring against them

of being too fond of their comforts: the opposite reproach might be brought against them with infinitely more justice. . . . There is even in the nature of men this very remarkable feature, that the less their knowledge and resources, the less desire they have of acquiring these. The most miserable savages and the least enlightened of men are precisely those in whom it is most difficult to arouse wants, those in whom it is hardest to inspire the desire to rise out of their condition; so that man must already have gained a certain degree of comfort by his labor, before he can feel with any keenness that need of improving his condition, of perfecting his existence, which I call the love of well-being." I

Thus the misery of the laboring classes arises in general from their lack of heart and mind, or, as M. Passy has said somewhere, from the weakness, the inertia of their moral and intellectual faculties. This inertia is due to the fact that the said laboring classes, still half savage, do not have a sufficiently ardent desire to ameliorate their condition: this M. Dunoyer shows. But as this absence of desire is itself the effect of misery, it follows that misery and apathy are each other's effect and cause, and that the proletariat turns in a circle.

To rise out of this abyss there must be either well-being,—that is, a gradual increase of wages,—or intelligence and courage,—that is, a gradual development of faculties: two things diametrically opposed to the degradation of soul and body which is the natural effect of the division of labor. The misfortune of the proletariat, then, is wholly providential, and to undertake to extinguish it in the present state of political economy would be to produce a revolutionary whirlwind.

For it is not without a profound reason, rooted in the loftiest considerations of morality, that the universal conscience, expressing itself by turns through the selfishness of the rich and the apathy of the proletariat, denies a reward to the man whose whole function is that of a lever and spring. If, by some impossibility, material well-being could fall to the lot of the *parcellaire* laborer, we should see something monstrous happen: the laborers employed at disagreeable tasks would become like those Romans, gorged with the wealth of the world, whose brutalized

<sup>&</sup>quot;The Liberty of Labor," Vol. II, p. 80.

minds became incapable of devising new pleasures. Well-being without education stupefies people and makes them insolent: this was noticed in the most ancient times. *Incrassatus est, et recalcitravit*, says Deuteronomy. For the rest, the *parcellaire* laborer has judged himself: he is content, provided he has bread, a pallet to sleep on, and plenty of liquor on Sunday. Any other condition would be prejudicial to him, and would endanger public order.

At Lyons there is a class of men who, under cover of the monopoly given them by the city government, receive higher pay than college professors or the head-clerks of the government ministers: I mean the porters. The price of loading and unloading at certain wharves in Lyons, according to the schedule of the Rigues or porters' associations, is thirty centimes per hundred kilogrammes. At this rate, it is not seldom that a man earns twelve, fifteen, and even twenty francs a day: he only has to carry forty or fifty sacks from a vessel to a warehouse. It is but a few hours' work. What a favorable condition this would be for the development of intelligence, as well for children as for parents, if, of itself and the leisure which it brings, wealth was a moralizing principle! But this is not the case: the porters of Lyons are to-day what they always have been, drunken, dissolute, brutal, insolent, selfish, and base. It is a painful thing to say, but I look upon the following declaration as a duty, because it is the truth: one of the first reforms to be effected among the laboring classes will be the reduction of the wages of some at the same time that we raise those of others. Monopoly does not gain in respectability by belonging to the lowest classes of people, especially when it serves to maintain only the grossest individualism. The revolt of the silk-workers met with no sympathy, but rather hostility, from the porters and the river population generally. Nothing that happens off the wharves has any power to move them. Beasts of burden fashioned in advance for despotism, they will not mingle with politics as long as their privilege is maintained. Nevertheless, I ought to say in their defence that, some time ago, the necessities of competition having brought their prices down, more social sentiments began to awaken in these gross natures: a few more reductions seasoned with a little poverty, and the Rigues of Lyons will be chosen as the storming-party when the time comes for assaulting the bastilles.

In short, it is impossible, contradictory, in the present system of society, for the proletariat to secure well-being through education or education through well-being. For, without considering the fact that the proletaire, a human machine, is as unfit for comfort as for education, it is demonstrated, on the one hand, that his wages continually tend to go down rather than up, and, on the other, that the cultivation of his mind, if it were possible, would be useless to him; so that he always inclines towards barbarism and misery. Every thing that has been attempted of late years in France and England with a view to the amelioration of the condition of the poor in the matters of the labor of women and children and of primary instruction, unless it was the fruit of some hidden thought of radicalism, has been done contrary to economic ideas and to the prejudice of the established order. Progress, to the mass of laborers, is always the book sealed with the seven seals; and it is not by legislative misconstructions that the relentless enigma will be solved.

For the rest, if the economists, by exclusive attention to their old routine, have finally lost all knowledge of the present state of things, it cannot be said that the socialists have better solved the antinomy which division of labor raised. Quite the contrary, they have stopped with negation; for is it not perpetual negation to oppose, for instance, the uniformity of *parcellaire* labor with a so-called variety in which each one can change his occupation ten, fifteen, twenty times a day at will?

As if to change ten, fifteen, twenty times a day from one kind of divided labor to another was to make labor synthetic; as if, consequently, twenty fractions of the day's work of a manual laborer could be equal to the day's work of an artist! Even if such industrial vaulting was practicable, — and it may be asserted in advance that it would disappear in the presence of the necessity of making laborers responsible and therefore functions personal, — it would not change at all the physical, moral, and intellectual condition of the laborer; the dissipation would only be a surer guarantee of his incapacity and, consequently, his dependence. This is admitted, moreover, by the organizers, communists, and others. So far are they from pretending to solve

the antinomy of division that all of them admit, as an essential condition of organization, the hierarchy of labor, — that is, the classification of laborers into parcellaires and generalizers or organizers, — and in all utopias the distinction of capacities, the basis or everlasting excuse for inequality of goods, is admitted as a pivot. Those reformers whose schemes have nothing to recommend them but logic, and who, after having complained of the simplism, monotony, uniformity, and extreme division of labor, then propose a plurality as a SYNTHESIS, — such inventors, I say, are judged already, and ought to be sent back to school.

But you, critic, the reader undoubtedly will ask, what is your solution? Show us this synthesis which, retaining the responsibility, the personality, in short, the specialty of the laborer, will unite extreme division and the greatest variety in one com-

plex and harmonious whole.

My reply is ready: Interrogate facts, consult humanity; we can choose no better guide. After the oscillations of value, division of labor is the economic fact which influences most perceptibly profits and wages. It is the first stake driven by Providence into the soil of industry, the starting-point of the immense triangulation which finally must determine the right and duty of each and all. Let us, then, follow our guides, without which we can only wander and lose ourselves.

Tu longe sequere, et vestigia semper adora.

## GOLD AND SILVER AS STANDARDS OF VALUE:

## THE FLAGRANT CHEAT IN REGARD TO THEM.

ALL the usurpation, and tyranny, and extortion, and robbery, and fraud, that are involved in the monopoly of money are practised, and attempted to be justified, under the pretence of maintaining the standard of value. This pretence is intrinsically a false one throughout. And the whole motive for it is to afford some color of justification for such a monopoly of money as will enable the few holders of gold and silver coins (or of such other money as may be specially licensed and substituted for them) to extort, in exchange for them, more of other men's property than the coins (or their substitutes) are naturally and truly worth. That such is the fact, it is the purpose of this article to prove.

In order to be standards by which to measure the values of other things, it is plain that these coins must have a fixed and definite - or, at least, something like a fixed and definite - value of their own; just as a yard-stick, in order to be a standard by which to measure the length of other things, must necessarily have a fixed and definite length of its own; and just as a pound weight, in order to be a standard by which to measure the weight of other things, must necessarily have a fixed and definite weight of its own. It is only because a yard-stick has a fixed and definite length of its own that we are enabled to measure the length of other things by it. It is only because a pound weight has a fixed and definite weight of its own that we are enabled to measure the weight of other things by it. For a like reason, unless gold and silver coins have fixed and definite - or, at least, something like fixed and definite - values of their own, they can serve no purpose as standards by which to measure the values of other things.

The first question, then, to be settled is this, — namely, what is that fixed or definite value (or something like a fixed or definite value) which gold and silver coins have, and which enables them to be used as standards for measuring the values of other things?

The answer is that the true and natural market value of gold and silver coins is that value, and only that value, which they have for use or consumption as metals, - that is, for plate. watches, jewelry, gilding, dentistry, and other ornamental and useful purposes. This is the value at which they now stand in the markets of the world, as is proved by the fact that doubtless not more than one-tenth, and very likely not more than onetwentieth, of all the gold and silver in the world (out of the mines) is in circulation as money. All the rest is in plate, watches, jewelry, and the like; except that in some parts of the world, where property in general is unsafe, large amounts of gold and silver are hoarded and concealed to prevent their being taken by rapacious governments, or public enemies, or private robbers. Leaving these hoards out of account, doubtless ninetenths, and very likely nineteen-twentieths, of all the gold and silver of the world are in other forms than coin.

And as fast as new gold and silver are taken out of the mines, they are first carried to the mints, and made into coins; then they are carried all over the world by the operations of commerce, and given in exchange for other commodities. Then the goldsmiths and silversmiths, in every part of the world (unless among savages), are constantly taking these coins and converting them into such articles of plate, jewelry, and the like as they have call for. In this way the annual crops of gold and silver that are taken from the mines are worked up into articles for use as regularly as the annual crops of breadstuffs are consumed as food, or as the annual crops of iron, and cotton, and silk, and wool, and leather are worked up into articles for use.

And when the coins have thus been wrought into articles for use, they for ever remain so, unless these articles become unfashionable, or for some other reason undesirable. In that case, they are sent again to the mint, and converted again into coin; then put into circulation again as money; then taken out of circulation again by the goldsmiths and silversmiths, and wrought

again into plate, jewelry, and the like, for use. They remain in circulation as money only while they are going from the mint to the goldsmiths and silversmiths. And this route is a very short and quick one. An old coin is rarely seen, unless it has been hoarded.

Unless new gold and silver were being constantly taken from the mines, and old and unfashionable plate and jewelry were being constantly recoined, these metals would soon disappear altogether as money.

All this proves that they have no true or natural value as money beyond their value for use or consumption as metals. If they were worth more as money than they are for use or consumption as metals, they would, after being once coined, remain for ever in circulation as money, instead of being taken out of circulation and appropriated to these other uses.

In Asia, where these metals have been accumulating from time immemorial, and whither all the gold and silver of Europe and America — except so much as is caught up and converted into plate, watches, jewelry, etc., - is now going, and has been going for the last two thousand years,2 very small amounts only are in circulation as money. Instead of using them as money, the people - or so many of them as are able - cover themselves with jewelry, fill their houses with plate, and their palaces and temples with gold and silver ornaments. Instead of investing their surplus wealth in fine houses, fine clothing, fine furniture, fine carriages, etc., as Europeans and Americans do, it is nearly all invested in gold, silver, and precious stones. In every thing else they are miserably poor. Even the rich are so poor that they cannot afford to indulge, as we do, in such luxuries as costly dwellings, clothing, furniture, and the like, which require frequent repairs, or quickly decay, or wear out with use. Hence their preference for ornaments of gold, silver, and precious stones, which never wear out, and retain their value for ever.

In China, which has at least a fourth, and perhaps a third, of all the population of the globe, gold and silver are not coined at

so rare that they sell for high prices as curiosities.

<sup>2</sup>That is, from Europe for two thousand years, and from America from its first discovery by Europeans.

Old coins — those that are no more than twenty, thirty, or fifty years old — are so rare that they sell for high prices as curiosities.

all by the Government. The only coin that is coined by the Government, and that is in circulation as money, is a small coin. of a base metal, worth no more than a fifth, sixth, or seventh of one of our cents. This coin is the common money of the people. And gold and silver are not in circulation at all as money. except some few foreign coins, and some plates, bars, or nuggets of gold and silver that pass by weight, and are generally weighed whenever they pass from one person to another.

In India, among two hundred millions of people, although the few rich have immense amounts of gold and silver plate and ornaments, very little gold and silver is in circulation as money. The mass of the people have either no money at all, - taking their pay for their labor in rice or other articles of food. - or have only certain shells, called cowries, of which it takes from

fifty to a hundred to be worth one of our cents.1

In still other parts of Asia, gold and silver have little more circulation as money than in China and India. And yet Asia, I repeat, is the great and final market whither all the gold and silver of Europe and America - except what has been caught up and converted into plate, jewelry, and the like - is now going, and has been going for two thousand years, and whence they never return.

In Europe and America, the great increase of gold from the mines of California and Australia within the last thirty years has added only moderately to the amount of gold in circulation as money. But it has added very largely to the use of gold for plate, watches, jewelry, and the like. This greatly increased consumption of gold for ornamental purposes in England and America, and the increased flow of gold to Asia, to be there devoted to the same uses, account for the fact - which to many persons seems unaccountable - that the great amounts of gold taken from the mines have added so little to the amount in circulation as money.

And even though the amounts of gold and silver taken from the mines should hereafter be still greater - no matter how much greater - than they ever have been heretofore, they would all be disposed of in the same way; namely, first be converted

I believe the English have recently attempted to introduce a small copper coin, called an anna; but what is its precise value, or what the number in circulation, I do not know.

into coin and put into circulation as money, and then taken out of circulation and converted into plate, jewelry, and the like. They would exist in the form of money only while they were performing their short and predestined journey from the mint to the goldsmiths and silversmiths.

These facts — let it be emphatically repeated — prove beyond all color of doubt, or possibility of refutation, that the true and natural market value of gold and silver coins is that value, and only that value, which they have for use or consumption as metals. Consequently it is at that value, and only at that value, that they have the least claim to be considered standards by which to measure the value of any thing else. And any body who pretends to write about the value of money from any other basis than this is either an ignoramus or an impostor, — probably the latter.

II. But that gold and silver coins can have no true or natural market value as money beyond their value for use or consumption as metals will still more clearly appear when we consider why it is that they are in demand at all as money; why it is that they have a market value; and why it is that every man will accept them in exchange for any thing he has to sell.

The solution of these questions is that the original, primal source of all the demand for them as money—the essential and only reason why they have market value, and sell so readily in exchange for other commodities—is simply because they are wanted to be taken out of circulation, and converted into plate, jewelry, and other articles of use.

They are wanted for these purposes by all the people on the globe. Hence they are carried at once from the countries in which they are first obtained — the mining countries — to all the other countries of the world as articles of commerce, and given in exchange for such other commodities as the holders of them prefer for the gratification of their wants and desires.

If they were not wanted to be taken out of circulation and wrought into articles of use, they would have no market value as money, and could not circulate at all as money. No one would have any motive to buy them, and no one would give any thing of value in exchange for them.

The reason of this is that gold and silver, in the state of coin,

cannot be used. Tonsequently, in the state of coin, they produce nothing to the owner. A man cannot afford to keep them as an investment, because that would be equivalent to losing the use of his capital. He must, therefore, either exchange them for something he can use—something that will be productive and yield an income; or else he must convert them into plate, jewelry, etc., in which form he can use them and get an income from them.

It is, therefore, only when gold and silver coins have been wrought up into plate, watches, jewelry, etc., that they can be said to be *invested*; because it is only in that form that they can be *used*, be productive, or yield an income.

The income which they yield as investments—that is, the income which they yield when used in the form of plate, jewelry, etc.—is yielded mostly in the shape of a luxurious pleasure—the pleasure of gratified fancy, vanity, or pride.

This pleasure is the same as that which is derived from the use of ornaments generally; such as feathers, and ribbons, and laces, and precious stones, and many other things that have no value at all as food, clothing, or shelter, yet bring great prices in the market simply for their uses as ornaments.

The amount of this income we will suppose to be six per cent. per annum on their whole value. That is to say, a person who is able, and has tastes in that direction, will give six dollars a year for the simple pleasure of using one hundred dollars' worth of plate, jewelry, etc.

This six dollars' worth of pleasure, then, or six dollars' worth of gratified fancy, vanity, or pride, is the annual income from an investment of one hundred dollars in gold and silver plate, jewelry, and the like.

This, be it noticed, is the *only income* that gold and silver are capable of yielding; because plate, jewelry, and the like are the only forms in which they can be used. So long as they remain

If he sale of them as money is not a use of them any more than the sale of a horse is a use of the horse. For convenience in speech, we call the buying and selling of money a use of it, but it is no more a use of it than the buying and selling of yother merchandise is a use of such merchandise. When a man says he wants money to use, he means only that he wants to part with it, — that he wants either to pay a debt with it, or to give it in exchange for something that he can use or consume.

in coin, they cannot be used, and therefore cannot yield an income.

It is, then, only this six per cent. annual income, this six dollars' worth of pleasure, which gold and silver yield as ornaments, —that is, as investments, —that is really the cause of all the demand for them in the market, and consequently of their being bought and sold as money.

By this it is not meant that every man who takes a gold or silver coin as money takes it because he *himself* wants a piece of gold or silver plate or jewelry; nor because he *himself* intends or wishes to work it into plate or jewelry,—for such is not the case probably with one man in a thousand, or perhaps one man in ten thousand, of those who take the coin. Each man takes it as money simply because he can sell it again. But he can sell it again solely because some other man wants it, or because some other man will want it, in order to convert it into articles for use. He can sell it solely because the goldsmith, the silversmith, the dentist, the gilder, etc., will *sometime* come along and buy it, *take it out of circulation*, and work it up into some article for consumption,—that is, for use.

This final consumption or use, then, is the main-spring that sets the coins in circulation, and keeps them in circulation, as money.

It is solely the consumption or use of them in other forms than coin that creates any demand for them in the market as money.

It is, then, only the value which gold and silver have as productive investments in articles of use, — in plate, watches, jewelry, and the like, — that creates any demand for them, or enables them to circulate as money.

And since this value which the coins have for use or consumption as metals is the only value that enables them to circulate at all as money, it is plain that it necessarily fixes and limits their true and natural value as money. Consequently any body who gives more for them as money than they are worth for use or consumption as metals gives more for them than they are worth for any purpose whatever, — more, in short, than their true and natural market value.

We all can understand that, if wheat were to circulate as

money, it could have no more true or natural market value as money than it had for use or consumption as food; since it would be its value for food alone that would induce anybody to accept it as money. All the wheat that should be in circulation as money would be destined to be taken out of circulation, and consumed as food; and if anybody should give more for it as money than it was worth for food, he, or some subsequent owner, would have to submit to a loss, whenever the wheat should come to be consumed as food.

For these reasons, the wheat as money could be no true or natural equivalent for any commodity that had more true or natural market value for use or consumption than the wheat.

So anybody can understand that, if silk, wool, cotton, and flax were to circulate as money, they could have no more true or natural market value as money than they had for use or consumption for clothing, or other analogous purposes. Their value for these other purposes would alone give them their value as money. Of course, then, their true and natural market value as money would be fixed and limited by their value for these other uses. They could plainly have no greater value as money than they had for clothing and other articles of use. As they would all be destined to be taken out of circulation, and converted into clothing or other articles of use, it is plain that, if anybody should give more for them as money than they were worth for clothing and other articles of use, he, or some subsequent owner, would have to submit to a loss whenever they should come to be converted into clothing, or any other article of use.

The same reasons that would apply to wheat, and silk, and wool, and cotton, and flax, if they were to circulate as money, and that would fix and limit their value as money, apply equally to gold and silver coins, and fix and limit their value as money.

We are brought, therefore, to the same conclusion as before, — namely, that the value which the coins have for use or consumption as metals is their only true and natural value as money. Consequently, this value which they have as metals is the value, and the only value, at which they can be said to be standards by which to measure the value of any thing else.

III. Assuming it now to be established that the true and natural market value of gold and silver coins as money is absolutely fixed and limited by their value for use or consumption as metals, and that their value for use or consumption as metals is the only value at which they can be called standards for measuring the values of other things, we come to another proposition,—namely, that the use or circulation of any possible amount of paper money has no tendency whatever to reduce the coins below their true and natural market value as metals, or, consequently, to diminish their value as standards.

Plainly the paper can have no such power or tendency, because the paper does not come at all in competition with the coins for any of those uses which alone give them their value. We cannot make a watch, a spoon, a necklace, or an ear-ring out of the paper, and, therefore, the paper cannot compete with the coins for those uses. Consequently it cannot diminish their market value for those uses, or — what is the same thing — their value as standards.

If the coins were never used at all as money, they would have the same true and natural market value that they have now. Their use or circulation as money adds nothing to their true and natural market value as metals, and their entire disuse as money would take nothing from their true and natural market value as metals. Consequently it would not diminish their value as standards. In other words, it would not reduce the coins below their true and natural value as standards.

Every dollar's worth of other vendible property in the world has precisely the same amount of true and natural market value as has a dollar in coin. And if every dollar's worth of other vendible property was bought and sold as money in competition with the coins, the true and natural market value of the coins would not be lessened thereby. They would still have their true and natural amount of market value, - that is, their value for plate, jewelry, and the like, - the same as though all this other property were not bought and sold in competition with them. The coins and all other property would be bought and sold as money only at their true and natural market values, respectively, for their different uses. One dollar's worth of any one kind of property would have the same amount of true and natural market value for its appropriate use that a coin, or any other dollar's worth of property, would have for its appropriate use. But none of them would have any additional value on account of their being bought and sold as money.

Now, all the other vendible property of the world cannot be actually cut up into pieces or parcels, each capable of being carried about in the pocket, and each having the same amount of true and natural market value as a dollar in coin. But it is not only theoretically possible, but actually practicable, that nearly or quite all this other vendible property should be represented by contracts on paper, — such as certificates, notes, checks, drafts, and bills of exchange, — and that these contracts shall not only have the same value with the coins in the market as money, but that, as money, they generally shall be preferred to the coins.

These contracts are preferred to the coins as money not only because they are more convenient, but also because we can have so many times more of them.<sup>1</sup>

Every solvent piece of paper that can circulate as money whether it be a certificate, note, check, draft, bill of exchange, or whatever else - represents property existing somewhere that is legally holden for the redemption or payment of the paper, and that can either be delivered itself in redemption of it, or be otherwise made available for its payment. And if every dollar's worth of such property in the world could be represented in the market by a contract on paper promising to deliver it on demand, and if every dollar's worth could be delivered on demand in redemption of the paper that represented it, the world then could have an amount of money equal to its entire vendible property. And yet clearly every dollar of paper would be equal in value to a dollar of gold or silver. Clearly, also, all this paper would do nothing towards reducing gold and silver coins below their true and natural market values, - that is, their values for use or consumption as metals.

The gold and silver coins would be good standards—as good perhaps as any that can be had—by which to measure the values of all this other property. But a gold dollar, or a silver dollar, would have no more true or natural market value than would each and every other dollar's worth of property that was measured by it.<sup>2</sup>

2 To say that a gold dollar, or a silver dollar, has any more true or natural market

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We can have at least a hundred and fifty times as many paper dollars as we can gold and silver dollars. And yet every one of these paper dollars, if it represents a dollar's worth of actual property that can either be delivered itself in redemption of the paper, or can otherwise be made available for the redemption of the paper, will have the same value in the market as the coins.

Under such a system of currency as this, there could evidently be no inflation of prices, relatively to the true and natural market values of gold and silver. Such a currency would no more inflate the prices of one thing than of another. It would just as much inflate the prices of gold and silver themselves as of any thing else. Gold and silver would stand at their true and natural market values as metals; and all other things would also stand at their true and natural values for their respective uses.

No more of this currency could be kept in circulation than would be necessary or convenient for the purchase and sale of commodities at their true and natural market values, relatively to gold and silver; for if at any time the paper was not worth as much, or would not buy as much, in the market as gold or silver, it would be returned to the issuers for redemption in gold and silver, and thus be taken out of circulation.

Thus we are brought again to the conclusion that it is only when gold and silver coins are suffered to stand at their true and natural values as metals — which are also their true and natural values as standards — that they can be said to measure truly the values of other things.

At their values as metals the coins serve as standards by which to measure the value of all other *money*, as well as of all other property. But at any other than their true and natural values as metals they will naturally and truly measure the value of nothing whatever, — neither of other money, nor of any thing else.

## IV. We come now to still another proposition, - namely, that

value than any other dollar's worth of vendible property is just as absurd as it would be to say that a yardstick has more length than a yard of cloth or a yard of any thing else; or as it would be to say that a pound weight has more weight than a pound of sugar or a pound of stone.

I The bankers have no motive to issue more of their notes than are needed for circulation at coin prices; because their only motive for issuing their notes at all is to get interest on them while they are in circulation. If they issue no more than are needed for circulation at coin prices, the notes, as a general rule, will remain in circulation until they come back to the bankers in payment of notes discounted; and the bankers will have no occasion to redeem them otherwise than by receiving them in payment of notes discounted. But if the bankers issue more notes than are needed for circulation at coin prices, the surplus notes will come back for redemption in coin before they have earned any interest. Thus the bankers will not only fail of getting any profit from their issues, but will subject themselves to the necessity and inconvenience of redeeming their notes with coin. They, therefore, have no chance of profit, but necessarily subject themselves to inconvenience, and perhaps loss, if they issue more notes than are wanted for circulation at coin prices.

no possible amount of paper money that can be put in circulation in any one country that is open to free commerce with the rest of the world can affect the true or natural market value of gold or silver coins in that country.

If the coins should be entirely excluded from circulation by the paper, they still would have the same true and natural market value as if they were the only money in circulation; for, in both cases alike, their true and natural market value in that country would be determined by their value in the markets of the world.

The coins can be carried from any one part of the world to any other part at so small an expense that they can have no appreciably greater market value in any one part than in any other. And their true and natural market value in all parts of the world depends upon the general consumption of them as metals, and not at all upon their circulation as money. They are everywhere simply merchandise in the market of the world, waiting for consumption, like any other merchandise.

This fact—that the disuse of the coins as money in any one country cannot reduce their value in that country below their value in the markets of the world—was fully tested in the United States for fourteen or fifteen years,—that is, from 1861, or 1862, to 1876. During the whole of that time gold and silver were wholly absent from general circulation as money. Yet they had the same value here as metals that they had in other parts of the world either as money or as metals. And they were as much used during that time for plate, watches, jewelry, and the like as they ever were.

The people of the United States comprise not more than a twenty-fifth — perhaps not more than a thirtieth — part of the population of the globe. And if they were to abandon the use of gold and silver entirely, not only for money, but for plate, watches, jewelry, and every other purpose whatever; if they were even to banish the metals themselves from the country, — they thereby would reduce their value in the markets of the world by not more than a twenty-fifth, or perhaps a thirtieth, of their present value. How absurd, then, to pretend that the simple disuse of them as money by one twenty-fifth, or one-thirtieth, part of the population of the globe can have any appreciable effect upon their market value the world over!

These facts prove that all restrictions imposed by law in any one country upon all other money than gold and silver coins, under pretence of maintaining the true standard of value in that country, are the merest farces, not to say the merest frauds; that they have no tendency of that kind whatever; that they only serve to derange the standard in that country by establishing a monopoly of money, and giving a monopoly and extortionate price to the coins in that country, instead of suffering them to stand at their true and natural value, both as metals and as standards, and also at the same value that they have in the markets of the world.

Furthermore, if any or all other nations have been wicked and tyrannical enough to give, or attempt to give, a monopoly and extortionate price to gold and silver coins by restrictions upon any or all other money, that is no reason why we should be guilty of the same crime. So far as such restrictions may have affected the price of the coins in the markets of the world, we may not be able to save either ourselves or the rest of mankind from the natural consequences of such a monopoly. But we are under no more obligation to follow the bad example of these nations in this matter than in any other. Because other nations enslave and impoverish their people by depriving them of all money and all credit by establishing a monopoly of money, that is no reason why we should do so. All our efforts in this direction do nothing towards making the coins better standards of value than they otherwise would be.

V. It is an utter absurdity to talk about gold and silver coins having any more true or natural value as money than they have for use or consumption as metals. To say that they have more true or natural market value as money than they have for use as metals is equivalent to saying that they have more true and natural value for being bought and sold than they have as commodities for use or consumption. And to say that they have more true or natural market value for being bought and sold than they have as commodities for use or consumption is just as absurd as it would be to say that houses, and lands, and cattle, and horses, and food, and clothing, have more true and natural market value for being bought and sold than they have as commodities for use.

VI. Finally, the true and natural market value of any and every vendible thing whatever is that value, and only that value, which it will maintain in the market in competition with any and all other vendible things that can be brought into the market in competition with it. This is the only rule by which the true and natural market value of any vendible thing whatever can be ascertained; and this rule applies as much to gold and silver coins as to any other commodities whatever.

Tried by this rule, we know that the coins will bear no higher value in the market as money than they will for use or consumption as metals; because mankind have other money which they prefer to the coins, and which — if permitted to do so — they will always buy and sell as money rather than give more for the coins as money than they are worth for use or consumption as metals.

VII. To give color to the idea that solvent notes, promising to pay money on demand, tend to reduce the standard of value below that of the coins, the advocates of that idea are accustomed to say that such notes cost nothing, and have no value in themselves; and, consequently, that to suffer them to be bought and sold as money in the place of coin, and as if they were of equal value with coin, necessarily depreciates the market value of the coin at least for the time being; that, in other words, it reduces the standard of value for the time being.

The answer to this pretence is that nobody claims or supposes that a promissory note, simply as so much paper, has any value. But the contract written upon the paper—if the note be a solvent one—is in the nature of a lien upon so much material property of the maker of the note as is sufficient to pay the note, and as can be taken by legal process and sold for payment of the note.

Every *solvent* promissory note — whether it circulates as money, or not — is in the nature of a lien upon the property of the maker, — that is, upon the property that is legally holden for the payment of the note, and that can be taken by legal process, and applied to the payment of the note.

The value of the note, therefore, is not in the mere paper as paper, but in the property on which the contract written upon paper gives the holder a lien for the amount of the note.

In this respect, a banker's note, circulating as money, is just like any other man's note that is locked up in the desk or safe of the holder. The fact that it is bought and sold from hand to hand as money — that is, in exchange for other property — makes no change whatever in the character or value of the note.

In the case of a mortgage upon land, the value is not in the mere paper, as paper, upon which the mortgage is written, but in the land on which the mortgage gives the mortgagee a lien for the amount of his debt. So in the case of a note, if it be a solvent one, it is in the nature of a lien upon, or conditional title to, the property of the maker of the note, — property that is legally holden for the payment of the note, and that can be taken by legal process, and applied to the payment of the note.

To say that such a note has no value in itself is just as absurd as it would be to say that a mortgage on land has no value in itself. Everybody knows that neither the mortgage nor the note has any value as mere paper; that the value is in the land, or the property, that is holden, or liable to be taken, for the pay-

ment of the mortgage or note.

In every case where material property is represented by paper, -as in the case of a deed, mortgage, certificate of stock, certificate of deposit, check, note, draft, or whatever else, - the value is in the property represented, and not in the paper that represents it. The paper has no value, except as it contains the evidence of the right to the property represented by it. And this is as true in the case of what is called paper money as in all other cases where property is represented by paper. The value of the money is not in the paper as paper, but in the property represented by the paper, and to which, or on which, the contract written on the paper gives a title, claim, or lien. The property that is represented by the paper, and which constitutes the real money, is just as real substantial property as is gold, or silver, or any other money or property whatever. And it is really an incorrect and false use of the term to call such money paper money, as if the paper itself were the real money; or as if there were no money, and no value, outside of the paper. A dollar's worth of land, wheat, iron, wool, or leather, is just as much a dollar in real value as is a dollar of gold or silver; and when represented by paper, it is just as real money, so far as value is concerned, as is gold and silver.

Every solvent promissory note is a mere representative of, or lien upon, or conditional title to material property in the hands of the maker; property that has an equal value with coin; that is legally holden for the payment of coin; and that can be taken by legal process, and sold for coin, which must be applied to the payment of the note. When, therefore, a man sells a solvent promissory note, he sells a legal title to, or claim to, or lien upon, so much actual property in the hands of the maker of the note as is necessary to pay the note; property which men have just as much right to buy and sell from hand to hand as money, if they so please, — that is, in exchange for other property, — as they have to buy and sell coin, or any other money that can be invented.

And it matters not how many of these notes are in circulation as money, provided they are all solvent; since, in that case, each note represents a separate piece of property from all the others; each separate piece of property being equal in value to coin, and capable of insuring the payment of coin. If, therefore, all the material wealth of a country were thus represented by paper, the paper, — that is, the property represented by the paper — would all have the same value as the same nominal amount of coin; and the circulation of all this paper as money would do nothing towards reducing the coins below their true and natural value as metals, or below their value in the markets of the world. Consequently, it would do nothing towards depreciating the true and natural standard of value. All this other money would have the same value, dollar for dollar, as the coin; and the true and natural value of the coins as standards of value would not be changed.

There certainly can be no question that a *solvent* promissory note that circulates from hand to hand as money — which everybody is willing to accept in payment for other property — is just as legitimate a piece of paper, and has just as much value as a lien, or as evidence of a lien, upon the property that is holden for its payment, as any other promissory note whatever. If such a note be not legitimate, if it have no value, then no promissory note whatever is legitimate, or has value. And if the issue of such notes for circulation as money — that is, among those who voluntarily give and receive them in exchange for other property — be illegitimate, and ought to be suppressed, then all promis-

sory notes whatsoever are equally illegitimate, and ought to be suppressed. But if any one such note, which any one man, or company of men, can make, be legitimate, then any and every other similar note, which any other man, or company of men, can make, is equally legitimate.

VIII. But to hide the deception that is attempted to be practised under pretence of maintaining the standard of value, it is said that there is but a small amount of coin in comparison with the notes that can be put in circulation as money; and that it is therefore impossible that any great number of notes, promising to pay coin on demand, can be solvent; that the property that is nominally holden to pay the notes cannot be made to bring any more coin than there really is; and that, therefore, the notes, if more numerous than the coins, must be spurious; that they promise to pay something which the makers do not possess, and which they consequently are unable to pay, no matter how much other property they may have.

One answer to this argument is that, on this principle, no promissory note whatever—whether issued for circulation or not—could ever be considered solvent, unless the maker kept constantly on hand an equivalent amount of coin with which to redeem it. Whereas we know that all notes are considered solvent, provided the makers have sufficient property to bring the coin when it is likely to be called for. And this is the principle on which all ordinary commercial credit rests.

Another answer to this argument is that, however valid it may be against notes that are either not solvent, or not known to be solvent, — that is, not issued on the credit of property sufficient to pay the notes, — it has no weight against notes that are solvent, and that are known to be solvent; because, first, if the notes are solvent, and are known to be solvent, the holders usually prefer them to coin, and therefore seldom present them for redemption in coin; and because, secondly, the notes issued for circulation are issued by discounting other solvent notes that are to be held by the bankers, and the circulating notes are, therefore, all wanted for paying the notes discounted, and, with rare exceptions, will all come back to the bankers in payment of the notes discounted; and it is, therefore, only rarely that any other redemption of the circulating notes is called for.

The bankers soon learn by experience how often coin will be called for, and how much, therefore, it is necessary for them to keep on hand for such contingencies. This amount a due regard for their own interests will induce them to keep on hand, because they cannot afford to be sued on their notes, or to have their credit injured by not meeting their notes when coin is demanded.

The opposers of a *solvent* paper currency either ignorantly overlook, or craftily and dishonestly attempt to keep out of sight, the vital fact that, in all safe, legitimate, solvent, and prudent banking, all the notes issued for circulation will be wanted to pay the notes discounted, and will come back to the banks in payment of notes discounted; and that it is only rarely that any other redemption—redemption in coin—will be demanded or desired.

The pretence, therefore, that no more notes can be honestly issued for circulation than there is coin kept constantly on hand for their redemption is nothing but a pretence, since, however great the amount of notes issued, — provided they be solvent ones, —it is only a mere fraction of them — probably not so much even as one per cent. — that will ever have any call to be redeemed in coin.

IX. But it is often said that the panics which have usually occurred after any considerable increase of money by the issue of paper are proof that the paper was not equal in value, dollar for dollar, with coin. Those who say this claim that the panics are caused by the attempts of the holders of the notes to convert them into coin. These attempts have taken the form of runs upon the banks for the redemption of their notes in coin. And it is claimed that these runs upon the banks for coin are proof that the notes are not equal in value, dollar for dollar, with coin. And this proof, say they, is made complete by the fact that the banks, when thus run upon for coin, cannot redeem their notes in coin.

But these runs upon banks for coin by no means prove that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The principle named in the text of course applies only to *solvent* banks. It has nothing to do with insolvent ones, whose business is to swindle the public. As a general rule, only those banks can be relied on as solvent where the private property of the stockholders is holden for the notes of the company. Not that there *may not* be other solvent ones, — for undoubtedly there may be, — but experience thus far has been largely against all others.

solvent notes are not equal in value, dollar for dollar, with coin. They prove only that the holders of the notes have doubted the solvency of the banks. These runs have never occurred in countries where the banks were known to be solvent. They have occurred only in countries where the solvency of the banks was doubted, as in England and the United States. Thus, in Scotland there is no history (so far as I know or believe) of a single run upon the banks in a period of eighty years, - that is, from 1765 to 1845. There may have been runs in a few instances upon some particular bank, but none upon the banks generally. And why? Not at all because these banks kept on hand large amounts of coin, - for they really kept very little, - but solely because the public had a perfect assurance of the solvency of the banks; an assurance resulting from the facts that each of the banking companies had a very large number of stockholders, and that the private property (including the real estate) of all these stockholders was holden for the debts of the banks. The public. therefore, knew, or felt perfectly assured, not only that the notes of the banks were all solvent, but also that they would all speedily go back to the banks, and be redeemed by being accepted in payment of notes discounted. Under these circumstances, the public not only made no runs upon the banks for coin, but even preferred the notes to the coin.

In England, on the contrary, the runs upon the banks during the same period of eighty years were very frequent. And why? Because nobody had any abiding confidence in the solvency of the banks. The Government, for the sake of giving a valuable monopoly to the Bank of England, had virtually enacted that there should be no other solvent banks in England; or at least none that could be publicly known to be solvent. This enactment was that, with the exception of the Bank of England, no bank in England should consist of more than six partners. Rich men - those who had credit and wished to use it - could generally do better with it than to put it into a company where there were only six partners, and where the credit of the partnership could not be sufficiently known to be of much value, or to protect them against runs for coin. The result was that, with the exception of the Bank of England, all, or very nearly all, the banking business in England was in the hands of men who were not only

unworthy of credit, but really had no credit, except so long as they were ready to redeem their notes either in coin or Bank of England notes.

In many or most of the United States, up to 1860, the solvency of the banks was rendered doubtful, or worse than doubtful, by legislation that authorized the banks to issue notes to two, three, or four times the amount of their capital; that authorized the stockholders themselves to borrow these notes of the banks, and then exempted the private property of the stockholders from all liability for the debts of the banks. Of course it often happened that no reliance could be placed on the solvency of such banks, and that runs, which they could not meet, would be made upon them for coin.

But clearly the runs upon such banks as these did nothing towards proving that the notes of banks, *known to be solvent*, were not equal in value, dollar for dollar, with coin.

But the panic of 1873, in the United States, did not proceed at all from any doubt as to the solvency of the banks, but wholly from the insufficiency in the amount of money. The destruction of the State banks by a ten per cent. tax on their issues; the limitation upon the issues of the national banks to the sum of three hundred and fifty-six million dollars; and the limitation upon the greenbacks to three hundred million dollars, - reduced the currency to six hundred and fifty-six million dollars. And these six hundred and fifty-six million dollars, being, for want of redemption, some fifteen per cent. below par of specie, reduced the actual amount of money to about five hundred and fifty-eight millions. The population of the country in 1873 was at least forty millions. and the property probably forty thousand millions. This lack of money, compared with population and property, compelled traffic of all kinds to be done on credit, instead of for cash. Every thing was bought on credit, and sold on credit. And the same commodity, in going from producer to consumer, was generally sold two,

I One cause that made the English banking companies — companies consisting of not more than six partners — unworthy of credit was that, although the private property of the partners was holden for the partnership debts, yet the condition of land titles in England was such as to make land practically unavailable as a basis of credit. The credit of the bankers, therefore, rested only on their personal property. That is, the credit of each banking company rested, at best, only on the personal property of not more than six persons.

three, four, or more times over *on credit*. The consequence was that this private indebtedness among the people had become so enormous in proportion to the money with which to cancel it as to place the credit of the whole community at the mercy of a few holders of money, who had no motive but to extort the utmost possible from the necessities of the community. The result was the general collapse of substantially all credit.

Had there been freedom in banking, nothing of this kind would have occurred. The bankers would have been so numerous as to be able to furnish all the money that could have been kept in circulation. They would probably have supplied three, four, or five times the amount we actually had. Traffic between man and man would have been almost wholly done for cash, instead of on credit; and nothing in the form of a panic would have been known.

The panic of 1873, therefore, does nothing towards proving that *solvent* notes, issued for circulation as money, — no matter how great their amount, — are not equal in value, dollar for dollar, with coin.

X. But the argument that is offered perhaps with the most assurance as proof that any increase of money by means of paper reduces for the time being the gold or silver dollar below its true and natural market value is derived from the rise that takes place in the prices of commodities, relatively to gold and silver, whenever the currency is increased by the addition of paper.

This argument, if it be an honest one, implies an ignorance of two things; namely, first, an ignorance of the fact that the paper is employed as capital to diversify industry and increase production; and, secondly, an ignorance of the effect which a diversity of industry and increase of production have upon the prices of commodities, relatively to any fixed standard of value. This effect has been illustrated in a previous number of this Review, and need not be repeated here.

The diversity of industry and increase of production that follow an increase of currency by paper, and the effect which that diversity and production have upon the prices of commodities,

<sup>1</sup> See "The Law of Prices" in the "Radical Review" for August, 1877.

utterly destroy the argument that the rise in prices results from any depreciation in the value of coin below its true and natural value as a metal.

A second answer to the argument drawn from the rise in prices under an abundant paper currency is to be found in the theory of the very men who oppose such a currency. Their theory is that, by the prohibition of the paper, the coins can be made to have a "purchasing power as money" indefinitely greater than their true and natural market value as metals. They hold that the coins already have "a purchasing power" as money far greater than their true and natural value as metals.

Now, inasmuch as every dollar of *solvent* paper currency represents — by giving a lien upon — so much real property as is equal to the coin in true and natural market value, it necessarily follows, on their own theory, that the paper has no other effect than to bring the coins *down*, from their unnatural, fictitious, and monopoly price, or "purchasing power," to their true and natural value as metals; or, what is the same thing, to bring all other property *up* to its true and natural market value, relatively to the coins as metals.

XI. It will now be taken for granted that the following propositions have been established; namely,—

- I. That the only true and natural market value of gold and silver coins is that value, and only that value, which they have for use or consumption as metals; that this is the value at which they now stand in the markets of the world; that it is the only value that has any stability; and that it is the only value at which they can be said to be standards for measuring the value of any other property whatever.
- 2. That inasmuch as paper money does not compete at all with gold and silver coins for any of those uses that give them their value, the true and natural market value of the coins cannot be reduced below their value as metals, or their value in the markets of the world, by any possible amount of paper money that can be kept in circulation; and that, consequently, the paper money, however great its amount, can do nothing towards reducing the coins as standards of value below their true and natural value as standards,—that is, their value as metals.

- 3. That the coins, standing at their true and natural value as metals, are as much standards by which to measure the value of all other *money* as of all other property; and, consequently, that all other money that has the same value in the market, dollar for dollar, with the coins, only increases the amount of money, without lowering the standard of value; and that, if all the other vendible property in the world were cut up into pieces or parcels, each of the same value with a dollar (or any given number of dollars) of coin, and each piece or parcel were represented by a promissory note, and all these notes were to be bought and sold as money in competition with the coins, the coins would not be thereby reduced below their true and natural market value as metals, nor, consequently, below their true and natural market value as standards.
- 4. That to say that the true and natural market value of the coins as standards of value is diminished by increasing the number of dollars, so long as the additional dollars are of the same value, dollar for dollar, with the standards, is equivalent to saying that the coins have no fixed—nor any thing like a fixed—value of their own; and that they are, consequently, unfit for, and incapable of being, standards of value; that to say that increasing the number of dollars, all of one and the same value, is diminishing the value of the dollar is just as absurd as it would be to say that increasing the number of yardsticks, all of one and the same length, diminishes the length of the yardstick; or as it would be to say that increasing the number of pound-weights, all of one and the same weight, diminishes the weight of the pound-weight.

XII. The four propositions in the last preceding section are so manifestly true that no one, I apprehend, will even attempt to controvert them otherwise than by asserting that the present market value of the coins does not rest wholly upon their value as metals, but, in part, upon these further facts, — namely, that the coins are money, and, secondly, that they are made a privileged money by the prohibitions or limitations imposed by law upon all other money.

If it should be said—as it constantly is said—that the fact of the coins being made money, and the further fact of prohibitions or limitations being imposed upon all other money, have given the coins "a purchasing power" far above their true and natural value as metals, the answer is that such a "purchasing power" is an unjust and extortionate power—a mere power of robbery—arbitrarily granted to the holders of the coins, from no motive whatever but to enable them to get more for their coins than they are really worth; or, what is the same thing, to enable them to coerce all other persons into selling their property to the holders of the coins for less than it is worth. And this is really the only motive that was ever urged against the free purchase and sale of all other money in competition with the coins.

The frauds and extortions that are attempted to be practised by making the coins a privileged money, under cover of the pretence of maintaining the standard of value, may be illustrated in this way; namely,—

In some parts of Europe, there is said to be quite a trade in humming birds. While living, they are wanted, I suppose, as pets, the same as parrots, canaries, and some other birds. When dead, after passing through the hands of the taxidermists, they are wanted as ornaments.

Let us suppose there were such a trade in this country. And let us suppose the whole number of humming birds, already caught, in the country, to be ten thousand. And let us suppose their market value as pets and for ornaments to be ten dollars each. The market value of the whole ten thousand humming birds, then, would be one hundred thousand dollars.

And suppose these ten thousand humming birds to be owned by one hundred men, each man owning one hundred birds, that is, one thousand dollars' worth.

But suppose further that, in consideration of humming birds being rare, beautiful, containing much value in small space, and incapable of being rapidly increased, the government should adopt and legalize them as money, as standards of value.

And suppose that, under pretence of maintaining this standard of value unimpaired, the government should prohibit all other money, and should also prohibit all substitutes and all contracts — such as notes, checks, drafts, bills of exchange, and the like — by which the necessity for buying and selling the humming birds themselves — the legalized money — should be avoided.

Suppose, in short, that, under pretence of maintaining this standard of value, the government should establish, in the hands of these hundred owners of the humming birds, an absolute monopoly of money, and of every thing that could serve the purposes of money.

What, now, would be the market price of the humming birds? And what would become of the standard of value? Why, we know that the one hundred owners of these ten thousand humming birds, having thus secured to themselves an absolute monopoly of all the money in the country, would demand for their birds as money, a hundred, a thousand, or a million times more than their true and natural value, - that is, more than they were worth simply as humming birds. By the monopoly of money, they would be put in possession of a substantially absolute power over all the property and labor of our forty-five millions of people. There would be but one holder of money for every four hundred and fifty thousand people. These four hundred and fifty thousand people could sell neither their labor nor their property to anybody except this single owner of humming birds. And they could sell to him only at such prices as he should choose to give. And he, knowing his power over their necessities, would not part with one of his birds, unless he should get in exchange for it a hundred, a thousand, or a million times more than it was really and truly worth. In this way this pretended standard of value would be made to measure — that is, to procure for its possessor - a hundred, a thousand, or a million times more than its own true and natural value.

Of course, everybody in the country, except these hundred men, would be robbed of all their property at once, unless there should chance to be some few so situated that they could contrive to live within themselves without selling either their property or their labor. And these hundred men would soon make themselves masters and owners of substantially all the property in the country. All the other people of the country would be at their mercy, and would be permitted to live, or suffered to die, as the pleasure of the one hundred men should dictate.

Such would be the effect of establishing a monopoly of money under pretence of establishing a standard of value.

But suppose, now, on the other hand, that all men were allowed

to exercise their natural right of buying and selling as money any thing and every thing which they should choose to buy and sell as money. What would be the result? Why, we know from experience that, instead of buying and selling the humming birds themselves, they would rarely buy one of them. On the contrary, they would buy and sell notes, checks, drafts, and the like, representing perhaps a large portion of the property of the country. These notes, checks, and drafts would be nominally and legally made payable in humming birds, and would be in the nature of liens upon the property of the makers. And any holder of one of them could, if he chose, not only demand humming birds in payment, but, if that were refused, could sue for, and recover judgment for, so many actual humming birds as the note promised. And the property of the maker of the note would be taken by legal process, and sold for humming birds, and nothing else; and these birds would then be paid over to the holder of the note.

But we know, at the same time, that the humming birds, when thus actually paid over to the holder of the note, would be worth no more in the market than the note was before he sued on it: that they would buy no more of any thing he wanted to buy than would the note; that nearly or quite everybody who had any thing to sell would rather have the note than the birds; and that, unless he wanted to keep the birds as pets or for ornaments, he would have made a bad bargain for himself; that even if he wanted the birds to keep, he could have bought them in the market with the note at the same price and with much less trouble to himself than it cost him to obtain them by his suit; and finally, that he had made a fool and a curmudgeon of himself by bringing a suit, and taking trouble upon himself, and giving trouble to the maker of the note, in order to get something that he did not want, and which it would be a trouble and loss to him to keep, and a trouble to get rid of; for all which he would get no profit or compensation whatever.

As sensible men would not be likely to go through such unprofitable operations as this, the result would be that men generally, instead of buying and selling the humming birds themselves as money, would seldom or never buy them, except when they had a special use for them as humming birds; but, in place

of them, would buy and sell such notes, checks, drafts, and the like as had an equal value in the market with the birds, and were more convenient to keep, handle, and transport than the birds. The birds themselves would continue to stand, in the market, at their true and natural value as humming birds, and, as such, would be very good standards of value by which to measure the value of all other money, as well as of all other property; and all traffic between man and man would be the exchange of one kind of property for another, each at its full, true, and natural value, with no extortion or coercion on either side.

This supposed case of the humming birds gives a fair illustratration of the sense, motives, and honesty of all that class of men who are continually crying out for prohibitions or limitations upon all money except gold and silver coins, or some other privileged money, under pretence of maintaining the standard of value. They all have but one and the same motive, — namely, the monopoly of money, and the power which that monopoly gives them to rob everybody else.

LYSANDER SPOONER.

## THE MARTYR'S VISION.

MORNING dawns on fair Italia. From the blue-robed, Adrian deep Climbs the golden car of Phœbus Up Albano's glittering steep. Far above the gray Campagna Greets the sun one mighty dome Gleaming in colossal splendor, — Coronet of papal Rome.

Hark! what sounds within the city
On the matin breezes swell,
Chilling with their slow vibrations?—
'Tis a martyr's funeral knell!
While on Nature's glowing canvas
Morning's loveliest colors vie,
From his cell, by priests attended,
Comes a hero forth to die.

Firmly and with brow uplifted
Walks the victim thro' the throng;
In a smile his lips are parted,
As by notes of voiceless song;
All unmindful of the tumult,
With self-poised, majestic mien,
Wrapt in Thought's sublime abstraction,
Bruno contemplates the scene.

They have reached the broad Piazza, Bound him to the fatal pyre, And th' unfeeling crowd watch breathless For the cruel tongues of fire. Yet the peaceful smile still lingers On the lips of him they slay, And a light illumes his features Like the deepening flush of day.

- "See, he moves his lips blaspheming!"
  Shout th' attendants standing near;
  But the whispers of the martyr
  Fall upon no mortal ear!
  None can catch the wondrous vision
  Which the dying hero sees;
  None can trace his spirit's triumph,
  As he murmurs thoughts like these:—
- "Church of Rome, Truth's worst opponent! You may crush me by your might, But you will not thus extinguish Heaven's advancing waves of light! Can you quench the dawn, whose glory Crowns Frascati's silvered crest? Just as little can you smother Truths which glow within this breast!
- "Tho' no 'martyr's crown' awaits me In a world beyond the grave, Consciousness of Right elates me; 'Tis enough! No more I crave. All your curses do not reach me, For I walk with Truth sublime, And my perfect vindication I with calmness leave to Time.
- "For as yon bright day is breaking O'er this gloom-enshrouded earth, So the age of Truth is destined Here ere long to find its birth! Resting on a sure foundation, Based on proven facts alone, Freed from trammels of tradition, Reason then shall rear its throne!
- "Burn, then, Giordano Bruno! Give his ashes to the wind!

You can never crush the freedom Of a Truth-inspired mind! While my body writhes in anguish Shall my soul with rapture swell At its vision of the future! Age of darkness, — priests, — farewell!"

Lit is now the ghastly pyre; Lurid are the flames that rise; Loud the Church's exultation As the man of science dies.

Ah! but from those hallowed ashes Springs a power which ne'er can die; For the dawn of Bruno's vision Gilds the portals of the sky!

JOHN L. STODDARD.

## CURRENT LITERATURE.

 Natural Law. An Essay in Ethics. By Edith Simcox. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. 1877. pp. 361.

"Human consciousness is beyond doubt a something distinct and unique, but it is still an open question whether we are to class mental processes on one side and every other natural phenomenon on the other, or whether we should look on man as only the chief and most interesting among the many marvellous products of natural evolution." This is the "open question" of questions, which the work before us attempts, - not to close, perhaps, for the writer seems too true a philosopher to dream of extinguishing philosophy by that final solution at the present stage of human self-inquiry, - but rather to set out in such aspects as may reconcile men to the solution which positive philosophy anticipates. The attempt is no new one, either in aim or plan, but it has never been made by a bolder mind, nor with keener originality of thinking, nor with a broader comprehension of all that the undertaking involves. Accepting no formulas in thinking from any school, the author holds her rationalistic creed quite equally independent of any authoritative name behind her own. She represents the positivism of Comte, reinforced by the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer, and by the physio-psychology of Lewes and Bain; but it is neither as a follower of Comte nor as a follower of Spencer that she enters these vast fields of speculation. Their methods have led her quite wide of the "religion of humanity" which gained a prophet and a ritualist in the one, and quite beyond the halting doctrine of "the unknowable" at which the other paused. She has conceived, in fact, a philosophical system that is quite her own, and she traverses it, in this book, with as firm-footed logic, at least, as that of any among the adventurous explorers of the present day, who bring reports from that chartless realm wherein the very possibilities of longitudinal reckoning have just begun to be known.

It is, of course, impossible to give, in this place, any just account of such a systematic body of thought. The best that can be done is to outline a very few of the main conceptions from which it is evolved.

The author prefers to describe her method of thinking as that of a "naturalist," and she has established a fixed centre for it by a definition of "natural law" which removes all the prevalent confusions that attach to the idea of "law." Her first effort is to modify, if not eliminate, the notions of authority and command which jurists and theologians have alike assisted to identify with that of law. She does this by showing that will and command are insufficient, under any circumstances, to produce the condition of necessity which constitutes law; that even in the case of man, and even in the case of his own political ordinances, those conditions are determined by something in the nature of the subject of the law, which results in obedience, if the law be a true one, and which is a prime factor, therefore, in the idea of law. In accordance with this conception, her readers are requested always to understand by the term law "a statement of constant relations, posited by the nature of things," - meaning by "the nature of a thing" the classes of actions (or sufferances) constantly characteristic of it under given circumstances, the fact of such constancy being determined by experience.

The second chapter of the book is devoted to a demonstration of the fact that man possesses a knowable "nature," in the strict meaning of this definition; that he is a subject, therefore, of natural law, in the same sense in which every unconscious part of Nature is subjected; that his own political laws, by means of which he realizes the social state (toward which the circumstances of his existence impel him), are always the outcome of natural law, formulated and declared. It will not do, in the space at command here, to trace at all the interesting and original discussion which occupies this portion of the book, analyzing the growth of customary or common law, the rise of political authority in settled communities, and the passage of that which is originally custom or habit into judgments, precedents, declaratory statutes or decrees, subject all the time to the modifications which go on in the underlying "natural law" of prevalent custom, opinion, and belief.

The grand theme of the book is reached in the succeeding chapter. Having derived from her prior investigations the conclusion that "human law is most intelligible and explicable, if conceived as the mere addition of consciousness to a real causal, or fixed order of relations, as, in fact, the consciousness of causation," she now applies this conception to the phenomena of that subjective constraint upon human con-

duct which is variously described as "moral law," "moral obligation," "sense of duty," and so on. We can almost convey a fair idea of the process of her reasoning by picking here and there a conspicuous sentence from her work. "A real tendency or impulse . . . toward the effecting of any particular result becomes present to consciousness as a desire for that result." "Men become conscious of law as a check on desire." "'Ought' is what I feel obliged to do, because for ages and ages the stream of human tendency has set in favor of such doing, and my present inclinations have been moulded by the stream; if completely, I do easily and willingly what I ought; if not, I may leave it undone and repent, or do it grudgingly and with pain, or I may set myself against the stream and deny the obligation; but, in the ordinary use of words, I am a 'good' or 'bad' man in proportion to the completeness and spontaneity of my obedience." "By natural good we mean, as will probably be allowed, the perfection of any thing after its kind, understanding by such perfection only a statement or inference from experience that there are certain types to which beings of different species do actually tend to approximate, and this so generally that, though the perfect type may never be realized in one individual specimen of the class, still, every particular partial divergence from it appears as an exception to the general rule." "We conceive moral good as the pursuit of natural (not sensible) good under difficulties without which the pursuit would not be self-conscious." "The natural good of any species may vary indefinitely with whatever modifications of the specific type actually take place, but as there always is a type, the standard of natural good is at least relatively fixed." "The highest form of virtue, or moral excellence, according to this view, would lie in the conscious tendency toward conformity to the type as it is going to be, but as, except in a few chosen specimens, it is not yet discernible to be." "Morality advances when the sense of moral obligation is onerous and distressing, because the necessity then experienced by the moral teachers of the race is made by desires going forward after the unattained, not by motives already present to sense." These sentences contain, we think, the essence of the moral philosophy of the book, although the real fulness of it cannot be indicated by them at all. In the discursive thought which flows through and around the main argument, with constantly surprising incidental effects, - washing away, for example, the foundations of Utilitarianism, which is the basing of morality upon the pursuit of "sensible good," instead of "natural good," - there is much that ought to be noticed, if space did not forbid. But the kernel of doctrine, which the whole work is an effort to plant, is this: that the moral "good" which man recognizes, and the moral "right" by which he is constrained, are the acting and reacting "stream of tendency" in himself and in his fellows toward "perfection after their kind" (according to their "nature," that is), developed to consciousness by the resistances which obstruct it, and there manifested in the idea of moral law, the sentiment of duty, the dictate of self-denial and sacrifice.

It is not difficult to see the criticism to which this theory of morality is most exposed. While the author accepts fully the doctrine of evolution, and builds upon it, she yet seems to be importing into that doctrine something which cannot be reconciled with it. The strict evolutionist cannot possibly admit into his philosophy the factor that is represented by such phrases as "the perfection of a thing after its kind," "types," "standards," "natural excellence," and so on, no matter how guardedly they may be used nor with what qualifications. It is true that they are not employed here in their every-day sense; it is true that the "perfection" contemplated is something relative to changing conditions, and that the conceivability of an entirely different moral "good" under different conditions is fully recognized; yet the whole idea of a tendency in things to the "perfection of their kind" is alien to evolutionary philosophy. Such conceptions are excluded from it by its very terms. The abstract notion of "perfection" is a generalization, an imagination, about which it cannot assume to know any thing or to frame any hypothesis. It sees in things only their adaptation, not to any fancied end or purpose or knowable outcome whatsoever, but simply to the external fact of the relations by which their existence is conditioned. It contemplates each thing of every kind as merely striving to continue to be by satisfying the terms on which its continued existence is found possible under the play of those determined interactions in Nature which, when we have ascertained them by experience, we call natural laws. It knows no tendency in any thing, except the tendency, if it may be called so, to continue or persist in being, which would be resolved in the last analysis, perhaps, into a certain plasticity, by virtue of which it adapts itself to the conditions of its existence. It can allow no other meaning, therefore, to such words as "perfection," "good," or "best," than that of mere completeness of adaptation.

An evolutionary system of morals, then, must be one which shows that the several states of human feeling and the several qualities in human conduct which we call moral (static and dynamic) have become what they are, and attained the kind of character of sovereignty that is conceded to them, by the triumph of survival only, and by the fitness for being which survival represents. This our author does not

seem to do in any systematic way, although in her chapters on "altruism" and on "customary and positive law" she analyzes with much acuteness the process of adaptation that goes on between man and man in the evolution of the social state. But all her thinking is colored by an assumption which nothing in her philosophy justifies, so far as we are able to see, - namely, that man "feels impelled to be, himself, as fine a specimen of humanity as he can, to realize, that is to say, all the capabilities of action and passion that are in him." We do not mean to say that this is untrue. We only question whether it can, with due consistency, be assumed as a fact, without accounting for it, in a system of philosophy which proposes to consider man as a "product of natural evolution." If it be true that man feels thus impelled, there would seem to be something evolved in this one product of evolution which appears in no other; something which strives, at least, to be independent in its evolution, going out to solicit conditions and make selections for itself. A phenomenon, surely, which demands explanation before any other.

This logical unsatisfactoriness in the doctrine of the book finds its sufficient reason in what follows. Underneath all the philosophical contentment which she has striven with intellectual courage to attain, there is an unrepressed craving of religious sentiment, asserting itself in her nature, and commanding her to rationalize it, if she can. This is the manifest motive of the work. She cannot apotheosize Humanity with Comte, and no form of theistic or pantheistic conception is satisfactory to her mind. She seeks for a purely subjective religion, or for something which shall justify religious emotion with every object of religious adoration withdrawn. In that questionable postulate, that man feels himself impelled toward perfection after his kind, she appears to find what she seeks. Acting alone, the impulse would carry each individual man in pursuit of his own specific natural good; but he is overruled by the fact that he is "placed in a world the natural good of which requires sacrifice . . . akin to the partial sacrifices of inclination within the individual enjoined by its [his] own moral nature." Out of this she can trace the possible growth of a "disinterested feeling and intelligence of the universal good," which may endure through each imposed sacrifice, and habitually induce "an active cooperation of the individual will with all the real forces of the universe in proportion to their reality." But — and here the doctrine becomes very nearly mystical - to sustain such a moral attitude in man toward the "universal good," "the supreme religious influence of the general tendencies of the not-self," she says, must be "felt, as a clear and present reality, not constraining or controlling the will, but absolutely transforming it, moulding it into acquiescence or conformity with all that exists." She maintains with warmth that there is such a "natural and intelligible revolution in the feelings, which follows upon the apprehension of a new truth of vital importance, or, more commonly, upon some moral crisis which causes an old belief suddenly to acquire fresh force and significance;" that it is akin, on the one hand, to the spiritual revolution which constitutes the "new birth" of the Calvinists, and, on the other hand, to the sudden illumination which mathematicians have experienced while groping amid the obscurities of the differential calculus. "The change of heart by which the saints felt themselves released at once from the bondage of natural iniquity and of the law of natural morality, may be described as the discovery by a soul that had been out of harmony with its surroundings, that harmony, though not happiness, is possible - at a price; that, though the self cannot remodel the universe in conformity to its own best impulses, all its own best impulses can find scope and satisfaction in conformity with true tendencies in the not-self." And thus she appropriates for her own naturalistic creed the whole of the emotional contents of every self-abnegating religion, and provides for a piety which needs no pantheon.

We shall not undertake to discuss these views, nor even to say how far, if they stood by themselves, they would seem to be satisfactory or unsatisfactory. But in their connection with the system of philosophy which the writer professes, our criticism upon them has been indicated already. Their consistency with the logic of positivism or naturalism is doubtful, — more than doubtful, — and another book will be needed to establish quite a number of the grounds on which the writer has built venturously in this.

J. N. L.

The Conflict between Labor and Capital. By Albert S. Bolles, author of "Chapters in Political Economy," and editor of the "Norwich Morning Bulletin." Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876. pp. 211.

THE greater portion of this little book was written, as we are informed in the preface, while the author was traveling in Europe, where the wealth of facts bearing on the present relations of labor and capital with which his pages are crowded was gathered by personal inquiry or collated from official reports. The work is a suggestive one in the present feverish state of the public pulse, and many of the facts stated will give rise to a train of thought more searching than our author has ventured to open. We are told that in the Netherlands, prior to 1872, there had been a continual rise of prices in the necessaries of life, but not in labor, and that the Dutch laborer only succeeds in fighting off starvation by an exclusively vegetable diet. "To the industrial classes of Holland, animal food, cheese, eggs, beer, currants, raisins, sugar, etc., are luxuries of which they partake only on Sundays, and then sparingly; ofttimes not at all." In Belgium we find that "the names of nine hundred thousand persons, or one-fifth of the population, are inscribed upon the list of poor-relief." "In Saxony, women chiefly live upon weak coffee, often made from roasted barley or from grounds bought in hotels and taverns." In France, statistical documents under the Empire bear testimony that "the examination of the increase of wages, proved by documents of charitable institutions running over thirty-two years, may be summed up in the remark that, while the price of living has increased forty-five per cent., wages have increased only seventeen per cent." In England, "the tendency of the hour is to reduce wages and increase the cost of living." The information compiled on the subject of Trade-Unions is very fair and instructive, as well as the chapters on industrial partnerships and cooperative undertakings in England, France, and Germany, though not as complete as could

But if the reader seeks for a deeper glance into the relations of labor and capital, he will look in vain. The book is readily seen to be the work of the journalist rather than the thinker; in fact, the chief object of the book is avowed to be the desire "of toning down the antagonism existing between the two classes." In furtherance of this undertaking we find on page 74 the labor problem disposed of by the following short and easy method:—

"The contest between capitalist and laborer is a contest between present and accumulated labor. Capital is labor saved, nothing more The contest is between those who have saved their labor or inherited it, and those having less. It is a contest of the laborer with the laborer, after all. . . . Respecting the true relations between capitalist and laborer, there is no division of opinion. They are partners in the same enterprise; they are united by a common purpose; hence there is no reason whatever for jealousy on the part of workmen toward their employers. Such is the belief of all who have investigated the subject."

Nowhere is confusion of thought more apparent than in these words, wherein our author signally fails to discriminate between wealth and capital. Only what bears interest can be called capital; it is that portion of wealth which grows by absorbing a part of the fruit of labor. Labor saved is wealth, but the fruit of the partially rewarded labor of others diverted from its equitable distribution constitutes rent or interest, which distinguishes capital from wealth. Amasa Walker terms the distinction an important one, epigrammatically remarking, "wealth is as it is had; capital as it is used."

The question of the meaning of "property" is a fundamental one that requires at least statement in any work assuming to discuss the relations of labor to capital; yet our author dismisses the subject in a sentence. But the questions remain, and press for settlement. Must conditions originating in violence, robbery, and oppression remain unquestioned? In equity can Nature, like the products of human exertions, become an inherited commodity, from a share in which humanity is to be excluded? Shall raw materials remain the sport of speculators whose action entirely suspends the law of supply and demand? The anti-slavery idea was that men had an inalienable right to the fruit of their own labor, but this question received no settlement when President Lincoln affixed his signature to the emancipation proclamation. The contest was merely changed from the question of the ownership of labor to that of the ownership of the means of labor, and man's "inalienable right" remains curtailed so long as he is denied economic freedom. A work on the conflict between labor and capital should have entered, however briefly, into the history of the growth of private ownership of the means of labor, and showed that it is an outgrowth of modern civilization, and entirely unknown in the world's history until within recent centuries. A chapter on the rise of capitalistic production would seem to have been imperatively demanded, but the horizon of established custom seems to have limited any excursion into broader fields, and they are only hinted at as "fanciful speculations."

J. S. Mill clearly discerned the rocks upon which modern society is rapidly drifting, and by way of contrast we refresh ourselves with his estimate of the dangers involved in the conflict:—

"If the choice were to be made between Communism with all its chances, and the present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices; if the institution of private property necessarily carried with it, as a consequence, that the produce of labor should be apportioned as we now see it, — almost in an inverse ratio to the labor, — the largest portions to those who have never worked at all, the next largest to those whose work is almost nominal, and so in a descending scale as the work grows harder and more disagreeable, — if this or Communism were the alternative, all the difficulties, great or small, of Communism would be but as dust in the balance."

But, fortunately for the interests of society, neither of these types

represent the normal conditions of the social organization. Society is an organism, not the creature of statute law; its interests are one, not many. Social health is the harmonious action of all the functions of the body politic. Whenever the interests of one class are served at the expense of others, and success in life depends upon diverting the unrewarded labor of others to self-aggrandizement; when the egoistic, rather than the altruistic, impulses prevail, - then disease characterizes the social organism. Into such a state we have passed; social aims are ignored, and individual interests prevail. "Every man for himself" is the guiding rule of modern civilization, and "profits" the sole incentive to action; consequently we witness the disruption of social bonds, and the resulting anarchical condition into which we have fallen. Our author informs us that "every man seeks to get the most he can for what he sells, and pay as little as possible for what he buys. This is the law of the world." Just because this is the law of the world, we predicate the failure of the civilization based upon it.

Under such a system, or no-system, the conflict between labor and capital must increase; it becomes an irrepressible conflict between capitalistic production, on the one hand, and coöperative production and distribution, on the other; in a word, it is virtually war between the interests of society as a whole and the class interest of a few, and we might as well attempt to whistle down the wind as to tone down the antagonism inevitably arising from such relationships, or to mouth the well-meaning, but reactionary, phrases of our ignorant economists, who see not the impending revolution toward which we are swiftly drifting. Fortunately, humanity is immortal; its sickness is never unto death; and however convulsive may be the throes with which the organism is seized, of the ultimate result we need cherish no doubt.

The time is ripe for a work on this subject laying bare the positive principles upon which healthful social action is based, and which will rise above the limited horizon that restricts the view of our economists. But, while deficient in that enlarged view of social relations for which the world waits, we would still commend the work under notice as unusually fair and sympathetic, and deserving the careful consideration of our capitalist friends, whom a more thorough treatment would repulse.

 The Life of Edgar Allan Poe. By WILLIAM F. GILL. Illustrated. New York: C. T. Dillingham. 1877.

A GENIAL critic will approach this book with perplexity. From one point of view it is to be exceedingly commended; from another, very little praised, if not, indeed, altogether condemned. Shall we take our stand severely upon literary worth and purity, like a censor for the protection of art and language? Or shall we permit ourselves to be charmed out of watchfulness by sympathy with an honest and kindly purpose, honorable alike to the author's heart and head? There is so much sincerity in the work, so much generous admiration of the subject, so much devotion to the aim, and withal so much freedom from the taint of self-consciousness in the writer, indeed such entire forgetfulness of every thing (English and grammar included) except the object of the work, and that object is such a worthy one, - namely, to vindicate the reputation of a sad life and character from posthumous calumnies, and to give an extraordinary genius in letters his due place in moral estimation, - all this I say is so admirable that we feel only a desire to record our thanks and commendation. But we fear we must be as just to the manner from a literary point of view as to the purpose from a moral one, and this is to say, with regret, that the book is very ill done. First of all, as a biography it is ill done, because it utterly fails to set the hero before us. After reading it, we find that Griswold's malice is severely exposed, and no doubt successfully broken down in the main, so that Poe is rescued from an enemy; also that several misstatements that have passed current are corrected, - such, for example, as that Poe utterly disappears from all eyes for two years, during which he wanders in Europe, it being asserted by Mr. Gill, upon competent testimony apparently, that Poe never left this country at all; also that testimony, some new, some old, is brought to bear in the poet's favor as to character in a manner that will be a comfort to a generous-minded lover of Poe, or even only an admirer of him. But these somewhat negative satisfactions are all that can be gleaned from the work. It leaves a good biography of Poe as desirable as it was before. It altogether fails to set before us a portrait of the man. We do not see him as he went out and came in; as he studied, composed, thought, dreamed. Except a mere glimpse at times, these, as well as his family life, are altogether sealed from our view. One particular point, and that not at all pertaining to an intimate matter, will suffice to illustrate. There are few purely literary authors and poets of modern schools whose works display more erudition than Poe's, and that too not only in literary, historical, and scientific matters, but in curious learning. Now, this does not come by intuition. Poe must have studied and read hard. But no glimpse of this study appears in Mr. Gill's work, nor even hardly any leisure making it possible. We are not competent to decide whether a biographical picture of this sad but extraordinary genius is possible. There are hints of the destruction of papers by Griswold, perhaps by others, and what needful material may have been destroyed for ever we cannot say. But we feel justified in three opinions: first, that a minutely detailed and complete daily biography of Poe is very desirable; secondly, that if such a work, or one much more nearly approaching it than Mr. Gill's, be absolutely impossible thirty years after Poe's death, when many of his contemporaries who had more or less knowledge of him, and even some of his relatives and friends, are still living, it is "something new under the sun" (and we suggest in parenthesis that possibly sufficient industry might even discover some of those boon companions several times alluded to by Gill as meeting the poet at unguarded moments, and leading him astray to liquor and madness); thirdly, that Poe's letters to private friends or business acquaintance, of which it is reasonable to assume there must be many existing, have not been brought to enrich this work of Gill or others previous to it. Yet it is to be mentioned that some interesting letters of Poe, bearing on both his character and his circumstances, which we have met elsewhere, receive no notice in this work of Mr. Gill. One of the most graphic and valuable passages in the volume is that describing Poe's midnight walk with Mr. Sartain of Philadelphia. It is pitiable, pathetic, terrible.

Mr. Gill cannot fairly be credited with literary skill, either in construction or in expression, and his lapses from good English appear in unfortunate prominence beside his subject; for Poe's diction is classical both in purity and elegance. In the preface, on page 4, the author savs. speaking of Griswold: "His shafts were none the less pitiless, although barbed with 'poor fustian.' " The italics are ours, introduced to indicate the ludicrous metaphor. The pitfall herein seems to be an unwise effort to be fine in writing to the forgetfulness of that simple precision and specific applicability of words which constitute their consummate grace as well as their highest utility. To be just to Mr. Gill, he does not often fail by trying to be fine; but why say, "Griswold sneers anent this theory" (p. 108), using an uncommon Scotch word for the proper English at? Illy (p. 10) is bad English: ill is an adverb as well as adjective. On page 133, we have, "it has been deemed not a little remarkable that he should have put forth what he must have known to have been," etc. This is very bad, - "a most vile martext;" it should read, "not a little remarkable that he should put forth what he must have known to be." The author writes (p. 94), "incapable of sensing delicate distinctions:" this is not English, indeed is no better than a sentimental affectation or slang; sense is not in use as a verb. But a more monstrous error of this kind appears on page 162, where the author speaks of "newspaporial headquarters!" "Phœbus! what a name!"

We have marked other errors or infelicities, but the foregoing are enough, perhaps more than enough. As a literary performance the work is of too little importance to deserve so much criticism. It is rescued by its moral purpose, by the worth of its subject-matter, and by its considerable success in the vindication from many calumnies and misunderstandings of a sad, suffering, gifted son of song, whose extraordinary writings stand by themselves, unapproachable in their peculiar powers, and shedding the lustre of a classical elevation upon the literature of his country and his language. That Poe, after all is said, had lamentable faults, is true; but it is also true that he had many surpassing virtues, and that some of his sufferings are to be ascribed not to his weakness or sins, but to his singular fidelity to his ideal of his vocation. Probably no man ever lived as to whom more readily the good parson of Auburn would have "quite forgot his vices in his woe." It has been remarked that Poe was devoid of moral sense. We think the remark is wanton. There is no space here to take up this topic, which is intimately connected with Poe's views of the poet's art. But two things may be briefly said. First, that Poe's relations with womankind seem without any stain, and, indeed, marked by a singular fidelity to him of his wife and of her mother, in penury, cold, sickness, obscurity, loneliness, - a devotion which never wavered, and which is as much a testimony to him as it is honorable to themselves. Whatever his faults, it is certain he was chaste toward all women, and tenderly true to his own. He was as far as possible from a sensualist in any direction, even in the melancholy lapses of his intemperance, or the early ungratefulness of his extravagance and gambling. Secondly, it is to be said that one may search in vain throughout his works for an unclean word or suggestion. His writings are clean, perfectly clean, from beginning to end. Whatever of morality they may fail to teach, or not aim to teach positively, there is not in them a syllable which by the most remote suggestion can grieve the most sensitive spirit. It is from this point of view that all who admire the genius of Poe owe gratitude to Mr. Gill. For as long as the malicious (Graham says "dastardly") assertions of Griswold were left to stand, the apparent discrepancy between the man and his works was distressing and perplexing. If we do not much better know, by reason of Mr. Gill, what Poe was, we are thankful to him for demolishing the odious fabrications of what he was not.

J. V. B.

4.—An Epitome of the Positive Philosophy and Religion, explanatory of the Society of Humanity in the City of New York, together with the Constitution and Regulations of that Society; to which is added an important letter of Harriet Martineau in regard to her religious convictions. Published by the Society of Humanity, 141 Eighth Street, New York. 1877. pp. 60.

THIS little work, a mere brochure, bears the distinctive earmarks of the earnest and vigorous pen of Thaddeus B. Wakeman, who is rising to be the larger luminary of the American branch of the "Positive," or Positivistic, movement, as it slowly, but surely, forces its way upon the attention and convictions of the world. And yet, after half a century of announcement, "Positivism" is not so well known, even by the intelligent public at large, as not to be told of somewhat as if it were a new thing. A little ambiguity first has to be disposed of. The term positive, as the common property of the scientific world, means whatsoever is certainly known, or rather whatsoever is scientifically ascertained and demonstrated. In this sense, all scientists, - those who carefully hold hypothesis in the true place of hypothesis, and never allow credo to glide over surreptitiously or unconsciously into scio, are positivists, unless they choose to call themselves echosophists. But the Positivistic movement sometimes means something more specific, as when it is confined to the full or partial disciples of Auguste Comte, the great French philosopher, now dead, who filled a place in France not unlike that which Herbert Spencer has filled, and now fills, in England.

Comte, while less extensively known among English-speaking peoples than Spencer, is more widely known over Europe at large, and is impressing himself probably more profoundly upon the general thoughts of the world. He preceded Spencer by two or three decades as a writer, and Spencer has experienced some difficulty in guarding himself from the imputation of being one of his partial disciples. Each, however, is a great original thinker, and the coincidence between them is only incidental to the fact that they have worked somewhat on parallel lines in the grand sciento-philosophic evolution of the past half-century. To point out the difference between them

is more important in this sketch than to indicate their likeness. That difference lies, perhaps, most fundamentally in the inspiring animus of their respective labors. Spencer is scholarly, scientific, and philosophical; Comte is scientific, philosophical, and reformatory. Spencer stops, for the most part, with the analysis of what has been and is, and the synthesis in idea, or our knowledge of the matter; Comte is intently bent on accomplishing the needed changes in human society, and his whole philosophical elaboration is simply the building of a platform upon which to operate for the beneficent reconstruction of human institutions. Spencer is a philosopher; Comte is both philosopher and reformer, the reformatory purpose preponderating, how profound soever were his preliminary investigations.

The result of this difference on the part of Comte has been, as he himself planned and intended, the springing up of small, incipient organizations in various countries, intended to replace the prevalent church organization, and to charge themselves with the general education and development of mankind. It is claimed for Comte that he was the founder, at once, of the science of sociology and the religion of humanity, as contrasted with the divinity schools and religions of the past. The Society of Humanity in the city of New York is, at a second remove, one of these organizations, but so enlarged as to cease to be distinctively Comtean. It retains and prefers the term Positive, enlarging it to embrace the labors of all the great thinkers. Henry Edger was incipiently, and for some years, the personal head of the distinctively Comtean movement in America, and, we believe, still retains that position. Mr. Wakeman is the active man and leader of this later effort to found a church upon the distinctive basis of science.

The first thing, in order to understand something of Positivism, is to know that certain frequent and important words have a distinctive and technical meaning, differing from the present popular use. The CREED of this church is, or means, the entire body of the sciences, or all that is known certainly of the world and its inhabitants. Positivists, even Comteans, are by no means atheists, although they make society, or humanity rather, the direct object of their worshipful devotedness. They simply demand scientific proofs of the existence of God, or else they leave the question in abeyance, among matters unsolved, in respect to which they are neither entitled to affirm or deny. So also of spiritual existence beyond this world. According to their view, church and religion are natural needs and outgrowths of humanity, not resting, as ordinarily assumed, upon faith in God or immortality, but upon the necessity for human culture and improvement; so, indeed, that if there be no God and no worldful of immortals to look after us, then

all the more do we need to organize for the care of our own spiritual and material destiny. We should be all the more religious, and not less so, if there is no superhuman machinery intent on watching over and providing for us. But we cannot do better than to let Mr. Wakeman himself tell us what Positivism means by RELIGION.

"This word has been defined as belief in, worship of, or obligation of man to, some particular God or Supreme Being. Thus each Protestant or Catholic Christian, or Mohammedan, or Hindoo, has his 'religion.' Each sect and people regards itself as having the one true religion, because its god is the only true one. The word 'religion' has thus come to express the relation of the worshipper to his supernatural god. Religion and theology are, in this view, indissoluble. The moral and practical effect of thus limiting the meaning of this word has been to make enemies or strangers of the adherents of the various gods or theological conceptions. It was this old theological meaning of the word that made the earth the battle-field of 'religions.'

"But in the newer—that is, in the human and scientific—sense, the word 'religion' has come to mean that 'convergence' or unity of people, or of peoples, that has resulted, or may result, from any common belief or sentiment, whether springing from a belief in a god or otherwise. In this sense, the unity, integration, or binding together under the influence of a common conviction, is the substance of the meaning, of which the gods are ever but variable incidents. Thus, in the march of history, each god in his turn falls into insignificance, but the social unity—the collective man—is more and more. In this view the lesson of history is clear that human progress must be arrested, or man must, in this newer sense, become more and more religious, and yet at the same time less and less theological.

"The whole law of human progress may well illustrate the new meaning of this word 'religion,' for 'that law is but the application of the law of growth in biology to human societies. There is an ever-increasing cooperation of parts and organs, which are ever more and more *specialized*. That is, the growth or integration of the people, or of peoples, is attended by an ever-increasing liberty and also convergence of the individual as a part and organ of the integration. Each religion in history is an integration, and each therefore has been in turn succeeded by a broader faith, while the individual has generally become more free, and less a slave or serf, — that is, less a creature of status or birth. To illustrate:—

"I. The fetichistic religions formed the bond of communities small in size and simple in organization, while the individual was the slave of Nature or of tribal authority.

"2. Out of these tribes arose the larger religious integrations of astrolatry,  $-\epsilon$ . g, Egypt, Assyria, Persia.

"3. Over these grew the still larger polytheistic empires of Greece and Rome.

"4. Over and out of these grew the grander monotheistic integrations of the Papacy and Mohammedanism.

"5. The fierceness of the faiths last named was expended in the Crusades; and the feeling that all men are brethren, and that all nations are, under the law of nations, parts of a great commonwealth, announced the dawn of a new and still higher integration. This has been properly called the RELIGION OF HUMANITY. It is based upon the conviction that mankind and their interests and destiny are the matters of supreme interest on this planet. 'I come not to bring peace, but a sword,' was the

old import of this word 'religion.' Liberty and Union, Order and Progress, are the watchwords of its newer meaning.

"This scientific and human use of this word 'religion' Comte (Catechism, p. 51) finds to be most happily included in the generally received etymology of the word, by which it is derived from the latin re, back, and ligo-are, to bind. The word is thus made to tell us that it is the binding back of man to his fellows and to the world. It is the tie by which his feelings and thoughts within, and his actions without, are co-ordinated into health and harmony with each other, with society and the world, with the past and the future.

"Some modern scholars, however, suspect that the truer derivation of the word is from re, over again, and lego-ere, to gather or consider, — i. e., to ponder or carefully review. Thus the common Latin phrase, 'Religio jurisjurandi' (the religion of an oath), would mean, under the first derivation, the bond or obligation of the oath; but, under the second derivation, it would mean the care and scrupulousness of the oath. Fortunately, under the 'new faith,' the meanings sustained by both derivations are happily included and harmonized. In it, religion stands, as never before, for the great reconciliation, in which social unity and moral obligation rest upon, and grow ever stronger from, the ever-tested truth and scrupulous exactness of science.

"The substance and the constructive feeling of the word 'religion' is admirably presented in the meaning and etymology of the word 'holy,' which, as an adjective, is often associated with it. The derivation of this word points to the Anglo-Saxon verb, to 'heal,' to make 'whole,'—that is, to secure the wholeness or harmony of health."

In a similar manner, the Epitome proceeds to define science, humanity, egoism, altruism, and other words, either new or employed in modified senses. Perhaps the use of the term priests by the Positivists is most novel and confusing. The creed of the new church being science, the whole body of scientific men becomes, or should become, the future priests of humanity. Their calling becomes elevated and sanctified. It is they who, in a special sense, are hereafter to take charge of the destinies of the social world. They should realize to themselves the sanctity and responsibility of their position. They should recall themselves from their vagrant and merely speculative investigations, tending now loosely outward in a thousand directions, and concentrate themselves upon such science as will most effectively and immediately contribute to the social welfare. In this manner sociology looms up as the supreme science. All other sciences should be studied in subservience to this. Such is a slight sketch of the religion of humanity. Its American development takes on certain modifications, never contemplated by Comte, from the more radical and cosmopolitan thinking around us. Already American "Positivism," itself a branch of empiricism at large, has become a pretty broad eclecticism, assimilating evolution, social freedom, and much other recent doctrine; and Wakeman is preëminently a leading, perhaps the leading, mind of this American eclectic empiricism.

S. P. A.

5.— The Cradle of the Christ: A Study of Primitive Christianity. By Octavius Brooks Frothingham. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 8vo.

As regards seriousness of purpose, importance of subject, and charm of diction this book is to be classed with such works as "Ecce Homo" and "Literature and Dogma;" but, in the time which has already elapsed since its publication, it is made evident that the somewhat eager reception accorded to those works is not to be accorded to this. It is to be regretted that it could not have come to us from across the water, with some little mystification as to authorship, and backed by a trans-Atlantic reputation. The experiment were worth trying, had it been possible. Mr. Frothingham is a bête noir to so respectable a portion of the reading public that his writings must fare as fares any cause presented to a hostile tribunal. If the court knows itself, and respects itself, it will give no countenance to so revolutionary utterances.

But the experiment would be impracticable, for the authorship of Mr. Frothingham's books could not be hidden; they need no autograph; and its absence from the title page could give rise to no mystification while on all the other pages its presence is so pronounced.

Mr. Frothingham's rather flippant treatment of other essays in the department of Christology may, however, partially reconcile the evenminded reader to the unjust indifference of the public towards himself. Why not serve him up with his own sauce? Why not include his own works with those others, and dismiss his own claim to attention as lightly as he dismisses the claims of others, saying with him: "Books have been written about the New Testament by the thousand, - libraries of books; but they merely supplant and refute one another. Each is entitled to as much consideration as the rest, and to no more"? This is substantially one more book about the New Testament. Are we, then, to concede off-hand that a prophet has come to judgment at last? In view of a self-assurance so sublime, and in defence of the splendid literature so carelessly contemned, one is sorely tempted to condone the public inhospitality. But the book must still be judged on its merits. And it is to be said, moreover, that this dictum of our author is not quite so complacent as it seems, standing alone. He may

fairly claim, and impliedly does claim, that his own work is exempted from the judgment thus flung broadcast upon the works of others by reason of its different method. Whereas those have been written from the standpoint of supernaturalism, this is not so written. Those were dogmatic; this is literary. In dogmatism all is confusion, — mere assertion and refutation. The literary method, on the other hand, gives promise of definite result. There is, therefore, neither praise nor blame. It is not in the man that walketh to direct his steps; all is of the method which the spirit of the age permits him to grasp.

The literary method, as employed by the author, leads straight to one result sufficiently definite to alienate the great majority of Bible-readers from his present undertaking: "The literary laws forbid under these circumstances our reading the gospel narratives as authentic histories, — constrain us, in fact, to read them, in some sort, as disquisitions, making allowance, as we go along, for the infusion of doctrinal elements." This statement involves the fundamental premise of the whole work. Here must the opponent make a stand, if he would not incontinently yield himself or flee. When we have once surrendered the notion of a special inspiration of some sort exempting the New Testament from literary treatment, will our next step place us by the side of our author? If so, we shall be quite likely to go with him the rest of the way. It surely is not far to his inference that "the actual Jesus is inaccessible to scientific research."

At any rate, by this statement the author opens wide the way for the enterprise of tracing the origin and development of the Christ-idea; the book is partially devoted to that undertaking. But it is also "a study of primitive Christianity." Unfortunately the two subjects thus indicated only lap marginally one upon the other; they are not coincident; for the most part an excursion into one involves a departure from the other, so that the reader finds himself unwittingly attempting the feat of being in two places at the same time; or, seeking to read with undivided mind, he is put to the labor of assorting the author's material, and discovering for himself — a task not always easy — what has reference to the principal thesis and what to the sub-titular "study."

The "Cradle of the Christ" was the Hebrew hope of a national deliverer. The Messianic faith of the earlier disciples pertained to the prevailing Jewish conceptions of the period. The "Son of Man" of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, "their Pauline elements being eliminated," does not transcend the requirements of the common expectation. Jesus does but repeat with persuasive lips what the law-givers of his race had proclaimed. "He is a radical Pharisee, who has at heart the en-

franchisement of his people." He is made a native of Galilee, "the insurgent district of the country;" is associated with Bethlehem, the city of David, and laboriously connected with the royal line; is represented by frequent iteration as fulfilling Old Testament anticipations; and is formally welcomed by John the Baptist, himself thoroughly imbued with the popular Messianic expectation. The story of the Temptation is patterned after incidents in the career of Moses. The story of the Transfiguration derives its point from the introduction of the law-giver and prophet of the old dispensation. The phrase "kingdom of heaven," as used by Jesus, was interpreted into conformity with the common expectation, as describing the reign of a prince of David's line. It was expected that the Messiah would work miracles, and Iesus is made to fulfil that expectation. His moral precepts are in character with his position, echoes of ancient ethical law. His religious beliefs are the ordinary beliefs of his age and people, nor does his conception of his office differ materially from that of his countrymen.

The Pauline phase of Christianity is put also under the lineage of Hebrew thought. Paul's religious belief was not altered by his conversion. He was a Messianic believer before that crisis and after it. His writings thoroughly reflect the speculations of the Talmud. His teachings do not go beyond the times of Jewish thought.

In the fourth gospel — the Johannean authorship of which is unqualifiedly denied — "vestiges of the popular Jewish conception appear but faintly here and there." But the conception underlying the representation of Christ as the Logos—the conception of the divine reason personified—was of ancient date, and had worked its way into the substance of Jewish thought. "Here is already the germ of a trinity maturing within the bosom of the Hebrew monotheism. The process has been simple; the consecutive steps have been inevitable. But in the process the solid ground of Judaism has been left; the massive substance of the ancient faith has been melted into cloud."

To the Christ-idea thus formed in the East the West gave currency; made it the central feature of a vast religious system; crowned it, and placed it on a throne. There is a supplementary chapter in which are considered the claims of Jesus to a place in history. Throughout his work the author distinguishes between Jesus and the Christ. The Christ-idea has had obviously an historical development; the historical status of Jesus is another question, — a question which his subject does not oblige him to touch upon, but which he is not unwilling to consider in deference to the reader's probable expectation. He doubts if such a person as Jesus is prestumed to have been was necessary to

account for the existence of the religion afterwards called Christian. "As an impelling force he was not required, for his age was throbbing and bursting with suppressed energy." "Jesus is not necessary to account for the ethics of the New Testament. They were, as has been said, the native ethics of Judaism unqualified." He concludes that "no clearly defined traces of the personal Jesus remain on the surface, or beneath the surface, of Christendom." "The image of Jesus, has been irrecoverably lost." "The person of Jesus, though it may have been immense, is indistinct. That a great character was there may be conceded; but precisely wherein the character was great is left to our conjecture."

We have sufficiently indicated the general scope of the volume before us. What is the bearing of this argument upon the common faith of to-day? Does it tend to invalidate the claims of Christianity? The author affirms that it does not. He separates religion from criticism, and divests the subject in hand of religious implications. He disclaims all purpose or desire "to undermine Christianity." He believes that religion is independent of history, and that Christianity is independent of the New Testament. Any system of religion must stand on its merits, - that is to say, its uses. "The church that arrogates for itself the right to control the spiritual concerns of the modern world must not plead in justification of its pretension that it satisfied the requirements of devout people in another hemisphere two thousand years ago." "Christianity must prove its adaptation to the hour that now is; its adaptation to days gone by is not to the purpose." In short, "a church that does not bless mankind cannot be saved, and a church that does bless mankind cannot be destroyed."

This is well and truly said. The question remains, however: Are the author's conclusions just and true? That question must be referred to the reader's judgment. It must not be concealed, however, that the book has much the appearance of an ex parte statement. And this may be said without imputing to the author either wilful reservations or conscious partisanship. The fault is in his stars; he is apparently equipped with organs to discern very clearly the under side of things. Towards sentiment, which gives presentiment of an upper side, his attitude is indulgent, but not sympathetic. "Sentiment is conservative. The poetic feeling detains in picturesque form the ideas which, if exposed to the clear action of intelligence, would be rejected as unsubstantial." Must we, then, reject as unsubstantial ideas that are not wholly clear to intelligence? Possibly; but if the reader of this work is not prepared to concede that whatever is undemonstrable is unworthy of regard, and that there is no verity in the unverifiable, he must ap-

prehend that a mind intolerant of the undemonstrable and unverifiable will ignore some aspects of a religion that are essential to its complete presentation.

While the author is indulgent towards sentiment, in regard to the flat-footed class of writers and speakers his utterance is more decided. "The acute, unimaginative, determined minds, impatient of the mists, however beautiful, that conceal knowledge, clear a way for the homes and gardens of the new generations." It may be fairly doubted, however, whether a mind that is impatient of the mists that veil in mystery the sources of religious sentiment and devotion (mists that no impatience, or science either, ever can dispel); a mind that is only "acute, unimaginative, determined,"—is fully qualified for a fair estimate of the sources and sanctions of the Christ-idea.

However this may be, the unbroken terrestrial tenor of the work must give it an appearance of one-sidedness, even to impartial readers. The mental prepossession is too apparent to be questioned. After following out this theory that the Christ came up, born of a nation's mood and nurtured by political emergencies, one feels that, though the case is well made out on that side, — or because it is, — an advocate should be immediately heard upon the other side, in favor of the alternative — or rather supplementary — hypothesis that the Christ came down "from above."

The questionable prepossession now referred to appears distinctly in the following allusion to Jesus: "If the time ever comes when his lineaments are fully revealed to sight, he will be found not much greater nor much better than his generation justified." The theory here, it is noticeable, is essentially identical with the theory concerning the Christ-idea, and the doubtful character of this reflects doubt upon that. What is the maximum limit under this rule? Does Shakspere, for example, transcend the limit? If he does, so perhaps may Jesus; if he does not, the rule would seem to have no application; it would be difficult, to say the least, to adjust the proportion between Shakspere and "his generation."

The stature of *soul* is not to be estimated in that way. And it is a supposition not to be altogether ignored that, whether through special inspiration from on high, or through a fortuitous concurrence of atomic felicities, or through a happy combination of ancestral gifts, the soul of Jesus attained such stature that he himself was able to lift the Jewish notion of a Deliverer to the sublimity of the Christ-idea.

C. W. B.

 The Story of Avis. By ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS, author of "The Gates Ajar." Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. 1877.

HER story opens with her appearance at a Reading Club in a University town which is placed so near to the sea that she can hear the sound of the tide. It is called Harmouth. Miss Phelps may have gathered some of her allusions in Portsmouth or its marine vicinity; we recognize the source of the allusion to the little birds which fly directly toward the great lantern of a Harbor Light-house, and of the bushel of dead birds which was once picked up after one of the twilight ventures of the little innocents. We have used the same fact to gild the moral of another fancy. Avis is the sole child of a Professor who married rather late a lady who came near trying her fortune upon the stage. Avis is introduced to us as posessing a talent for painting. One of her charcoal sketches, representing Una followed by the lion and flying from her knight, has been purloined by her friend Coy, who exhibits it at the close of a reading from Spenser by Mr. Philip Ostrander, tutor in Latin. The mother of Avis is dead: there are two very delicate reminiscences, one of the child Avis who questioned her mother and touched the nerve which vibrated with disappointment, and one of a little picture of her own which she brought to her mother when she was dying. A childless widow-sister of the Professor, "of excellent Vermont intentions and high ideals in cup-cake," comes to take charge of Avis, who likes her, but hates her pastry and preserving occupations, - hates the kitchen just as so many other girls with no particular talent, not even talent for cooking, admire to do. Avis, having talent, is sent abroad to study, and receives from masters great encouragement. Her appearance at the Reading Club is soon after her return. She recognizes Mr. Ostrander, and remembers him as the man who looked so meaningly at her abroad in the church of the Madeleine. She undertakes to paint his portrait for his mother. He falls in love with her, and one day abruptly tells her so, but is repelled; for she loves art and not marriage, and does not think she is the woman to make any man happy. He enlists as a surgeon, is shot through the lungs, returns to be tenderly nursed at a friend's, and one day, when convalescent, meets her by accident in the fields, and discovers she is afraid she loves him. The conflict in the nature of Avis begins; she is created to care nothing for marriage, yet she is drawn towards Her prevailing sentiment through this and other scenes is that of dread; it is alloyed by womanly pity for him. Dazed with this mixed love and pity, she flies at length to his heart, like one of the little birds to the lantern of Harbor Light.

She knows nothing about housekeeping, and has the usual luck of all of us with the Hibernian sister. Her husband had sworn to respect her art, and let it have free scope. But practically the kitchen is more exacting than the studio in the attic. Her first child dismays her; she didn't want one, and she has to bear the brunt of its peevishness. Evidently a woman not made to take the risks of matrimony even with that kind of person, - that angelic being whom all women intend to marry. Her husband is not one of these angels; no literary man ever is. Perhaps he also never ought to marry. The first decided jar upon Avis's confidence was made by the discovery that he had been engaged to an up-country girl, and jilted her. Then of course there came another baby; and on the heels of that the husband began to shirk his college work, partly because the old wound weakened the lungs. Then naturally the children have the whooping cough, she comes down with diphtheria, and he has an attack of pleurisy, - a pretty inscrutable Providence, she thinks. They are packed off to Florida with the hope to baffle the tendency to consumption, which appears to have been a remote result of his old wound. The children are left with that delicious cake-making and preserving Aunt Chloe, who is one of Miss Phelps's pleasantest sketches. In Florida, just before Philip dies, a reconciliation takes place which goes to the root of the matter and gives Avis a husband when Philip has no farther need of a wife.

The story is very brightly and picturesquely told, with an abundance of sharp and petulant turns of sentences, and a prevailing sense for character.

But Miss Phelps must have been pretty rigorously married to somebody in a preëxistent state. Fortunately for the sustenance of the universe, single people never anticipate the risks and conditions of matrimony; otherwise no marriage service would ever have stolen into print, and clergymen would be out of pocket to a limited extent in the matter of fees. This mutual unconsciousness of the youth and the maid is Nature's fine stratagem to perpetuate and stereotype that aboriginal scrape into which all her creatures get for her benefit.

Miss Phelps serves Avis just as Nature would have done. But the process of her story will only confirm our horde of art-loving, painting, scribbling, tinting, ornamenting, water-coloring women in their indifference to matrimony; and if the matter goes on at the present rate, we do not know what in the end will become of Nature.

## CHIPS FROM MY STUDIO.

A FINE poem in Bayard Taylor's new book, "Home Pastorals," is entitled "Napoleon at Gotha." Especially noticeable are the opening lines:—

We walk amid the currents of actions left undone, The germs of deeds that wither, before they see the sun. For every sentence uttered, a million more are dumb: Men's lives are chains of chances, and History their sum.

"In the Lists" also attracts my attention: -

Could I choose the age and fortunate season When to be born,

I would fly from the censure of your barren reason, And the scourges of your scorn:

Could I take the tongue, and the land, and the station
That to me were fit,

I would make my life a force and an exultation, And you could not stifle it.

But the thing most near to the freedom I covet
Is the freedom I wrest

From a time that would bar me from climbing above it, To seek the East in the West.

I have dreamed of the forms of a nobler existence Than you give me here,

And the beauty that lies afar in the dateless distance I would conquer, and bring more near.

It is good, undowered with the bounty of Fortune, In the sun to stand:

Let others excuse, and cringe, and importune, I will try the strength of my hand!

If I fail, I shall fall not among the mistaken, Whom you dare deride:

If I win, you shall hear, and see, and at last awaken

To thank me because I defied!

I HAVE been entrusted with the following report of a late interesting occasion at the "Invisible Club:"—

There was a breeze at the "Invisible Club" the other evening when it was announced that the distinguished gentleman from the far wilds of the West, Rev. Justinian Floorman, would take the place on that occasion of the regularly appointed essayist. The venerable Mrs. immediately fumbled for her eye-glasses, while the ponderous head of the Plato of the club was seen slowly to raise itself from its usual resting-place on its owner's gold-headed cane. Two gentlemen and a lady holding an animated discussion in one corner of the room on the ill or good there might be in intoxicating liquors whirled violently to encounter the new sensation. In short, the commotion that suddenly displayed itself in all parts of the room was simply intense. The fact was that for a number of evenings the situation had been precisely as Miss -, a maiden lady of some fifty-five summers, had described it, - "rather prosy." A disinterested spectator might not be able to discover any good reason why it should have been otherwise. Not that the club can be charged with a lack of brilliant talent, nor that genius even might not put in a valid claim for recognition. But the subject that had persistently been kept before the club for eleven long evenings by the committee in charge had been the by no means novel one of "Temperance." For a season the discussion ran high, there being marked and irreconcilable differences, which it was found impossible to confine, as a member had remarked, "within a purely intellectual consideration." The extreme temperance advocates were bent on making of it a personal and moral question. This so irritated the moderate members that angry feelings showed themselves, until it was observed that, in the whole history of the club, no such general and prolonged excitement had before occurred. The danger of an explosion came to seem imminent; but for the last three evenings discretion had got the better part of valor on both sides, and the effect of this had been to tame the discussion down to the merest commonplace. Hence, for these three evenings the interest in the club had waned measurably. Many had absented themselves purposely, preferring to wait until there should be a change in the programme. The radical element especially, on the occasion now referred to, was but sparsely represented. The conservative and Christian members were there in better force.

No sooner had it been announced that the Rev. Justinian Floorman, from the "far wilds of the West," would honor the club that evening with his presence, and would open the conversation with a few re-

marks on the great subject of the "If," than a small, rotund-looking man, with sparkling black eyes and a radiant face, rose to protest that he feared the Committee had unwittingly sprung a trap on that portion of the club which only he and a few others had on this present occasion the honor to represent. He had all respect for the distinguished gentleman who was to address them, but he thought that, if he was to treat of the "If" before the club, the club ought to be fully notified of that fact: for he believed he understood pretty fully what kind of views lurked under the subject the gentleman had selected, and he felt sure those members who were absent, and who were so perfectly competent to oppose those views, would deeply regret their absence, and he appealed to the Committee, in all fairness, to know whether the distinguished gentleman could not postpone his remarks until the next evening, when they might have a special meeting and a full attendance.

After a brief conversation with the Rev. Justinian Floorman, the Chairman of the Committee announced that the Rev. Mr. Floorman had been caught on a flying visit to this Eastern country, and that his time was absolutely all preoccupied with lecturing engagements, so that it was "this evening or never." He would leave it to the club to decide. Several voices responding, "Go on" and "Hear him," the reverend gentleman was introduced once more. He came rapidly forward, and seated himself in a large arm-chair almost in the very midst of his auditors. Then, spreading his hands over his knees, with a slight upward toss of his luxuriantly-robed head, he spoke as follows:—

"Gentlemen of the Invisible Club, - and Ladies, whom I now perceive with abounding gratification, - we are to discourse of the 'If.' Do you ever measure the vast possibilities that lie concealed in that all-fructifying word? I remember well when, one cold, wintry morn, I sat 'mid the wigwams of the red and ductile Indian on the banks of the Longtombigbee. It was the tribe of the Arrapahoes. Slowly raising his head, after long and thoughtful meditation, the great chief broke the solemn silence by saying, 'I fear my people are learning from the white man the "If." I heard, and I was abashed. Gentlemen, in this Eastern land that 'If' was born; here, by the side of Plymouth rock; here, in the 'Cradle of Liberty.' What do you Shall it circumnavigate the globe; or shall it be strangled here in the land of its birth? [Visible sensation.] If I have any mission on this earth, I believe in the very deeps of the deepness of my soul that it lies solely and for ever in this, and only in this, one direction. We are menaced, gentlemen, on this most excellent globe of 'I

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ours by a modern revival of this all-devastating and heaven-annihilating Behind the sun, burning in yon blue azure, there is another sun, a sun of glory; behind the calm moon, silvering the darkness of the night, there is another moon, a moon of peace; but behind this 'If' there is -nothing ! [A gathering applause, in which it was noticed that two of the out-and-out materialists, who had recently entered, generously joined.] Your applause is reassuring, gentlemen. I ask it not for my words because they are mine, but because I know that it is scientifically demonstrable that they are true. Walking one sultry day with the Sultan along the shimmering sands of the shore of the Bosphorus, I said to him, 'What is the limit of your majesty's knowledge?' His response, electric and supreme, caused me to hang my Christian head before the genius of the Infidel. Prostrating himself three and twenty times on the earth, he turned his eyes toward the heavens, and ejaculated, in tones musical as a summer breeze, these simple, all-inclusive, decisive words, 'Great is Allah!' I said to myself, that people are invincible who stand thus on the luminous summit of the most scientific peak of the ages!"

Loud applause from a few members at this point caused considerable disturbance, and so broke into the flow of the reverend gentleman's remarks that a lady present timidly ventured to interrupt him merely that she might be set right in her own mind as to the precise force of his words, which, owing doubtless to the confused state of her own mind, did not appear to her to be as clear as a devotee of the strictly scientific method could wish. She begged to know if the speaker intended to say that the Sultan claimed that the limit of his own knowledge could only be discerned by measuring the extent of the knowledge of Deity? Several voices chimed in, "Hear, hear!" upon which the reverend gentleman remarked dryly, his manner indicating plainly that he was a trifle disgusted, "I have to regret if my language is not in range with the wisdom of a portion of this company. It must be very plain to every thoughtful mind that I only meant to say that this Sultan of all the Moslems affirmed the being of God. To him and his people the 'If' was unknown." Another round of applause greeted the speaker, and he was about to resume, when one of the materialists present, who had been showing unmistakeable signs that he was eager for the fray, astonished the club with a further intrusion: "Professor Huxley says, 'If a little knowledge is dangerous, where is the man who has so much as to be out of danger?' Now I would like to ask the gentleman, did the Sultan of all the Turks affirm the being of God from so much knowledge as to be out of danger of one day finding out his ignorance?" There was a defiant glance in the eye of the reverend gentleman as he turned haughtily to confront his new assailant, and a perceptible movement of rising indignation on the part of the conservative members. But forbearing any direct response, the essayist continued:—

"Gentlemen, my purpose is to discourse of the 'If.' Do you remember the words of your Shakspere's Coriolanus:—

'My soul aches
To know, when two authorities are up,
Neither supreme, how soon confusion
May enter 'twixt the gap of both, and take
The one by the other?'

Gentlemen, I have turned my ardent gaze from the mere 'If' of theology to the 'If' of the scientific materialist. I was in radiant, all-penetrating earnest. I said, 'My soul aches to know.' When Socrates turned from all other authorities, he looked at the nature of things, and the radiance was dazzling. Try Christianity by this standard, and your 'If' goes out with the darkness you have dispelled. God, Immortality, the Atonement, the Triune Unity, the blessed state of all who go hence in peace, — in the Nature of Things are all these established.

- "1. God—as a distinguished gentleman of your own city has remarked, speaking figuratively—wears on His finger Gyges' ring, which, according to Greek mythology, makes the wearer invisible.
- "2. Being invisible, how do we know, why do we affirm, His existence?
- "3. We know, because it is scientifically demonstrable that matter is inert.
  - "4. Matter being inert, it is not living matter.
  - "5. Inert or not-living matter cannot produce life.
  - "6. We know that life is.
- "7. Hence we know there is a power other than this inert, notliving matter.
  - "8. That power is God."

There was breathless attention while the Reverend gentleman was thus proceeding in logical sequence with his bristling points. But the smile of deep satisfaction which for a time was visible on the faces of the orthodox and conservative members gradually wore away, and disappeared: settling, if I may so speak, into a calmly pictured sort of heroic intellectual weariness, as he followed on, point after point, with rapid utterance and unabated energy, until at last he reached the final and concluding one, which was—I am ready to vouch for it in any court—the

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"172. Now, gentlemen, in the radiance of this demonstration, will any one presume to say that the chaos-bringing, power-annihilating 'If' is not cast for ever into the abyss?"

The club awoke, as if startled from a long dream by the loud crack of a whip, as the reverend gentleman, with all the energy his ponderous, swaying physical frame could impart,—his face beaming with what Joseph Cook might describe as the "indescribable solar look,"—brought thus his—as he himself evidently deemed it—exhaustive illustration of the luminosity there is in the "nature of things" to a close. He had then, however, only just begun what he had proposed to say. Immortality; the Thirty-nine Articles; the "Te Deum;" and all that pertained to the vital character of Christianity as reinforced and reëstablished by the scientific method, deriving its vast recuperative power from the Nature of Things,—all remained behind. It was more than reason or friendship could expect any one man to do, however, and so when he waived the further consideration of the subject, and invited criticism, there was loud and long-continued applause.

As the excitement lulled and the club recovered itself, it was plain that the first response from the members was to come from the happy, unperturbed materialist who, in the beginning, had desired a post-ponement of the subject until another evening. He rose to his feet, a glance of confidence twinkled in his eye, and with a slight wave of his hand toward the President, he said:—

"I need waste no words at this hour of the evening in expressing what I am sure is the unanimous feeling of the club in regard to the remarkable discourse to which we have listened. Did I not think it able, I should not essay a reply. As we all know, it was able; I may say also, it was peculiar and brilliant. I come at once to the point. The gentleman says there is a God. There is no longer any 'If' in the case. He has annihilated the 'If;' he has cast it into the abyss. Let us see. What are his main propositions? He admits, in the first place, that his God is invisible. We cannot see him. Neither can we hear him, feel him, taste him, or touch him. We are not able to do any one of these things. All our senses fail us. Nevertheless there is such a being, — a God who eludes our every ability to discover him. Now I say, 'if' there be a God like this, it is a piece of gross impertinence in us to be for ever following him up and striving to find him out. He has chosen to veil himself in obscurity, to hide himself and be alone. I, for one, have too much self-respect to insist on disturbing the desired privacy of so august a personage. Nay, I would not so molest and illtreat the humblest individual. I apprehend, however, that this God, 'if' he exists, has not any fear of our ultimate success. He had the thing all in his own hands. He might have given us another sense by which we could recognize him as he passed to and fro on his rounds through the universe. He did not choose so to do. He rests, we may suppose, serene in his knowledge that only his own creative power can add that he has not given, and so render our much-seeking fruitful. But I see the gentleman is impatient with this strain of remark, and I will not pursue it farther. We are all agreed, apparently, that, by our five senses, a God is past finding out. How, then, is he discernible?

"The gentleman affirms: -

- "1. God is invisible. But, -
- "2. There are evidences which, in spite of his invisibility (I may add, his inaccessibility in every way), are proof beyond question of his existence. For instance,—
  - "3. There is living matter and not-living matter.
- "4. Passing from not-living to living matter cannot be accomplished except by the intervention of some external power.
  - "5. That Power is God.
- "I think I have restated the gentleman's positions fairly. My reply shall be brief.
  - "1. In not-living matter there begin to appear signs of life.
- "2. What is the conclusion? That an external power was then first at work upon it?
- "3. It is only rational to say that what we *supposed* to be matter *not*-living was, in fact, matter *living*. To suppose a power outside is gratuitous.
- "4. Matter we know. All its powers we do not know. But it is fair to assume that, whatever manifestation comes of it, the cause of that manifestation inheres in it.
- "5. By all analogy and experience we should hold this conclusion, until we discover some extra, outside cause, or being, whose office it is shown to be to produce the effect we witness.
  - "6. God must not be an inference.
- "7. The illustration of the invisible player on the keys of an organ fails. For if it had been our uniform experience that an instrument constructed in a certain fashion would produce even the fifth symphony of Beethoven, we should not say, or even surmise, that an outside person, visible or invisible, was necessary to account for the music we heard.
- "8. The phenomenon might be wonderful as we contemplated it, but we still should feel bound to account for it by natural causes, and not by supernatural ones.
  - "9. Hence the 'If' is not cast into the abyss."

The spiritedness and vim the speaker put into this little speech was quite refreshing, and it was evident that all the members felt a certain

membership-pride in the creditable manner in which he had acquitted himself. There were but two of them, however, who honored him with their applause, but they clapped in most approved, vigorous style. There was a momentary pause, no one seeming inclined to follow up the discussion; but just as the President was preparing to break the silence with some remark, a member, who, I was told, had never before at the club ventured upon any observation whatsoever, rose, and in a low, quiet tone said he had a few thoughts on the general subject before the club which he would endeavor to present. He spoke nearly as follows:—

"I approve the conclusion of the member who has just interested us. The distinction of not-living matter is purely arbitrary. Either all matter is alive, or all is dead. It is perilous to say that mind enters matter at any one point. It is perilous, for it is an assumption of which there is no proof. To rest the affirmation of God on evidence which is not evidence is to establish not God, but the 'If,' beyond controversy. For myself, I believe in mind. What we call matter is but the mind's expression. Matter in reality is illusion. Rather than the question whether there be any God or not, I query if there be any thing but God. The All-inclusive, the Infinite, is one with endless manifestation. I have not the gift to follow either of the gentlemen in their logical order. My view is rather a picture than a process of reasoning. I do not need to go delving in the mud with microscope to see where God begins. In doing so, I should violate my own integrity. Man himself is the highest expression. Why go from one's self, when all there is is there presented? I have been amused at seeing your men of science, with dark-lantern vision, go wandering over the earth, peering outwardly into 'first manifestations of Mind' to see where, if anywhere, the god appears. Why, the deadest matter you can imagine is his appearance. Dead will you call it, and yet his manifestation? Have you forgotten the old Scripture that the world was created out of nothing? What is the world? Nothing, - nothing but an appearance. I put no slight upon it for that reason. Let us not turn mere matterists, - fumbling for matter-facts, drawing conclusions, inferring. 'God is not an inference,' as my friend has well observed.

"I must confess my surprise that the reverend gentleman, who, by all just expectation, should support the spiritual view, is himself in his method as rank a materialist as our friend and fellow-member who, on the gentleman's own ground, has—let me say it—defeated him thoroughly. [Sensation.] Does he not, as he has charged the materialist, quoting another, 'swim with fins of lead'? He is weighed down

by the science of materialistic investigation and evidences. He and my friend, for instance, — what do they do? They both go to material phenomena, and they ask with eyes cast down, peering into the mud, 'Is there a god?' 'No, sir.' 'I say there is.' And from that day to the end of time they may discuss the point, and they will get no further, and the world will be no wiser. I would quote to the gentleman his own Scripture: 'Canst thou by searching find out God?' No, not by searching. God is known by living.

"I wish to be brief. Let me outline my own knowledge.

"I will say that I know God. It is not a belief, a speculation, a search: mud or no mud, God is. What is God? Ask yourselves this question: What dominates, what transcends, what controls your life? Whatever that may be, you are conscious that it is a supreme somewhat in which, in very truth, you live, move, and have your being. What is your objection to calling the personality that is yourself, and yet other and vaster than yourself, God? It and you! And yet, one! Two there would be, but that you are illusion. This personality which you are is the equivalent of the all-beautiful, the all-true, the all-loving, the all-just. Whatsoever is supreme in your inner, pulsing heart, —that is God. Gentlemen, do you know this God? I aver that you do; that we all do. We are all not simply believers; we are knowers. Are not your disputes, then, as to the livingness or deadness of the mud supererogatory?

"I have said, mind is all. Let me for a moment dwell on that proposition. What is our experience of mind? What is the nature of mind? The gentleman dwells on the nature of things. I ask a higher question: What is the nature of mind? How does it manifest itself? Is there more than one kind of mind? We may keep within the limit of our knowledge, and answer, 'No.' Then, each may study mind for himself; that is, mind may testify of mind. Look now, each one of you, at your own mind. I will report what I myself discover, and you shall say how it tallies with your own discoveries. I find states of mind: a conscious personality, and a conscious individuality. But the consciousness of the one differs from that of the other. My personality does not say 'I.' My individuality does. The former is a state of being, but without bounds; without form or shape; an infinite, not in the sense of greatness, but as not feeling limitation: in brief, it is existence emptied of individuality. And yet, it is the very bliss and energy of the perfect: perfect not by comparison, but as the allcontent. This very day I have been surprised and greatly pleased at reading that Tennyson relates his own experience of how, "out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, the individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being; and this not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the surest, utterly beyond words, the loss of individuality seeming no extinction, but only true life." That is one state of mind. Do I err in calling it infinite? There is a state corresponding to this which precedes individuality or finite manifestation. I was about to speak of it as the impersonal infinite. But I should better express my meaning by saying the three states of mind may be enumerated thus: 1, unconscious personal; 2, individual unconscious and conscious; 3, conscious personal, - this last being that referred to by Tennyson. Now, to test this, take any new creative effort. First, individuality disappears; unconscious of self, what you see is a vision without form or color, - an outlying, shapeless glory: then, secondly, individuality of self and of vision as your effort brings order or shape out of the beautiful chaos. But never is this finite expression satisfying. What, then; do you give way to despair? No; in moments of bliss you float away, in a conscious personality utterly beyond words, into the very joy of life. I say conscious personality, but a very unlike state to conscious individuality. In the latter you are conscious of the me that is living; in the former you are so alive you cannot stop to think, or in leastwise to say, 'Me!' Self-reference does not lie in that state of boundless being. When you do say 'me,' you wake out of blessedness, as by a fall. Perhaps this is akin to what Bronson Alcott means by his doctrine of the 'lapse.'

"Now, have I stated the process of creative mind as we, by experience, may know it? Well, as we may not affirm that there are two kinds of mind, shall we not say, even so was the world made? Did the creative world-mind not lie in unconscious personality? Did it not pass into million-folded individuality, into conscious finite intelligence, most fully manifested in man? And, finally, in man does it not return again into itself with the added consciousness of personality which I have described? That which was and is and ever shall be is personality, boundless being; passing through individuality, unconscious and conscious, its gain is that it has added to personality-living personality-conscious-of-living. Hence I say God. Hence I say Immortality: for each soul is this living personality conscious of living.

"I know I have now only arrived at a point where questions thickly arise, but I have trespassed too far with my speech. I will close abruptly and at once."

As the gentleman took his seat there was a hush over the souls present, as though they were all illustrating the loss of individuality that had been spoken of. For two or three seconds, at least, there was a

silence as profound as there would have been had the members of the Invisible Club all, of one accord, turned into the not-living substance from which the Reverend Mr. Floorman had declared only an outside. interfering Somewhat could summon life. The revivification, however, was consummated by a very thin, yet penetrating, voice, coming from one of the most intensely orthodox ladies that belonged to the club. "I cannot say," quoth she, "that I have not been interested in the discussion this evening, but I should do myself great injustice, did I not add that I have felt, all through it, a pang of sorrow that no reference whatever was made to the atoning merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by whose blood alone we are sanctified and made fit for an inheritance of glory with God and his angels in the heaven of heavens." It would be impossible to describe the ludicrous effect of this remark. All at once rose to their feet, the Reverend Mr. Floorman foremost of any, as if by common, silent consent the club had decided that it had better avoid, by speedy adjournment, any further catastrophe that might be impending. It was high time, too, for the old-fashioned, tall, closet-like clock that stood in the corner, was just then striking eleven.

It has been said that we are "born believing." I take it that the race emerged from the abyss not with a negation, but with the joy of affirmation on its lips. This affirmation, however, must have been a blank negation to the bliss of the quadrupeds lurking behind. The new-born man opened his eyes rejoicingly, with his faith in the Unknown triumphantly fixed. Intellect became conscious of a destiny, - the liberation of the soul. In the new heavens, though no sun appeared, shone all the stars of promise. In man creation began consciously to believe in itself. The characteristics of man as a progressive being appeared, announcing a new, if far-off, millennium. He was filled with new and irresistible longings. From that time forth was he divided within himself into old and new, conservative and radical. The universe had borne in upon his soul the assurance of a possible new being. He could be born again, and many times. He was not cast, as a rock, to abide for ever firm. His human nature was set free to flow upward, and fashion itself anew for ever. This universe could not break faith with him. He could not break faith with it. He lived and moved and had his being in his faith. Faith led the way. Science followed, and must ever follow: for faith is not intellectual expression, but the condition of it. With growing intelligence the mind achieved

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broader and yet broader interpretations. But it must have accepted the universe, or it had made no attempt to explain it; it must have accepted it in the spirit of reconciliation, or it never had had the heart to explain the mystery.

Manifold the interpretations, but it were rash to say the solvent word has yet been spoken. One achievement is to be celebrated, however,—the weaning of the world from dependence on the belief in the fatherhood and care of a Supreme Mechanic. Not wholly passed away, but passing, is this natural, early conception. All things are still possible with God, but God now dwells not apart from human life and activity.

A SOMEWHAT embittered controversy is pending between Dr. Carpenter and Mr. Alfred R. Wallace in regard to the phenomena of spiritualism. Dr. Carpenter has stated his opinion that Mr. Crookes and Mr. Wallace are "typical examples of men suffering under an epidemic delusion comparable to the witchcraft epidemic of the seventeenth century." Mr. Wallace replies that Dr. Carpenter is a "curious example of fossilized scepticism." He says:—

"To refuse belief to unsupported rumors of improbable events is enlightened scepticism; to reject all second-hand or anonymous tales to the injury or depreciation of any one is charitable scepticism; to doubt your own prepossessions when opposed to facts observed and reobserved by honest and capable men is a noble scepticism. But the scepticism of Dr. Carpenter is none of these. It is a blind, unreasoning, arrogant disbelief, that marches on from youth to age with its eyes shut to all that opposes its own pet theories; that believes its own judgment to be infallible; that never acknowledges its errors. It is a scepticism that clings to its refuted errors, and refuses to accept new truths."

It is clear to an observer that neither of these gentlemen is in a mood to repeat Burns' lines,—

"O wad some power the giftie gie us, To see oursels as others see us,—

as respects each other. Dr. Carpenter, so far from accepting his opponent's estimate of himself, "honestly believes" that he has "unusual power of dealing with this subject;" and Mr. Wallace thinks it strange indeed that he and his friends should be pronounced "psychological curiosities" because they rely upon what philosophers assure them is their "sole and ultimate-test of truth,—perception and reason."

Whatever one may think of the results of Mr. Wallace's "perception and reason," it is not possible to doubt his entire honesty of purpose. It is probable that the same may be said of Dr. Carpenter; but his opinion would carry more weight if he confined himself to the legitimate business of investigation, and withheld his gratuitous arraignment of such men as Wallace, Crookes, and others as men afflicted with an "epidemic." It is not a personal controversy that is desired, but a close-sticking to the facts and the argument.

Among some old manuscripts written a year or two since I find a little statement of my own impression of spiritism, which I do not feel the need of now revising. Perhaps it may be of enough interest

to warrant me in giving it space below.

There is an apparent lull in the discussions of mediumistic power, so far as the daily press is concerned; but it would be a mistake to suppose that the number of believers in the phenomena of spiritualism is therefore decreasing. The interest survives, seemingly, all "exposure." The vitality which the new, or old, doctrine - whichever it may be - displays, renders it not a little difficult to pass it all by as sheer delusion. Of one thing there can be no question: the great body of believers in spiritualism are as sincere in their faith as are believers in whatever other or contrary doctrine. They have won this title to respect, if no other. Still I am at loss to understand why they persist in calling their ism a science. To be a science the proofs must be universally accessible. But in all the manifestations I have been able to witness, or in any way become acquainted with, the only approach to certainty is enjoyed exclusively by the medium himself. Verification by others is cut short at a certain point, where it must be eked out with faith in mediumistic truth-telling. "The word of the medium is entitled to some respect," we are told. Yes, if it be a matter of personal faith; no, if we are studying a science.

It is true, the "word of the medium" predisposes to investigation. Did he advertise a "trick," it would pass for that; but by saying it is no trick, serious attention is challenged, and should be met in return with solicitation unreserved and fearless. If there is truth to be obtained in this way by scientific methods, as the mediums claim, however marvelous it may seem in our eyes, let us rejoice in and possess it. Let it become fact of common experience. Its marvelousness will simply be its newness. The universe we know is a succession of wonders to the discovering mind of man. Nothing is so incredible that it is to be banished ere its claims are sounded. And yet, 'tis no part of liberality to stand open-mouthed, ready to swallow all that fills the air. A

little unperturbed steadfastness in adhering to the old conception of the nature of things is prudentially wise.

To establish spiritism as a science, it is not enough to say that disbelievers are unable to furnish any other explanation than the one the believers insist upon. Science rests not on what we can't, but on what we can, do. There is no veiled secret accessible only to the few. Universality is its chief factor. There is no caste; it is wholly democratic. We may accept the word of the scientific savant as authority, but there is no obstacle to our own full verification of all that he affirms.

As to many of the "conditions" mediums insist upon, they may be, for excellent reasons, unavoidable; but the fact is certainly unfortunate. It serves to keep alive suspicion. Conviction halts, and awaits a more opportune occasion. It puts the performance on a level with wonderful tricks of jugglery, with the one difference already noticed, -that of the medium's contrary profession. The most one can fairly say is that he does not see how it was done. If he believes it was not jugglery, he does so on faith in the medium, and not as the result of investigation. The natives of Hindostan will allow you quite as favorable conditions, and puzzle you even more effectually. For instance, they will place a wicker basket on a gravel walk in your own door-yard. You see into it and through it. A boy gets into it. He is enveloped in a coarse net, which is securely tied at the end. He lies down, and the cover is shut over him and fastened well on the outside. You see him lying there in the basket. They cover the basket with a blanket. They retire some distance, and play upon their viols and stringed instruments. This done, they return, and thrust swords through every portion of the basket. The cover is then lifted. No boy is seen. He has vanished, leaving only the net in which he had been tied. Where is he? Presently he comes dancing up the road. All this is done out of doors in broad daylight, and was witnessed recently by a party of Englishmen traveling with the Prince of Wales.

Now, suppose those jugglers had asserted that there was no trick in the case. The boy was a medium able to dematerialize his body and so escape his confinement, materializing it again somewhere down the road. Would it not be a case parallel with many reported here in America, which we are asked to accept as genuine manifestations of spirit power? I read, not long since, something very similar in a leading spiritualist journal.

Suppose, again, that the request had been made that no blanket should be thrown over the basket, the investigators desiring to see the boy as his form dissolved or passed into invisibility. Such a request, in all probability, would be refused there as here. The blanket must

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remain over the basket as the sole condition under which spirit influence could work, light being too positive, etc.

It is plain that the position of the investigators would be one of some embarrassment, at least. If they could not affirm that the boy had not escaped from the basket by a dematerializing process, neither could they abandon their uniform experience that caused them to believe such things impossible. What would convince? Not the Hindostan boy-medium's testimony. Mere lookers-on would be obliged to remain "sceptics" until ample daylight had been let in upon such mysterious doings, and even then conviction absolute would be reached only after accumulative experience had tested and established the phenomena as indisputable fact.

I may add to the above that personally I have not the slightest objection to any new discovery which anybody is able to make in the worlds visible or invisible. I have no pet "faith" or theory of any sort which I care for in the least as weighed against the truth as it is in the universe. I may almost say that I believe more in what I don't know than in what I do know, — so much, I am sure, remains behind yet to be revealed. But this also appears certain: the fruits of this universe, so far as they are to become our possessions, are all capable of rational interpretation.

Some twelve years ago there had grown up within several of the leading Unitarian parishes of this country a feeling of dissatisfaction with what was called the "denominational life." Eminent preachers who had the popular ear discoursed of the "deadness" and "inactivity" of the liberal churches, - of their lack of cooperative sympathy and unity. There was really no "denominational life," but only isolated societies holding occasional conferences, having a sort of a good time socially when they met; the injunction, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel," was but poorly heeded. The time seemed to these liberal preachers and many of the laity to be especially propitious for a grand liberal movement. The future was theirs, if they did but bestir themselves. The war just closed had had a strong liberalizing influence. On the battle-field and in the hospital men of all creeds and of no creed had met and fraternized; they had fought side by side, suffered together, and vast numbers had died. Converted and unconverted lay slain and piled together. Theology was at fault. Could it be that a just and impartial judge would separate these fallen heroes as goats and sheep to go to the left and to the right on the great "last

day,"—some to hell, and some to heaven? Human nature shrank from such a catastrophe. Indeed it was too horrible. If the unrepentant slain had not been "washed in the blood of the Lamb," they had gone down to their graves shedding their own blood,—blood quite as precious to loved ones as any blood else,—and freely, that their country might live. Well, would God damn such as these? Whatever theological champions might say in the pulpit, the response of comrades and of mourning friends at home gave no uncertain sound. In brief, more potent than all Universalist preaching since the days of Murray was this face-to-face encounter with God's justice on the battle-fields of the nation. It might almost be said that America ceased to believe in "eternal damnation" from that day. Throughout the country evangelical churches are just awakening to the fact that the dogma is obsolete.

· Hence it was that Unitarian leaders felt that, taking the country in the temper in which it issued from the war, liberal ideas had a great advantage. Their new and zealous endeavor to avail themselves of this providential ally may be stated as follows:—

The first word was organization. The liberal churches must come together, and for all purposes of missionary enterprise must become one body. The denomination, so only in name, must become so in fact. In the spring of 1866 a grand council was held in New York City, with delegates from all churches choosing to send them. The avowed purpose was a closer union for the work of liberalizing the country. It was urged that a vigorous denominational life would supplement and reinforce local parish life. These local churches - weak and struggling, many of them - would acquire new importance at home when the victories won by the denomination at large should be reflected back as a part of their common work. Then, there were those who were not without hope that some common statement of belief might be agreed upon, so that it would no longer be so difficult a thing to answer the pertinent question often asked, What do Unitarians believe? To tell inquiring souls to believe what they pleased, or what they could believe, was not, to say the least, the most successful method of proselyting. People accustomed to definiteness and authority in their old beliefs were not prepared to find these both lacking in a - they could hardly say new belief; for was it, after all, more than a speculation? To be sure, the local minister might be supposed to know what he believed; but he spoke with no authority, and his successor might, and probably would, on some vital points, teach wholly different doctrine. There needed to be discovered some common ground for the whole denomination to give liberal ideas authority and inspire respect for them.

Thus was developed a state of affairs within the liberal fold, if I may so speak, for which the leaders in the new movement were scarcely prepared. That there was a "right" and a "left wing" to the denomination was no secret; but that the "left" could show so strong a front, or had any such vitality as was afterwards displayed on due occasion, was not realized. It required but this attempt to organize and state the denominational faith to bring out the whole truth. Unitarianism was all adrift. "The Drift Period," as a keen observer had already pointed out in the columns of "The Examiner," had been going on quietly for a long time; and this "drift," singularly enough, had been away from rather than towards the very dogma it was proposed to set up for general acceptance, - namely, the "Lordship of Christ." That was the very pith and marrow of the radical protest. In the Convention, however, the radicals were largely outnumbered. The obnoxious resolution was voted. It may be said that it was carried with a rather high hand, or head, - a prominent speaker declaring amid great applause that he would rather turn back to Rome than go forward with a body that refused to confess the leadership of Christ. It was said that this was no creed adopted to be enforced; that it was only the expression of the majority, and those who disliked it need not feel at all bound by it; or, they might, as they perhaps could, interpret the Lordship of Christ in a way not at all to conflict with their own cherished views. But the cardinal point with all radicals had been the placing of loyalty to truth before any personal claim whatsoever. They could not call Jesus "Lord and Master" without doing violence to this their profoundest conviction. What they asked was simply a united effort of the churches to liberalize public sentiment and free the land from superstitious and old-time ignorance, leaving both conservative and radical unembarrassed by any seemingly authoritative outline of creed or faith on the part of the general convention. Failing in this, a number ceased from that time to hold further relations with the Unitarian body. Others determined on an effort at repealing the obnoxious clause in a convention to be held at Syracuse two years later. They tried what they could do, and failed. The prime movers in this effort at repeal then withdrew from the association, renouncing not only Unitarianism, but Christianity itself. A curious fact here to be noticed is that, in the opinion of the leader of this repeal-movement, Christianity was then and there put upon the stand to decide for ever whether or no it could be harmonized with liberty. The vote of that Convention settled the case adversely and for all time, thereby determining that all liberals must henceforth range themselves in opposition as anti-Christian. As though the antagonism of Christianity to liberty was not as much a fact two years before at New York as then at Syracuse! If it could be allowed two years of grace, why not forty? The fact is, the vote had no great significance for or against liberty, so far as regards the country at large; but it helped dispel the illusion that there was, or could be, a Unitarian body; and if no body, then how could there be wings? From that time there has been very little said about the "two wings," and the "body," for great missionary effort or otherwise, has given no sign. The old disturbing resolve has fallen into neglect. Perhaps there are a few among the clergy and more among the laity in country towns who would still defend it with old-time zest: but the majority seem now to have passed on to new positions, so that, if one were an entire stranger, it might be puzzling to tell whether he had got into the midst of a Unitarian or Free Religious testival. The same general air of respectability would be observed in either, and the utterances of the speakers would mostly harmonize, save where in the latter some zealous anti-Christian might be holding forth. The Unitarians have not become a great denomination, but they have become vastly more liberal in spirit, and have advanced, as I believe, to much more reasonable and truthful convictions. Their pulpits are in a great measure radicalized, and their only remaining organ, - if I may so speak of it, - "The Christian Register," is certainly not in the hands of one who belonged to what was formerly known as the "right wing." Organization has failed. Liberality not that kind once scoffed at as a "mush of concessions," but the liberality of free minds unwilling to be enslaved or to enslave - has grown.

The recent trial of E. H. Heywood on the charge of sending through the mails two publications alleged to be "obscene," brought by the United States Government Agent, Anthony Comstock, attracted much attention. The court-room was crowded by a remarkably intellectual and intensely interested audience. There seemed to be a general appreciation of the importance of the issue. The case furnished a test of American intelligence in discriminating between that sort of publications designed to corrupt and deprave by appealing to the passions of young people, and the free expression of opinion, however obnoxious, when addressed to the reason of mankind. Large numbers of Mr. Heywood's personal friends and sympathizers were present, but much the larger portion of the audience was made up of the general public, brought together not by mere curiosity, but in all seriousness of purpose. The verdict of the jury by no means echoed the opinion

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of these unprejudiced lookers-on. In the first place, it was manifest that almost every thing like fair play was, from the beginning of the trial to its close, set aside. The rulings of the Court swept from the defendant his whole line of defence. Nothing concerning his character, his manner of conducting his business of publication, or the character of his works as distinguished from ordinary publications conceded to be obscene, or as compared with standard works of a recognized moral character, was permitted. The Court allowed but the two simple questions: 1, Were the two books specified in the indictment sent through the mails by Mr. Heywood? 2, Were they obscene, - the Court charging the jury as to the interpretation of obscenity? The jury decided that "Sexual Physiology" was not an obscene book, but that "Cupid's Yokes" was, and on the latter count rendered a verdict of "guilty." The case was thus narrowed down to Mr. Heywood's own work, the tendency of which this jury, under charge of the Court, felt authorized to declare to be demoralizing, and therefore obscene.

In the brief space at my command I can but touch upon the remarkable features of this trial, and express the hope that it does not in any sense represent the final determination of American society to defend its liberties and render justice.

A true record of the facts in the case as they have thus far transpired would appear to run about as follows:—

1. Mr. Heywood publishes the pamphlet entitled "Cupid's Yokes," in which he sets forth his views on the true relation of the sexes. He has positive opinions; he makes bold to tell the world what they are.

2. Anthony Comstock reads this book, and pronounces it immoral in its tendency, and as coming within the kind of publications the law classifies as obscene. He arrests Mr. Heywood, and this is the issue made up by the District Attorney, and presented to the jury: the whole doctrine of the book from beginning to end is foul and degrading, proposing, as it does, the abolition of marriage, etc., etc. Various passages are read and commented on in a manner, to say the least, not calculated to impress the jury with a fair idea of its author's spirit or the meaning of his words. The point, however, is sufficiently made out that the intent of the book is to present the "free-love" doctrines as Mr. Heywood understands them. The whole force of the Attorney's argument is directed to showing that such doctrines have an immoral tendency, and for that reason he pronounces them obscene, etc. He gets the obscenity out of their tendency, rather than their tendency out of their obscenity. In other words, the whole objection to the book is that it advocates ideas which the District Attorney does not conceive to be moral and sound.

- 3. The Attorney is ably supported by the presiding judge, both in his rulings and in his charge to the jury. The undisguised partisanship of the Court is commented on by nearly all present. To specify one or two instances: What can be said in defence of the exclusion of all comparable publications which would tend to illustrate or interpret the real meaning of the law? What of the Court's telling the jury that "such doctrines" would turn the State of Massachusetts into one great house of prostitution? Such might indeed be the private opinion of the eminent judge, but that it had aught to do with the question of "obscenity" no unprejudiced mind can for a moment affirm. Then, by what authority did the Court instruct the jury in words to this effect: You have been told by the counsel for the defence that you are to consider the influence of this book over yourselves, whether it would tend to corrupt or demoralize you; but I charge you, you are to consider its effect on the happy homes of this Commonwealth: it was not designed for such as you, but for the young, etc.? Now, what source of knowledge had the Court to draw upon in making this assertion? There was not a particle of evidence introduced as to the class of persons the book had been sent to, but every thing that would throw light on that point was carefully excluded. The whole charge was gratuitous and baseless, unsupported by any fact proven in court. Other points equally irrelevant and improper helped to furnish and complete the most extraordinary charge twelve jurymen probably ever listened to.
- 4. The defence admits the anti-marriage doctrines of the book, but denies that they are in any sense "lewd, lascivious, or obscene," either in their spirit or presentation. They are calm statements addressed to the reason of the people, and made within the clear right of the defendant as a free citizen.

Whatever may be the present issue of this case, — a question of the constitutionality of the law is pending while I write, — I am clearly convinced that the final result will be all that it should be. A verdict against the free discussion of all topics important to public welfare cannot in this country be permanently enforced. It stands to reason that if a custom may be supported it may also be opposed. No one is bound to be right in the estimation of others before he utters his opinion. He may oppose prevailing opinion; he may urge the repeal of the laws; he may use the platform and the press in the dissemination of all his convictions, whatever they may be. He may even advocate "treason" in security from any legal penalty. We have got to take the risk in this country of all the errors the human mind is heir to. It is our one faith that error may be tolerated safely where reason is left

free to oppose it. Jesus made no greater contribution to his kind than this saying: "Even the *spirit* of truth shall lead you into all truth." Who is wise to sit in judgment and abolish error with a scourge? Let him that is without error rise and proclaim himself!

I am free to say that I do not accept, or at all believe in, the general doctrine set forth by Mr. Heywood in "Cupid's Yokes." But I am wholly persuaded of his perfect right to express his own convictions. I should say that his ideas, if generally accepted and put into the world's life, would prove by no means to the world's benefit. But I say also that he has a clear right to propose them to the world, and the world, if it chooses, has a clear right to adopt them. I do not fear. The world has much to learn. It will not be dictated to by judges or juries; it will grow into its own convictions of propriety and duty, of truth and right, and never be satisfied with hearsay or authoritative egotism.

But all in good season.

Mr. Heywood is testing the faith of Americans in their own principles of freedom more stoutly than they have ever been tested before. The subject is a new one comparatively, and one which awakens great prejudice and feeling. But there is but one way to meet him, as they finally will become convinced, and that is with their abundant reason and good sense. We, as a race, think we have won some important victories over ourselves for religious toleration and freedom. In a similar way may I not say we have victories to gain for moral toleration and freedom?

Meantime the cause will have its martyrs.

Mr. Heywood in Charlestown prison emphatically may be regarded as one of them.

There are those who think the doctrine of universal salvation has a demoralizing tendency. But the time has gone by when any one would propose the imprisonment of all Universalist preachers.

There are those who believe the doctrine of the atonement has a demoralizing tendency. But who thinks of forcibly exterminating Ortho-

doxy by the aid of a penal statute?

So there are those—most people, apparently—who believe antimarriage doctrines pernicious and demoralizing. Very many of them seem to be of opinion that the rule they apply to other cases should not hold good in this. They would cast free-love preachers into prison, and thus root out the "heresy" once and for all.

They have yet to learn their own lesson better.

Such a determination would not only be wrong in principle, but equally foolish and vain. Do they forget that persecution is the scattering of firebrands? Mr. Heywood has twenty readers to-day where vesterday he had one.

The aged postmaster summoned by the Government from Princeton testified that he had known Mr. Heywood from his boyhood, and that, so far as he knew or had ever heard, his private character was irreproachable.

It is best to let all such men have their say on whatever topic. They cannot be choked off, even from the proclamation of grossest error, with profit to society.

Emilio Castelar declared in the Spanish Cortes: "If the Roman Catholic creed be true, it will prevail by force of truth; if Protestantism be true, it will prevail, and you cannot crush it. If liberty of conscience be of God, you cannot crush, if of man, you need not crush it."

How excellent is this doctrine, and how wide its application!

· Most opportunely the following lines, written by John Hay and published some years since, come to my hand. Heartily I commend them to my readers:—

## LIBERTY.

What man is there so bold that he should say,
"Thus and thus only would I have the sea"?
For whether lying calm and beautiful,
Clasping the earth in love, and throwing back
The smile of heaven from waves of amethyst;
Or whether, freshened by the busy winds,
It bears the trade and navies of the world
To ends of use or stern activity;
Or whether, lashed by tempests, it gives way
To elemental fury, howls and roars
At all its rocky barriers, in wild lust
Of ruin drinks the blood of living things,
And strews its wrecks o'er leagues of desolate shore;
— Always it is the sea, and all bow down
Before its vast and varied majesty.

And so in vain will timorous men essay
To set the metes and bounds of Liberty.
For Freedom is its own eternal law.
It makes its own conditions, and in storm
Or calm alike fulfills the unerring Will.
Let us not then despise it when it lies
Still as a sleeping lion, while a swarm
Of gnat-like evils hover round its head;

Nor doubt it when in mad, disjointed times
It shakes the torch of terror, and its cry
Shrills o'er the quaking earth, and in the flame
Of riot and war we see its awful form
Rise by the scaffold, where the crimson ax
Rings down its grooves the knell of shuddering kings.
For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light wher by the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee.

SIDNEY H. MORSE.

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